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ABSTRACT 
 
Feeling Bureaucratic: 
Political Poetry, Affective Rhetoric, and Parliamentary Process in Late Medieval England 
 
by 
 
Jonathan James Forbes 
 
 This dissertation explores the formation of the English parliament in the fourteenth 
century and tracks its conceptual development via an archive of texts produced within a 
culture of Westminster-based, Oxford-influenced government bureaucrats. These bureaucrats 
worked alongside the parliament, and through their writings, intervened in the very political 
processes that they helped to administrate. “Parliamentary” texts include not only allegorical 
portrayals but also debate poems, dream visions, bureaucratic “how-to” manuals, and 
archival documents, which often conceptualize the institution as engaging in practices of 
collective care by valuing ongoing political process. Such a conceptualization was valuable 
within a historical context of widespread cultural trauma in the fourteenth century and 
offered the institutionalization of collective care practices in parliament as a response to 
trauma. By way of psychoanalysis, assemblage theory, and trauma theory, this study offers a 
new historiography of parliament, one that turns away from longue durée arguments about 
barons restraining royal power to a more synchronic approach targeting the discursive and 
affective origins of parliamentary practice and thinking in fourteenth-century England. 
  
xiv 
 The introduction presents the formation of the parliament in fourteenth-century 
England alongside the century’s well-known cultural traumas—plague, warfare, and a young 
king—to offer a new cultural historiography of parliament. Chapter 1 places examples of 
medieval assembly in the Modus tenendi parliamentum, the headlinks to the Canterbury 
Tales, and the episode of Lady Meed in Piers Plowman alongside contemporary assemblage 
theory to suggest that medieval conceptualizations of the body politic became more flexible 
in response to parliamentary process. Chapter 2 considers the value of ongoing, unresolved 
political process in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls to argue that process-oriented 
politics builds attachments that sustain politics and inspire a vision of common profit that is 
both intimate and integral to the practice of collective care. Chapter 3 turns to the petitionary 
language in the Prologue to William Langland’s Piers Plowman to argue that parliamentary 
petitions offered affectively-charged rhetorical scripts for communicating and preserving 
one’s lived experience in an institutional arena that often addressed trauma. The conclusion 
finishes with a brief analysis of political process, activism, and group care in Trump’s 
America, insisting that process-oriented politics provides reparation even in the twenty-first 
century, where fascination with political outcomes shades the very human processes and 
affects at the core of our political practices. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION: PARLIAMENTARY TALKING CURES 
Parliament and Parlement 
In the midst of a raucous parliamentary debate over the marriage of a noble female 
eagle to one of three potential suitors, Geoffrey Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls1 asks how we 
engage in conflict: through violence or speech? When the threat of violence erupts in the 
poem’s parliament, a “terslet,” or male eagle,2 offers an alternative way to hold that space in 
conflict, namely, through the voice, or speech.  
[“]I can not se that argumentes avayle: 
Thenne semeth it there moste be batayle.” 
“Al redy!” quod these egles tercels tho. 
“Nay, sires,” quod he, “if that I durste it seye, 
Ye don me wrong, my tale is not ido! 
For, sires—ne taketh not agref I prey— 
It may not gon as ye wolde in this weye; 
Oure is the voyse that han the charge in honde, 
And to the juges dom ye moten stonde.[”]3 
Surely, the conflict does not dissipate; in fact, speech elongates the conflict by initiating a 
political process concerned with judgment. However, noteworthy about this scene is that it 
provides an example of a motif in late fourteenth-century English literature—namely, poems 
                                                 
1 For all citations from Geoffrey Chaucer, see The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson, 
3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). 
2 Middle English Dictionary (MED), University of Michigan, s.v. “tercelet (n.),” accessed 
August 17, 2018, https://quod.lib.umich.edu. 
3 Chaucer, The Parliament of Fowls, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd ed., 
383-94 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), lines 533-46. 
  
2 
written either entirely or in part about the newly forming institution of the English 
parliament. In these portrayals, the political processes in which their parliamentarians engage 
take center stage, and political speech holds these processes together in the midst of conflict. 
In addition to Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls, poetic representations of parliament occur in 
the Trojan Parliament in Book IV of his Troilus and Criseyde,4 William Langland’s Prologue 
and Passus IV in the B-text of Piers Plowman,5 and, nearly one hundred years later, in a 
parliament of planetary gods in fifteenth-century Scottish poet Robert Henryson’s Testament 
of Cresseid.6 However, what I pursue in this dissertation is not a study of literary 
representations, but instead, what these representations are symptomatic of. That is to say, 
while literary representations of parliament are clearly tied to the institution’s budding 
influence in late medieval England, particularly in the fourteenth century, I argue that the 
above-mentioned allegorical representations are only one part of a much larger preoccupation 
in late medieval literature with conceptualizing the process of engaging in political speech, 
and that such speech can serve as an institutionalized care practice aimed at confronting 
cultural traumas. 
The word “parliament” in medieval poetry refers to more than the political institution. 
Long before parliament’s institutionalization in the fourteenth century, readers encounter 
scenes of “parlement,” or, gathering and counsel between king and barons, in poetry.7 An 
                                                 
4 Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd ed., 
471-585 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). 
5 William Langland, Piers Plowman: A Parallel-Text Edition of the A, B, C and Z Versions, 
ed. A.V.C. Schmidt, 2nd ed. (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2011). 
6 Robert Henryson, The Testament of Cresseid, in The Poems of Robert Henryson, ed. Robert 
L. Kindrick (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997). 
7 MED, s.v. “parlement (n.),” 2.b., accessed August 19, 2018. 
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example is the thirteenth-century Middle English romance Havelok the Dane.8 Unlike 
Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls, Havelok is certainly not a poem about parliament, but it does 
contain two scenes of parlement that momentarily pause the action of the plot, and the 
discussions that occur provide conclusions that are crucial to the poem’s overall resolution. 
Here, political discourse is a means to poetical resolution. In fact, the Oxford English 
Dictionary identifies the reference to the political institution as among the latest definitions 
of the word “parliament,” the earliest referring not only to a formal council summoned by a 
monarch (e.g., the curia regis in Havelok), but also simply to “speech.”9 While recognizing 
the distinctions among the uses and definitions of parliament/parlement is necessary in order 
to avoid ironing out historical and contextual meaning, recognizing the links among them is 
also essential for understanding that the institution of parliament is located within a network 
of cultural formulations of political speech more generally. “Parliamentary” texts are not 
only limited to poems that allegorize the halls of parliament, but also include debate poems, 
dream visions, bureaucratic “how-to” manuals, and archival documents, all of which engage 
with the formalization of political speech—whether those forms are aesthetic or procedural. 
Critical Contexts 
 By and large, new historicists and historians alike have dominated recent studies on 
parliament and the texts that they produce. Such a focus has shaped the possible discussions 
on the history of parliament and studies in parliament and literature to focus on its historical 
significance both in institutional history and in relations between the king and his barons, and 
                                                 
8 Havelock the Dane, in Four Romances of England: King Horn, Havelock the Dane, Bevis 
of Hampton, Athelston, eds. Ronald B. Herzman, Graham Drake, and Eve Salisbury, 72-185 
(Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1999). 
9 Oxford English Dictionary (OED), Oxford UP, s.v. “parliament (n.1),” accessed January 
25, 2013, www.oed.com. 
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eventually, the Commons. As a result, other critical methodologies such as those that I 
pursue in this dissertation—namely, psychoanalysis and assemblage theory—have not 
intervened significantly in this institutional history, and as a result, parliamentary literature 
has been under-theorized relative to the corpus of late medieval work. However, visible in 
this historicism is a democratizing force that explores public entry into the parliamentary 
space, with a particular focus on the parliamentary documents that enabled this entry. 
Namely, four monograph-length studies have emerged in the last decade or so that have 
shaped the direction of the study of parliament and literature and its debt to literature and 
law. In what follows, I will review these studies to show the debt that my own dissertation 
pays to the history of this field, but also to encourage new critical methodologies to foray 
into the arena of literature and law and institutional history. 
Matthew Giancarlo’s Parliament and Literature in Late Medieval England10 is the 
only full-length monograph in medieval literary studies devoted to the topic of parliament 
and poetry. Giancarlo focuses his analysis primarily on three fourteenth-century London 
poets—Geoffrey Chaucer, John Gower, and William Langland—and their connections to 
parliamentary politics. His analysis dissects the relationship between their life experiences in 
parliament and their writing, namely, Chaucer’s analysis of petitioning and political 
mediation in Parliament of Fowls, Gower’s reflections on property in Mirour de l’Omme and 
Cronica Tripertita, and Langland’s conceptualization of the common voice in Piers 
Plowman. Giancarlo’s work has helped to establish how intimately connected the poetic and 
parliamentary worlds of late medieval London are. However, in tracing the connections 
                                                 
10 Matthew Giancarlo, Parliament and Literature in Late Medieval England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2007). 
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between the literary and parliamentary arenas, Giancarlo asserts that England’s parliamentary 
motifs become models for late fourteenth-century literary expression, models that eventually 
die off with the “English Renaissance.” The reason that this modeling eventually weakens, he 
argues, is that “literary art began to be categorized, culturally, much more discretely, as a 
realm with its own recognizable shapes and genres. No need, then, to borrow from something 
like a parliament or forms such as documentary petitions.”11 In other words, parliament as a 
set of motifs provides literature with a mechanism for writing the public, and as culture 
shifts, these motifs are replaced as literature supposedly develops more sophisticated and 
“homegrown” models of expression (i.e., the Italian, Latinate, and Humanist traditions, that 
is, hardly homegrown) in the early modern period. For Giancarlo, parliament’s influence on 
literature is unidirectional. 
My project also makes use of new historicist work in literature and law. Literary 
critics such as Steven Justice12 and Emily Steiner13 consider political documents such as 
common petitions, chronicle archives, bureaucratic documents, and political pamphlets as 
literary texts. In so doing, they reveal a dialogue between the literary and legal realms, and, 
even more so, insist that traditionally “non-literary” texts are ripe for literary analysis and 
intervention precisely because the production of late medieval English literature and law are 
so closely tied. Giancarlo’s work contributes to this discussion, and his literary analysis is 
shaped by the narratives that appear in the archives of parliament, which he argues 
correspond thematically to his chosen “literary” texts, in order to show how the very 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 256. 
12 Steven Justice, Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994). 
13 Emily Steiner, Documentary Culture and the Making of Medieval English Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003). 
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language and imagery used in poetry is lifted from parliamentary discourse. However, while 
literature and law, or “documentary culture,” has long been analyzed through the frame of 
new historicism, and while piecemeal attention has been paid to parliament’s interactions 
with literary production, what is needed is a theoretical framework for understanding the 
literary manifestations of parliament’s larger cultural significance, and a theoretical 
evaluation of late medieval political speech. Such a theoretical intervention expands the 
parameters of studies of literature and the law and institutional history to understand the 
human and behavioral processes at work in the making and unmaking of the law and politics. 
While new historicist studies do well to demonstrate the overall development of the 
parliamentary institution, my study values the affective realities that attend historical and 
political change. 
Within the field of history, studies on parliament tend to focus on the textual 
apparatus that it produced, namely, pamphlets, petitions, and the parliament rolls. Gwilym 
Dodd’s Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English Parliament in the Late 
Middle Ages14 offers a comprehensive analysis of the apparatus of private and common 
petitioning that, he argues, undergirded the political life surrounding the parliament and made 
parliament such an indispensable institution for both king and Commons alike. Dodd’s 
explanation of the process of submitting a petition to parliament to remedy a grievance 
reveals two key stakes. First, the growth of petitionary intake in the parliament helped to 
expand the king’s power in offering remedial justice throughout the realm.15 Secondly, and 
related to the first phenomenon, is that subjects and citizens had greater access to the king’s 
                                                 
14 Gwilym Dodd, Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English Parliament in the 
Late Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007). 
15 Ibid., 33. 
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remediation through the massive bureaucracy that was charged with routing these textual 
interactions to the appropriate place for justice or grace.16 Thus, a political culture formed 
around the parliament, and one of its platforms for expression was the written petition. 
Dodd ultimately concludes that a “broader political culture […] helped create a 
standardized body of language which the drafters of the petitions could readily (and perhaps 
unthinkingly) draw upon,”17 and thus, unlike Giancarlo, he opens the opportunity for local 
cultures to impact parliamentary discourse through the enumeration of local, particular 
grievances. Dodd’s work is valuable because it reveals that the rhetorical tradition, inflected 
with local culture, enabled access to the institution of parliament, demonstrating how central 
it was to political life throughout England. I push this analysis forward to consider how 
widespread access to remedial justice through documentary culture not only made parliament 
central to England’s political life, but also positioned petitionary process as a care practice. 
My study of petitions in Chapter 3 reveals a connection between affectively laden rhetoric 
and the practices of care that made parliament such an invaluable, potentiating institution. 
A skeptical reading of the rhetorical significance of petitioning, due to its oftentimes 
pathos-driven language, might suggest that these documents are such biased constructions of 
events that they should be treated carefully and without too much historical authority. 
However, two years after Dodd’s authoritative study on the petition came an edited collection 
on medieval petitioning, entitled Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance, a collaborative 
work shepherded by W. Mark Ormrod, Gwilym Dodd, and Anthony Musson that explores 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 60. 
17 Ibid., 283. 
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petitioning’s central role in establishing political relations throughout the Middle Ages.18 In 
Ormrod’s introduction, he dissects the relationship between reality and rhetoric and the self-
fashioning that petitions enabled, concluding that “[u]nderstanding that petitions were not 
merely the outpouring of real-life, hard-luck stories but artful constructs designed to get 
something done provides a first step to distinguishing between the fictional and the factual 
and thus to using them as a meaningful source for the appreciation of social, cultural, legal 
and political norms in later medieval England.”19 Ormrod’s assertion that the petitionary 
genre blends fact and fiction underscores that more than just a statement of facts is necessary 
to ensure access to juridical remediation; further, that “something else” that makes 
petitionary discourse effective is attributed to rhetorical formulae. 
I suggest that these formulae—that “something else” that offers petitions their blend 
of objectivity and subjective experience—offer scripts charged with communicating the 
affective experience that inflects these experiences of reality. As Brian Massumi points out in 
Parables for the Virtual, there is always that “something else” in communication that makes 
it more than just a series of words; affect makes words more shareable by expressing and 
impressing an embodied reality.20 Bias in history, so it seems, nonetheless communicates 
other types of information; rather than opposing fiction to fact, I understand fiction to 
communicate its own type of reality, one infused with affectively charged lived experiences. 
Petitions as mechanisms of affect, fiction, subjective reality, lived experience go beyond the 
                                                 
18 W. Mark Ormrod, Gwilym Dodd, and Anthony Musson, eds., Medieval Petitions: Grace 
and Grievance (York: Boydell & Brewer, 2009). 
19 Ormrod, “Introduction: Medieval Petitions in Context,” Medieval Petitions, 1-11; 11. 
20 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke UP, 
2002). 
  
9 
facts and open the institution of parliament up to emotional business, enhancing its role in the 
practice of care. 
However, the public’s access to parliament was not limited to petitions; in fact, 
broadsides recounting parliamentary business began when the Good Parliament of 1376 
captured the public’s political imagination. Clementine Oliver in her Parliament and 
Political Pamphleteering in Fourteenth-Century England21 explains that texts referred to as 
“processes” circulated throughout London as broadsides during and in the wake of a 
parliament, and that the public was in fact invested in and curious about the happenings of 
the parliament. Oliver’s work is invaluable because it demonstrates that the public had much 
more access to and interest in parliamentary news than was previously thought, and that the 
history of parliament is not only between kings and barons but includes the public’s access 
and response to parliamentary business.22 Oliver’s analysis provides evidence that this 
“something else” in parliamentary discourse—the affective layer of political 
communication—captured public attention, and that the documents produced by the 
parliament and in response to parliamentary business were influenced by culture and literary 
tropes. 
These four studies lay the parameters for recent histories of parliament. They also 
provide opportunities for new critical approaches to expand our historical understanding of 
the institution’s role in social and political life. Complicating Giancarlo’s claim that literature 
borrows from parliamentary motifs, this discussion demonstrates that culture and parliament 
(by “culture,” I mean the textual tradition emerging from the parliamentary archive) were 
                                                 
21 Clementine Oliver, Parliament and Political Pamphleteering in Fourteenth-Century 
England (York: York Medieval Press, 2010). 
22 Ibid., 33. 
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mutually constructive, not despite the bias and fictional nature of parliamentary portrayals 
across the archive, but because such rhetorical flourishes highlight the lived experience of 
interacting with the institution. 
Indeed, parliament quite literally formed out of another political institution, the curia 
regis (or, the royal counsel). But the widespread appearance of the institution and its motifs 
across historical documents and literary texts suggests that parliament also served as a 
response to culture—namely, to the cultural crises of the late Middle Ages. Returning to the 
abovementioned scene from Chaucer’s Parliament, when the debate fails among the royal 
eagles on the floor of parliament, the bird-speaker fears that “there moste be batayle.”23 
However, political speech quickly replaces the threat of violence as one of the common birds 
proclaims, “Oure is the voyse that han the charge in honde,”24 and speech rather than sword 
ensures the continuance of debate. Chaucer’s poem offers an example of how thin the line is 
between political speech and violence in the texts selected. The theoretical perspective that I 
offer in Feeling Bureaucratic: Political Poetry, Affective Rhetoric, and Parliamentary 
Process in Late Medieval England puts trauma studies and assemblage theory into contact 
with legal studies in order to suggest that psychoanalysis—the “talking cure”—can help to 
deepen our understanding of an institution that so heavily relies on speech and that comes to 
its full form in the midst of the traumatic political and cultural crises of the late Middle Ages 
in England. 
Parliament, then, not only affects literary expression by offering a model for talking 
through trauma and confronting social antagonism—and in some instances, participating in 
                                                 
23 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, line 539. 
24 Ibid., line 545. 
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both—but is also affected by underlying cultural anxieties that call for and make possible the 
formation and foundation of such an institution in the midst of crisis. Parliament and its 
archives, more than offering a buffet of literary imagery, are in fact symptomatic of a need in 
late medieval culture for the formalization of political speech in the face of such social and 
political disruptions as plague, warfare, class destabilization, and a vulnerable monarchy. In 
my reading, archival accounts of individual petitions before parliament do not only provide a 
historical grounding for understanding allegorical petitioners such as those in Langland’s 
Parliament of Rats and Mice. While in conversation with new historicist readings of legal 
and documentary culture, I read these histories differently, insofar as archival and poetic 
portrayals are all representations of political process, one no more privileged or authoritative 
than another, and all testify to the active conceptual development of an institution that 
reflects the needs and anxieties of the culture that produced it. 
In Feeling Bureaucratic, I seek to identify parliament not only as a budding 
institution but also as a cultural-political phenomenon that left its traces across time and texts 
in response to cultural trauma and social antagonism. In broadening the theoretical scope of 
this discussion on parliament and literature, the literary and textual culture of parliament 
presents as a phenomenon that extends beyond its immediate context in London to become a 
means of conceptualizing how the multiple processes for engaging in political rhetoric are 
processes that are in and of themselves both productive and therapeutic. That is, these texts 
all build the institution from the archive up, as a means of theorizing and conceptualizing the 
healing potentiality of political speech. 
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Historical Contexts 
Parliament’s relationship to trauma and antagonism are undergirded by the historical 
circumstances in which the institution emerges in fourteenth-century England. To read this 
history accordingly, one of my guiding questions about this period is: why did such a 
politically, economically, and socially fraught historical moment create the beginnings of 
what is today Britain’s democratic system? 
Before answering this question, it must be acknowledged that the history of 
parliament that I offer in this dissertation is not the typical history of parliament. 
Authoritative studies on the history of the institution, such as Roland Butt’s A History of 
Parliament: The Middle Ages, tells a story of counsel, struggle, and compromise between the 
king and his barons. In these histories, parliament is one step in the evolution of feudal 
political order in England, and the relationship between the Members of Parliament—
barons—and the king who summons it results from the institutionalization of feudal political 
culture. Butt writes that “Norman feudal order itself was to become the source of the first 
challenge to the power of the post-Conquest crown and its claims were to lead to the writing 
of the statement of liberties in Magna Carta of which Parliament came to be the guardian.”25 
From the Anglo-Saxon Witan to the curia regis to Magna Carta to Parliament, the history of 
parliament and its ancestry is written along the lines of feudal order. Offered below is an 
alternate history of parliament that contextualizes the rise of the institution and its outpouring 
of texts within the crises of the fourteenth century. Certainly parliament evolves out of a 
feudal structure, but the widespread cultural traumas of late medieval England also contribute 
to its history. 
                                                 
25 Roland Butt, A History of Parliament: The Middle Ages (London: Constable, 1989), 21. 
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As is well known, England in the fourteenth century witnessed two major waves of 
plague that conservative estimates say reduced its population by at least half;26 a continual 
war with France in The Hundred Years’ War that strained England economically through 
heavy taxation, socially through loss of life, and culturally through loss of land; and the 
instability of the monarchy after Richard II’s ascension to the throne at the age of ten, which 
eventually incited both rebellion and government corruption.27 Although the onslaught of 
plague quickly and traumatically reduced England’s population, it altered the socio-political 
topography such that a middle class gained increasing visibility in both literary and political 
expression. As the story goes, with a steady demand for labor but a decrease in the labor 
market, working wages increased and created a class of wealthy, non-aristocratic merchants, 
guildsmen, and local legal authorities that wielded financial, cultural, and political power. 
While it is generally regarded that the fourteenth century witnessed an eventual “rise” of a 
middle class and its increasing cultural influence, I consider the plague as a traumatic 
break—an overwhelming of the feudal political organism—which instigated a cultural 
response. While certainly the increased power of the middle class is reflected in its increased 
political representation in government, more important for this dissertation is that the 
formation of cultural institutions and their corresponding political processes are themselves 
responses to widespread cultural trauma. This institutional response took the form of not only 
the literal body of parliament, but also (as I argue above) the surrounding literary and textual 
production that conceptualized political speech. 
                                                 
26 May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century: 1307-1399 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1959), 332. 
27 For a contemporary critique of Richard II’s reign and its consequences, see the poem 
Richard the Redeless, in Richard the Redeless and Mum and the Soothsegger, ed. James M. 
Dean (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000).  
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Certainly, the literary texts that treat parliament and political speech do criticize the 
institution for occasionally provoking social antagonism and do call into question its 
productivity. However, they also underscore that the very process of engaging in political 
rhetoric, and its guaranteed presence in a political body whose institutionalization ensured its 
regularization, is nonetheless a valuable and productive addition to England’s political 
dynamics. Not only is antagonism harnessed to fuel a process of deliberation rather than 
destruction, but perhaps also antagonism and deliberation necessarily go hand-in-hand. 
One question remains, however: from where did these ideas about new forms of 
governance emerge, and who authored these texts? First and foremost, the burgeoning 
institution of parliament created an expanding bureaucracy, and this clerical class is largely 
responsible for the textual productions of the parliament. These texts include not only the 
petitions, broadsides, and parliament rolls mentioned above, but also include the poetry 
conceptualizing and imagining the institution. The two main authors that I focus on in 
Feeling Bureaucratic, Geoffrey Chaucer and William Langland, were both tapped into 
parliamentary bureaucratic circles. Chaucer himself had a distinguished career as a clerical 
bureaucrat that put him in close contact with the business of parliament, in addition to being 
a Member of Parliament himself.28 While we know little about Langland’s life, we do know, 
as Kathryn Kerby-Fulton and Steven Justice discuss, that Langland’s readership was heavily 
clerical.29 All this is to say that the same bureaucrats who wrote the more procedural texts 
that emerged from the parliament were the selfsame poets who dreamed of the institution’s 
                                                 
28 Derek Pearsall, The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), 96, 202. 
29 Kathryn Kerby-Fulton and Steven Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture in the English 
and Irish Civil Service: The Modus Tenendi Parliamentum and Its Literary Relations,” 
Traditio 53 (1998): 149-202; 181. 
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possibilities. In this dissertation, I consider all texts emerging from the parliamentary arena 
as equal conceptualizations of the institution, built from the archive up. 
This still does not answer how these parliamentary bureaucrats generated their 
conceptualizations of parliament, and what ideological tendencies inform their procedural 
and imagined portrayals of the institution. Kerby-Fulton argues that there emerged in London 
and Westminster what she calls the “clerical proletariat,” namely, over-educated, under-
employed clerks who graduated from Oxford but who could not find an ecclesiastical 
position.30 Many of these clerical proletarians found employment in the bureaucracies of 
London and Westminster, where their skills in rhetoric proved useful in the recording of 
petitions. Furthermore, Martin Carmargo shows that other opportunities for education 
developed in Oxford as well.31 That is, those not wishing to complete a bachelor’s program 
could take more vocationally-oriented clerical courses that would prepare students for careers 
in bureaucracy, letter writing, and other literate skills. Thus a highly educated and highly 
literate class of students emerged from Oxford, found employment in Westminster 
government, and employed the skills learned at Oxford in their parliamentary bureaucratic 
work. 
Moreover, Oxford was a hotbed of progressive politics and religious dissent in the 
fourteenth century, and it is possible that such reformist sentiments percolated from Oxford 
classrooms onto the clerical offices of London and Westminster. As part of the Bachelor of 
Arts curriculum, students were trained in the art of rhetoric and the practice of debate and 
                                                 
30 Kerby-Fulton, “The Clerical Proletariat: The Underemployed Scribe and Vocational 
Crisis,” Journal of the Early Book Society for the Study of Manuscripts and Printing History 
17 (2014): 1-34; Ann W. Astell, Introduction to Chaucer and the Universe of Learning 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996), 1-32. 
31 Martin Camargo, Ars Dictaminis, Ars Dictandi (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), 37, 57. 
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often attended debate performances as part of their graduation requirements.32 This facilitated 
what I am terming the Oxford-London intellectual exchange, wherein a progressive and 
reformist education from Oxford, and the rhetorical skills to implement it, influenced the 
burgeoning parliamentary bureaucracy in London. More than only a bureaucratic culture 
emerged in London; an intellectual culture also formed within its ranks as well, one that was 
involved in the intellectual conceptualization of the institution through the texts they read and 
wrote, both in Oxford and in London reading circles.  
 All this is to say that the history of parliament extends beyond feuds between kings 
and barons to include the immediate historical context that witnessed the institution’s growth 
during the latter half of the fourteenth century. A series of cultural crises met with an 
increasing intellectualism among government workers, and a sustained curiosity from the 
public about the newly forming institution. A progressive political intellectual movement 
formed that was interested in conceptualizing the changing form of government in England 
and the idea of the body politic. This was primarily an intellectual movement—a sharing of 
ideas and writings across various genres—but one that had direct tangible consequences on 
the institutions that it conceptually helped to erect. As an intellectual cultural movement, it 
held cultural sway and, in this way, had a much more profound effect on England than being 
limited to these poets’ and writers’ readership.33 Because these ideas had such sway in actual 
governance and political representation, in addition to individual petitioning, they affected 
those involved. And the primary institution that they affected was the budding parliament. 
                                                 
32 Thomas L. Reed, Jr., Middle English Debate Poetry and the Aesthetics of Irresolution 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 43-65. 
33 Astell, Chaucer and the Universe of Learning, 32-60. 
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 In essence, the intellectual exchange between Oxford and London and into 
Westminster was one of the main cultural influences on this newest governing body. As such, 
the library of this intellectual clerical-political culture was likewise part of the parliamentary 
archive, expanding the parameters of the parliamentary territory to writings on governance. 
They thought about governance through the rhetorical processes of debate and petition, 
through an institution that centered itself on deliberative group process. And they did so at a 
time when England had experienced a history of traumas in the fourteenth century. 
Parliament emerges from this political desire for more healing coming out of the political 
process: desires to control the amount of influence on the king in the Good Parliament of 
1376, and desires to bring grievances before the parliament to seek redress throughout the 
fourteenth century. Many of the problems—or even traumas—that needed petitions may have 
been caused by the socio-economic cultural shifts in the fallout of massive plague and 
warfare, the breaking of the feudal political organism. 
On Form: Late Medieval Genres of Political Speech 
 In considering the formalization of political speech, I also attend to the generic forms 
in which the selected texts conceptualize the political process. While romances of course 
continued into the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries in England,34 other literary 
genres grew in popularity, namely, the dream vision (e.g., Piers Plowman, Parliament of 
Fowls) and debate poetry (e.g., Richard the Redless, and, as I argue in Chapter 1, The 
Canterbury Tales’ narrative frame). While some debate poems generate a parliament or an 
                                                 
34 For an extended discussion of the history of romance in England, see Barbara Fuchs, 
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advisory council (e.g., The Parliament of the Thre Ages and Wynnere and Wastoure),35 
others offer a critique of contemporary social and political issues through estates satire (e.g., 
Mum and the Sothsegger).36 Whether depicting a formal parliament or not, these poems 
stress that the performance of debate and deliberative rhetoric expose social ills by giving a 
voice to all those under examination. However, many of these poems are either inconclusive, 
unfinished, or serve to air grievances rather than offer solutions. With less emphasis placed 
on outcomes and more on process, these poems at once critique and reflect the difficulty of 
reconciling the various concerns of the body politic while also acknowledging that this very 
process is what enables dialogue in the first place. Although parliament met with harsh 
criticism for its limited results, the literary exercises in deliberative rhetoric are part of the 
conceptual development of parliament by re-thinking and performing what qualifies as 
productive speech. Namely, debate poetry offers a model for a late medieval “talking cure” 
by defending political process as productive in its ability to collectively expose the 
underlying causes of social grief. 
 Parliament’s connection to psychological processes is even clearer with regards to the 
dream vision genre. In fact, not only do many poetic representations of parliament occur in a 
dream vision (e.g., Parliament of Fowls, Testament of Cresseid, and Piers Plowman), but 
many of the debate poems discussed above also contain them, such as Mum and the 
Sothsegger, which includes both a dream vision and a debate on medieval dream theory. 
What is needed in the literary scholarship of parliament is an explanation for why 
                                                 
35 See Wynner and Wastoure and The Parlement of the Thre Ages, ed. Warren Ginsberg 
(Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1992). 
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parliaments often occur in the dream vision genre; the frequency cannot be coincidental. By 
conflating the dream vision and debate poetry genres, both parliament and political speech 
are represented in poetry as psychological processes or states of mind. In some cases, 
parliament in literature is dreamed into existence. At stake in the congruence between the 
genres of debate poetry and dream visions is an invitation to theorize parliament’s 
associations with psychological process and mental states in the late medieval imagination. 
That the dream vision takes contemporary crises as its subject calls attention to parliament’s 
own engagement with cultural trauma in its literary history. That is, parliamentary crises are 
likewise imagined as mental and psychological crises, and a process of intersubjective 
deliberation is the cultural response imagined to be most fitting. 
Transmission of Cultural Trauma 
What is “curative” about the talking cure for psychoanalysts Françoise Davoine and 
Jean-Max Gaudillière is its ability to form a “social link” between the victim and an other 
who is not just willing to listen to the testimony, but willing to connect and incorporate it into 
his or her own traumas.37 In order to reconnect to a larger social framework, victims of 
trauma need an “other” who is not the “totalitarian other” who forbids speech, but the 
“trustworthy other” who is willing to feel what others feel and accept projective 
identifications. On the other hand, within the field of history, Dominick LaCapra insists on 
the ethical problems of writing a traumatic history, acknowledging that historians and 
witnesses must record their empathy and admit to subjective experience, but he warns against 
becoming victims by proxy. He seems to suggest that while trauma is certainly shareable and 
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even foundational to group identity among its survivors, historians must acknowledge the 
limits of trauma’s transferability from survivor to witness, and, to a larger extent, 
transgenerationally across an entire culture.38 However, Davoine and Gaudillière challenge 
LaCapra’s ethics of benevolent neutrality and instead argue that not only can traumatic 
experience affect the transference and countertransference between analyst and analysand, 
but that history itself is the transmission of transgenerational trauma. For them, analytic 
process is only effective “if the symptom finds someone to speak to,”39 and therefore, it is 
ethical to recognize that the social link marks the impossibility of being objective and 
unaffected, and instead highlights that the transmission and the treatment of cultural trauma 
is intersubjective exchange. 
If trauma can be transmitted culturally and transgenerationally, then one way in 
which this occurs is through the formation of cultural institutions such as parliament, whose 
deliberative rhetoric forms a social link similar to the analytic discourse of psychoanalysis. 
The dream vision genre offers an example of the late medieval equivalent of the social link in 
Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls. When the narrator awakes after his dream parliament offers 
no solution but instead delays its topic of discussion, he feels compelled to read: “I wok, and 
othere bokes tok me to, / To rede upon, and yit I rede alwey.” 40 Chaucer’s is one example 
that shows that the dream vision genre links the detached deliberation of the dream space to a 
surrounding cultural network. The crisis of an otherwise isolated mental space is integrated 
into an assemblage of texts, and intertextuality becomes a form of intersubjectivity. In 
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connection with Davoine and Gaudillière’s definition of trauma, in requiring a willing other 
with whom to speak, treatment is also transmission; yet, this transmission is nonetheless 
integrated into a cultural archive, and accordingly, is an intersubjective experience that 
creates a social link between trauma and history. There is an ethical imperative to recognize 
the traumatic foundations of cultural institutions; otherwise, the ways in which a society 
responds to a given widespread trauma may go unacknowledged, or even worse, erased and 
repeated. But more than this, it is necessary to understand how we respond to suffering and 
how it shapes our world.41 Moreover, the late medieval conflation in its literary genres of 
parliament, mental spaces, and intersubjective and intertextual deliberation is such an 
instance of the institutional treatment and transmission of cultural trauma—or, a 
parliamentary talking cure. 
 The larger theoretical stakes of this dissertation concern the place of political 
institutions in times of shared, widespread cultural trauma. An argument that has shaped 
thinking about post-plague England in the fourteenth century is that, because there was not a 
lot of literary production specifically concerning the plague, England must not have been as 
traumatized as countries on the continent.42 For example, the Decameron in Boccaccio’s Italy 
is explicitly a plague-narrative, and storytelling is understood as a way to not only pass the 
time, but to comfort and to strengthen group attachment in times of crisis. Despite the 
evidence that Boccaccio’s Decameron strongly influenced Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales—and 
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the plague narrative was mostly likely not missed by Chaucer—such equivalents do not exist 
as explicitly in England as they do elsewhere. However, this paradoxically assumes that any 
reaction to trauma must be an explicit one, although we also insist that trauma is an 
unincorporable and unrepresentable experience.43 
 I have a contention with both assumptions above: that trauma is in fact 
unincorporable, and that England had no cultural expression or repression of its traumatic 
fourteenth century. First, arguing that trauma is unincorporable, unrepresentable, or 
unclaimed experience privileges language as the only means by which survivors can process 
and symbolize trauma. We know now from writing in affect theory that language is not, in 
fact, the only system through which humans express themselves.44 Corroborating this, recent 
work in child adversity indicates that trauma is literally held by and incorporated into the 
body via a series of chemical and hormonal processes resulting in overwhelming external 
stress. Rather than unclaimed experience, as Nadine Burke Harris puts it, trauma is “an 
extreme example of the body remembering too much,”45 and in fact “symbolizing” it through 
biological processes and behavioral consequences. Trauma is bodily, and therefore it is an 
experience claimed. Assuming an unincorporable traumatic experience falls into the trap of 
separating mind from body, and neuroscience has long ago dismissed the notion of a “brain-
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in-a-vat”; that is, it is much more productive to think about the embodied mind rather than 
mind versus body.46 Trauma is certainly in-corpor-rated, that is, trapped in the body. 
 Insisting that trauma is unable to be incorporated or expressed assumes that the only 
ways in which we express ourselves, or experience incorporation, are through language. Or 
put another way, we assume that incorporating into language means the outright expression 
of trauma in a language-based, narrativized understanding of our traumatic experience. 
Medieval theories on the body politic value a bodily narrative; that is, they value in the 
human body a model of interaction in which society, government, and their institutions are 
connected through appendages.47 These, too, are narratives: society would collapse if it had 
no feet to prop it up, hence the value of the Commons; the head is the seat of reason, and 
therefore, holds the Crown. And as I will discuss later on, what Manual DeLanda calls the 
“organismic metaphor” of society assumes that each part of the body politic is defined by its 
specific relationship to the rest of the body.48 All this is to say that medieval political thought 
imagined embodied schemas to social interaction, and I cannot help but wonder if these 
metaphors played out more often than not in lived experience: the Commons are not literally 
feet, but this embodied metaphor determines how we think about the Commons as feet. This 
must affect lived experience.49 
                                                 
46 Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 147-70. 
47 For a contemporary theorization of “the King’s two bodies,” see John of Salisbury, 
Policraticus: The Statesman’s Book, ed. Murray F. Markland (New York: Frederick Ungar 
Publishing, 1979), Book VI, Chapter 25. 
48 Manual DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social 
Complexity (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006), 8. 
49 For the argument that there is no categorical distinction between body and metaphors 
thereof, since metaphors are themselves based in bodily experience, see George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
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 Parliament, on the other hand, challenges the preexisting embodied political model. It 
is a political body that summons, that requires that its various appendages move, separate, 
join, change, represent. It configures, reconfigures, and dissolves the body as needed, and it 
certainly has much more flexible appendages than the traditional body political model. That 
is, as the institution of parliament was becoming more and more present on the national 
landscape—maintained more of a bodily presence—England was figuring out how to 
reconfigure its own society in the wake of plague, war, shifting monarchy, and the large-
scale societal changes that it prompted. A fixed model of body politic simply is not flexible 
enough to accommodate expressions of trauma. For this reason, an assemblable body rather 
than a fully assembled one—one that is more flexible, can tolerate unorthodox and 
uncomfortable movement—might itself be an expression of cultural trauma. I suggest that 
one way in which societies respond to large-scale, shared cultural trauma is by erecting 
institutions to facilitate social bonds, group interactions, and political attachments that can 
facilitate cultural healing. Specifically for England in the fourteenth century, the intellectual, 
legal, and political work that was invested in developing the parliament is a symptom of 
cultural trauma in itself. And moreover, that this response was concerned with developing 
and sustaining processes of deliberation, talking, and embodied togetherness in an 
assembable rather than assembled way is of particular importance. 
 On a much larger theoretical scale, this dissertation argues that human behavioral 
functioning is primarily—or at least in large part—motivated by attachments. As such, we 
assemble in Natal spaces that are geared to facilitate attachment in physical spaces.50 
                                                 
50 I borrow the concept of the Natal from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987). In their “plateau,” or chapter, “1837: Of the Refrain,” they refer to 
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Assembling serves a much larger behavioral function of confronting large-scale societal 
issues, such as cultural traumas. Rebuilding the capacity for attachment is primary in treating 
trauma, and so the Natal place can serve likewise as an attachment space. Because mutual 
recognition of one another’s trauma treats trauma by building attachments, however verbal or 
nonverbal, then parliament is a behavioral function on a larger scale. As systems evolve, they 
emerge from their original function; so, as larger scale psychologies evolve in our collective 
practices, these more complex collective systems build on smaller-scale human behavior. 
Interventions: Why Psychoanalysis? 
 At the 1981 Franco-Latin American meeting of the International Psychoanalytic 
Association (IPA) in Paris, Jacques Derrida criticized the IPA for lacking a formal statement 
on the political violence and torture in Latin America, where he argued that “psychoanalysis 
can be the object or the agent, directly or indirectly, of very singular violations of human 
rights.”51 Specifically, he wrote that 
the less integration there is between the psychoanalytic and the ethico-political 
discourses, the easier it is for integration and appropriation to occur between 
the apparatuses, the easier it is for psychoanalysis to be manipulated by 
                                                 
the Natal as “outside” of a territory, but conceptually central to it: think of “pilgrimages to 
the source, as among salmon,” and other migratory journeys that both mark a shared territory 
(the salmon’s march upstream is a march through their territory), but which have as their 
endpoint a space outside of that territory (326). The Natal represents a conceptual center to a 
place of mutual belonging, but to which center one must journey together, marking an 
experience of primal togetherness. The Natal roots the territory without having to be located 
at its center. 
51 Jacques Derrida, “Geopsychoanalysis,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, eds. 
Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007), 328. See also 
Laurence A. Rickels, Nazi Psychoanalysis, 3 vols. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002) for the intersections between Nazism and psychoanalysis. 
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political and police authorities, for psychoanalytic power to be abused, and so 
forth.52 
Parliamentary deliberation is a fine line away from the threat of violence. While actual 
violence rarely broke out on the floor of parliament, mobs, armies, and the threat of 
individual duels were a reality waiting outside its chamber doors. Debate, rather than 
eliminating social antagonism, is promoted by it, and the delicate interaction among the law, 
deliberation, and violence is central to the talking cure. In Feeling Bureaucratic, I aim to 
politicize the discourse of psychoanalysis by arguing that deliberation within political 
institutions makes possible the transmission and treatment of trauma not only on an 
individual level (e.g., between analyst and analysand, witness and victim), but on a cultural 
and even transgenerational level (e.g., adjudication of reparations, war crimes, and even 
chivalric treatises). By politicizing the discourse of psychoanalysis, I aim to reconsider what 
is meant by “productive deliberation” within the field of medieval studies, and argue that late 
medieval literary genres highlight the connections among parliament, political speech, and 
mental spaces to understand the process of deliberation as productive in and of itself.  
In addition to the lens that psychoanalytic theory offers, assemblage theory, as 
articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, offers an obvious critical traction for 
thinking about parliament, assembly, emplacement, and the social link.53 Assemblage theory 
is here understood as a sociological systems theory that analyzes the capacities of constituent 
parts on their own terms, rather than only in relation to the larger body or system. This 
usefully enables a critique of the body politic model. One particularly useful and related 
                                                 
52 Derrida, “Geopsychoanalysis,” 330. 
53 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 310-50. 
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critical term is Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the Natal, to which I return throughout the 
dissertation. For Deleuze and Guattari, the “Natal” is a place that is outside but 
simultaneously always already inside: it is the center of a territory marked by constituent 
bodies but is always open to deterritoralization54 because such assembly points are formed 
through the holding together of heterogeneity. The Natal, therefore, can be thought of as a 
holding tank for the overlapping of multiple territories. The concept of the Natal helps me to 
take the psychoanalytic social link up in scale to deliberation in political institutions. Much 
like parliament, then, it is an assembly point at the center of a territory, which brings 
different constituencies together while at the same time articulating a new territory and new 
social links. “Placeness” is important here: there are places to which we congregate which 
provide holding spaces for the social link, which is to say, the thing that confronts trauma. 
Natal places are therefore particularly well suited to confronting trauma because of these 
assembly points and sociality (e.g., pilgrimages).  In Feeling Bureaucratic, I propose an 
investigation into the ways in which antagonism is central to democratic discourse, providing 
generative possibilities for a politics of psychoanalysis.  
Chapter Outline 
 Having laid the historical, critical, and theoretical foundations for this discussion, the 
ensuing chapters each explore elements of a clerical conceptual and intellectual development 
of the parliamentary institution, namely, the process of assembly as rethinking traditional 
modes of the body politics, attachment behavior as central to such political processes, and the 
                                                 
54 The concept of “deterritoralization” implies that what is proper to a territory can likewise 
be proper to other territories, as constituent parts of a territory work both together with and 
apart from other elements in the territory: an element can be part of multiple territories. Thus, 
central to the concept of territories for Deleuze and Guattari is that they have the capacity for 
deterritorialization, and thus are not closed systems.  
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affective motivations behind political processes like petitioning, or claiming a voice, in 
spaces of belonging. 
 Chapter 1, “The Parliamentary Assemblage: Capacities of the Body Politic,” suggests 
that the complexity of the parliamentary assembly complicates more traditional and familiar 
notions of a static body politic. By analyzing examples of medieval assembly alongside 
contemporary assemblage theory, I argue that, at various levels of social experience, the 
parliamentary assembly is conceptualized as a heterogeneous one capable of holding its 
constituent parts together in conflict without measurable resolution. In so doing, I isolate 
what assemblage theory would call three “plateaus”55 of social experience—namely, the 
institutional, the group, and the individual—to demonstrate that an “assemblaged,” 
parliamentary model of the body politic can complicate various elements of social 
experience, and likewise insist on their interrelatedness. 
I begin the discussion with the institutional by considering a fourteenth-century 
document called the Modus tenendi parliamentum,56 a “how-to manual” for holding 
parliament. I consider this text as a conceptual rather than literal portrayal of parliament; 
however, it is one that offers a dynamic vision of political assembly capable of hosting 
conflict and heterogeneity without political breakdown. Such an institutional space breeds a 
group experience that holds heterogeneity together in conflict. In moving down in scale to 
                                                 
55 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 21-22. For Deleuze and Guattari, a plateau is 
defined as “a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any 
orientation toward a culmination point or external end,” and “any multiplicity connected to 
other multiplicities.” My plateaus are not contained units but overlap and conceptually build 
upon one another. 
56 Modus Tenendi Parliamentum, in Nicholas Pronay and John Taylor, eds., Parliamentary 
Texts of the Later Middle Ages, 67-114 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). 
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the group, my discussion of the headlinks57 to the Canterbury Tales suggests that group 
experience in institutional spaces can provide sites of collective care. That is to say, a flexible 
institution can impact group experience such that group care is of primary concern. In my last 
section concerning the individual before the law, I take seriously the impacts of 
representational politics on the individual. In other words, how do spaces of group-care care 
for the individual, and how does heterogeneity both preserve the individual and assemble it 
with other bodies? In answering these questions, I look at the episode of Lady Meed before 
the king’s parliament in Passus IV of Piers Plowman to insist that Lady Meed is not just an 
allegorical figure but a character charged with the work of both individualizing and 
representing before the law. Lady Meed shows that the expression of affect preserves the 
individual in group spaces and thus plays a deep role in the holding together of heterogeneity. 
Together, these three plateaus engage with the notion of assembly to argue that out of late 
fourteenth-century parliamentary models emerge more complex conceptualizations of the 
body politic capable of holding conflict, and thus offering care. 
Given the parliamentary assembly’s role in valuing care, I then move on in chapter 2, 
“Political Process and Attachment in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls,” to the 
political and behavioral processes that enable the parliament to be a site of collective care. 
Because the ending of the poem is inconclusive, I attend more to the political processes that 
the journey to Nature’s Parliament hosts rather than to its “failed” outcomes, in order to 
stress that a fascination and fetishization of political outcomes—what I call an outcomes-
                                                 
57 The “headlinks” of the Canterbury Tales refer to what George Kittredge calls the “stage 
business” of the poem—namely, the prologues, epilogues, and bits of interaction among 
pilgrims between the tales themselves. For Kittredge’s full discussion, see Chaucer and His 
Poetry (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1946). 
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oriented ontology—undermines the work of the poem, which instead puts on full display the 
processes by which we assemble, attach, and care. A process-oriented politics, then, stresses 
group interaction, and therefore builds attachments that sustain political processes and inspire 
a vision of common profit that is intimate, continual, and without end. Read alongside 
Macrobius’ Commentary on the Dream of Scipio,58 I show that Chaucer’s narrator’s vision of 
common profit borrows from an attachment to a clerkly archive, and therefore is itself part of 
a larger discursive assemblage that conceptually developed the value of political process in 
the parliamentary arena. 
One of the most central and accessible political processes facing parliament was the 
practice of petitioning, and in Chapter 3, “The Affective Rhetoric of Complaint: Piers 
Plowman and Petitionary Culture,” I turn to the Parliament of Rats and Mice in the Prologue 
to Piers Plowman to argue that the petitionary form evolved in England during the fourteenth 
century to become more affective in its presentation of complaint. What I term affective 
rhetoric preserves the lived reality of the petitioner while also providing affective, rhetorical 
scripts that record that lived reality into the archive of parliament. This section analyzes the 
Parliament of Rats and Mice within the context of the Good Parliament of 1376 and the 
scholarship thereof to suggest that an obsession with the mice’s “failure” to bell the cat has 
drawn away from the affective work that petitioning enables in group process, namely, to be 
able to even understand the affective contours of a political problem. I engage with the 
intellectual history of Piers scholarship on this scene in order to argue that a fascination with 
political failure demonstrates more about twenty-first century obsessions with “outcomes,” 
                                                 
58 Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, ed. and trans. William Harris Stahl (New 
York: Columbia UP, 1952). All citations of the Commentary will include book, chapter, and 
section numbers hereafter. 
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“standards,” and “measurable goals” than it does about a period whose texts value open-
endedness and the processes it takes to maintain the simple act of continuing on. 
I conclude this dissertation with a brief contemporary analysis of political process, 
petitioning, and group care in Trump’s America, “Feeling Bureaucratic: Activism and 
Political Process in the Age of Trump.” Almost immediately after the election of Donald 
Trump on November 8, 2016 to the United States presidency, government workers (i.e., 
clerks and bureaucrats) who worked for Congressional offices in the United States 
government collaboratively wrote a “how to” manual for civic protest entitled Indivisible: A 
Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda.59 Noteworthy about this manual is that 
protest harnesses and embraces political process for its affective project. That is, political 
process here is seen not as a cumbersome bureaucratic nightmare but as a way to get things 
done. My theory of political process offered in this dissertation is especially important in the 
twenty-first century, where a technocratic and administrative fascination with outcomes 
shades the very human processes and affects at the core of our politics. 
Therefore, this dissertation experiments with methodological approaches not typically 
associated with either institutional history or studies in literature and the law, and as such, 
offers a new historiography of parliament, turning away from longue durée arguments about 
the desire and the ability of the barons to restrain royal power and prerogative to a more 
synchronic approach that targets the fourteenth-century discursive and affective origins of 
parliamentary thinking in England. 
  
                                                 
59 Indivisible: A Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda (The Indivisible Project, 
2016), https://www.indivisible.org/resource/guide-english-pdf. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLAGE: CAPACITIES OF THE BODY POLITIC 
  The Modus tenendi parliamentum, loosely translated as “How to Hold a Parliament,” 
is a procedural text written for lawyers and bureaucrats outlining the various functions and 
processes of the parliamentary assembly. Striking, however, is that, of its twenty-six 
chapters, the first seven are devoted to who ought to attend, how they ought to be summoned, 
and how they ought to assemble. For the Modus, parliament is, first and foremost, an 
assembly—of bodies, texts, and histories—and the very act of assembling such 
heterogeneous elements seems to be of primary importance because it offers a reconstruction 
of the body politic. It should be noted that the Modus does not offer a strict representation of 
how parliament actually operated, but instead poses a conceptual portrayal of the institution’s 
capacities when the various elements of the body politic gather and debate. That is, how can 
parliament operate, and how does it expand the capacities of the body politic? The Modus is 
not alone in asking this question: poems like Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and Langland’s 
Piers Plowman likewise conceptualize the act of gathering and assembling the various 
elements of the body politic, and furthermore, these poems are themselves assemblies of 
various individual narratives all held together in heterogeneity and conflict, and together 
forming something more than the sum of their parts. In this chapter, I use medieval 
conceptualizations of assembly alongside contemporary assemblage theory to outline how, at 
various levels of social experience, the parliamentary assembly is conceptualized—or, as my 
discussion insists, theorized—as a heterogeneous one capable of holding its constituent parts 
together in conflict without measurable resolution. This heterogeneity complicates the 
traditional metaphor of the body politic and offers instead a more flexible concept of society. 
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 This chapter itself is an assemblage of what Deleuze and Guattari would call three 
“plateaus” of social experience:1 the institutional, the group, and the individual. My analysis 
of the Modus tenendi parliamentum begins this discussion by considering the parliamentary 
assemblage as a more flexible model of the body politic, one capable of embracing its 
heterogeneity. Such a vision of society as an assemblaged body impacts group experience 
within those spaces, and my discussion of the headlinks in the Canterbury Tales asks how 
spaces of assembly can also be sites of collective care. How can group experience in 
institutional spaces hold rather than erase conflict? Parliament, however, is still a 
representation space, capable of complicating notions of the individual. Therefore, this 
discussion concludes by considering Lady Meed’s own subjectivity before the Law and her 
affective expressions in Piers Plowman, which cast into the parliamentary archive a 
recording of her lived experiences. 
FIRST PLATEAU: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
I. The Modus tenendi parliamentum: A Conceptual Document 
 The Modus was written as early as the reign of Edward II during the first half of the 
fourteenth century in England, at the same time as the institution of parliament was making 
its debut on the political stage.2 The Modus has garnered attention mainly among historians 
who are concerned with the text’s political purpose in England and Ireland,3 and others have 
                                                 
1 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 21-22. See Chapter 1, footnote 55, for a 
definition of “plateau.” 
2 For more on the dating and context of the Modus, see Nicholas Pronay and John Taylor, 
eds., Parliamentary Texts of the Later Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980) and Kerby-
Fulton and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture.” Pronay and Taylor date the Modus to the 
first half of the fourteenth century, possibly as early as the 1320s (22), whereas Kerby-Fulton 
and Justice argue for a later date, during the reign of Edward III (192). 
3 See Dodd, “Changing Perspectives: Parliament, Poetry and the ‘Civil Service’ Under 
Richard II and Henry IV,” Parliamentary History 25, no. 3 (2006): 299-322; Kerby-Fulton 
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put the manual in conversation with literary texts to establish an intellectual culture that 
hosted its production.4 Although self-identifying as a how-to manual, the text’s portrayal of 
parliament is largely interpretative, taking occasional liberties with the political process that 
it describes, and in many cases staking political claims by way of offering imagined—and 
politically charged—procedures. Accordingly, I argue that the Modus more likely offers a 
conceptual theorization of parliamentary procedure rather than a declarative guide for 
establishing a “right” way to gather and deliberate, and that such experimentations attest to 
the varieties of expressivity possible within institutions. With such interpretative work at its 
center, the Modus invites literary criticism, and the text’s own self-awareness of its relation 
to other official records creates within the Modus an appreciation for a textual culture 
surrounding the formation and theorization of England’s newest governing body. Particularly 
striking about the manual is that its genre as a how-to guide brings into plain sight the focus 
among parliamentary texts on the process of assembly, and that such processes constitute the 
body politic. In this light, we can treat the Modus as political writing; when positioned within 
a larger context of the parliamentary archive, the text so clearly appears to be directly 
interested in theorizing parliament as process-driven. 
Although lacking an exact author or date for the Modus prevents us from specifying 
overmuch its exact historical or social context, the text’s emphasis on the central role of the 
clerks of parliament does at least tell us something about the intellectual context out of which 
                                                 
and Ruth Horie, “The French Version of the Modus tenendi parliamentum in the Courtenay 
Cartulary: A Transcription and Introduction,” in The Medieval Reader: Reception and 
Cultural History in the Late Medieval Manuscript, eds. Kerby-Fulton and Maidie Hilmo, 
special issue of Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 3rd ser., no. 1 (1998): 225-31; 
W.C. Weber, “The Purpose of the English Modus Tenendi Parliamentum,” Parliamentary 
History 17, no. 2 (1998): 149-77. 
4 Kerby-Fulton and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture.” 
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it emerged—namely, that the clerical class was a permanent fixture of the institutional 
bureaucracy surrounding parliament, which is different than the more migrant Members of 
Parliament whom this bureaucracy summoned and supported both during parliament-time 
and after. The Modus’ opening image of parliament is an assembly, the first seven chapters 
describing who is obliged to assemble and how the various groups within parliament ought to 
be summoned. The focus of the text shifts, however, in Chapter VIII, noting that, “It having 
first been shown in what way, to whom and at what time the parliamentary summons ought 
to be made, and who ought to come by summons and who not, it must secondly be said who 
ought to come on account of their office, and should be present without summons throughout 
the whole of parliament.”5 The chapter then goes on to explain that “two principle clerks of 
parliament chosen by the King and his Council […] are bound to attend on the first day.”6 
What is important about this shift is the contrast it draws between the members and 
administrators of parliament: the former must travel, their journey to parliament marking an 
occasion, whereas the latter constitute a Westminster-based culture of clerks at the center of 
parliamentary activity, that is, a bureaucracy. The clerks were permanently stationed in 
Westminster and were, paradoxically, more consistently exposed to national as well as local 
political processes than the Members of Parliament. In addition to the two principal clerks, 
the author of the text includes “five expert and proven clerks,” whom the King will assign, 
and who serve the five grades of peers in parliament: bishops, proctors of the clergy, earls 
and barons, knights of the shire, and the citizens and burgesses.7 Most scholars agree with 
Kerby-Fulton and Justice that “the literary and intellectual culture of the royal bureaucracies 
                                                 
5 Modus, 83. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 86. 
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in England and Ireland, which had the intellectual resources and specialized knowledge 
needed to produce such a work,” is the most likely context for the Modus’ production.8 This 
clerical culture was service-based, indeed, and through its service was therefore at the center 
of not only documenting but also influencing the parliamentary process. It is precisely 
because of their access that they were in a position to further conceptualize and develop the 
processes that they also observed and supported in more practical ways. 
Despite this amity among scholars as to the Modus’ context, however, there is debate 
surrounding the Westminster clerks’ political loyalties, and consequently, the political desires 
that inform the conceptualization offered in the Modus. Although the Modus is a procedural 
manual, Kerby-Fulton and Justice argue that its “closest literary cousin is not something like 
the so-called ‘Lancastrian’ treatise on the steward or the minor procedural treatises from 
which it takes its genre, but Piers Plowman.”9 They locate such literary reformist sentiments 
within the Modus, pointing specifically to Chapter XXIII, which claims that “[i]t must be 
understood that two knights who come to parliament for the shire, have a greater voice in 
granting and denying than the greatest earl of England, […] and this in everything that ought 
to be granted, denied, or done by parliament.”10 Conversely, Dodd refuses a reformist 
reading and argues instead that any political leanings in clerical culture, however deeply 
rooted, were largely practical: “They owed their living and their position to their political 
masters and were expected to act loyally and obediently in return. Arguably, few needed to 
be persuaded that a conservative political outlook, closely aligned with the king and the 
                                                 
8 Kerby-Fulton and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture,” 152. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Modus, 89. 
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court, was in their best interests.”11 Both arguments are correct to insist upon strong political 
involvement of the Westminster clerks and the influence of the texts that they produced. But 
both are also limited by their insistence on the homogeneity of a given political or ideological 
outlook. Within the limits of what’s imaginable in a given culture, ideology never forecloses 
difference altogether. My interest is not in specifying an identifiable political position for this 
group—though I do agree with Kerby-Fulton and Justice’s assessment of the reformist 
currents within this culture; many were educated at Oxford, which during this period, as 
noted, was a hotbed of progressive politics—but I am more interested in disclosing this 
group’s enabling of disagreement and possibility, a skill perhaps more suited to those 
inclined toward reform. Throughout the parliamentary archive, in what seems to be a corpus 
of practical how-to manuals and procedural documents, we find a textual assemblage that 
conceptualizes and theorizes an institution that is in a perpetual process of self-formation. 
The Westminster clerks are first and foremost concerned with the stakes of thinking about 
political process as a means toward potentiality rather than oppressiveness; that is, how to 
make things happen. 
 The Modus’ presentation as a how-to manual is itself a performative gesture within 
the archives. The manual certainly circulated both among lawyers petitioning before 
parliament and government bureaucrats directly involved with the institution’s 
administration,12 and the two copies of the vernacular French Modus were “owned by 
politicians active in Irish parliamentary affairs.”13 However, the manual takes several 
liberties in its representation of parliamentary procedure: the number of two principle clerks 
                                                 
11 Dodd, “Changing Perspectives,” 312. 
12 Kerby-Fulton and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture,” 158, 162. 
13 Kerby-Fulton and Horie, “The French Version of the Modus,” 226. 
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and five under-clerks mentioned above was most likely exaggerated,14 and although many of 
the Modus’ extant manuscripts come from lawyers’ libraries, very little of the text describes 
processes that would actually aid petitioning, the majority of a lawyer’s work in parliament.15 
Therefore, this how-to manual was in many cases not entirely “useful,” occasionally 
antiquated, and at times inaccurate, suggesting that the line between governing and imagining 
is permeable, since both practices are mutually constitutive here. 
 This was the case with many other documents coming out of Westminster, including 
petitions and, in many cases, the parliament rolls themselves. Scholars seem to have a hard 
time analyzing the Modus because it is such a biased and imaginary portrayal; but my point 
is: so are many of the other documents in the Westminster archive. For example, W.M. 
Ormrod explains that “on many occasions, the chancery clerks could make a major 
contribution to the articulation of the political agenda of parliament by assisting in the 
formulation, presentation and recording of the common petitions,”16 and therefore, 
supposedly neutral government bureaucrats could infuse bias and opinion into the archive 
that they helped to construct. More conservative readings, such as that of Nicholas Taylor 
and John Pronay, do acknowledge that the treatise circulated mainly among lawyers, but 
insist that the document’s manuscript history denies any political impulses behind it.17 
However, more recent scholarship, such as that of Kerby-Fulton, Justice, and Oliver, reveals 
that this professional legal class who would have read the Modus in fact produced, circulated, 
and consumed politically-driven narratives of parliamentary proceedings, or what Oliver 
                                                 
14 Weber, “The Purpose of the English Modus,” 158. 
15 Kerby-Fulton and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture,” 160. 
16 W.M. Ormrod, “On—and Off—the Record: The Rolls of Parliament, 1337-1377,” 
Parliamentary History 23, no.1 (2008): 1-56; 51. 
17 Taylor and Pronay, Introduction to the Modus tenendi parliamentum, 13-14. 
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calls a “Process,” which occasionally made their way into chronicle accounts, but sometimes 
circulated on their own.18 An example more or less contemporaneous to Kerby-Fulton and 
Justice’s dating of the Modus is the Good Parliament’s attack on the royal government in 
1376; despite the clerks’ employment by the crown, they saw themselves, as the Modus 
corroborates, as “immediately subject to the King and his parliament jointly.”19 The clerks 
were concerned with creating an archive of parliamentary texts that infused that culture’s 
intellectual project into the political process in order to theorize parliament not as an 
institution dictated by a set of fixed rules, but as a political assemblage whose procedures 
emphasize a perpetual becoming for the sake of maintaining group experience. While it 
might not be a surprise that bureaucrats focus on elaborating process, the theoretical stakes of 
such practices are worth considering. The use of a how-to manual to deliver a conceptual 
overview of parliament’s formation and continual becoming is itself a performative gesture 
toward the value of process—that is, the how-to manual is a genre that values potential at 
least as much as precept. 
II. The Assemblaged Body Politic 
 By approaching the Modus’ insistence on perpetuating a textual culture partly via 
assemblage theory, my aim is to further show how parliament is in a continual state of self-
generation rather than entrenchment. The Modus begins with a call for assembly among the 
Members of Parliament, and responding to that call requires a contribution to the 
parliamentary archive. Each group of peers20 is summoned through similar means, and a 
                                                 
18 Oliver, Parliament and Political Pamphleteering, 54. 
19 Modus, 86. 
20 By “peers,” I refer to the five grades of peers beneath the King as outlined in the final 
chapter (XXVI) of the Modus: archbishops, bishops, abbots, and priors; proctors of the 
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passage from the chapter “Concerning the Barons of the Ports” applies equally to the other 
members, all of whom are required to “come with their warrants in duplicate, sealed with the 
common seal of the Ports, that they have been duly elected attorneys and sent on behalf of 
those baronies, one of which [letters] shall be delivered to the clerks of parliament, and the 
other remain with the barons themselves.”21 The archive is formed by the assembly of bodies 
bearing texts that identify and credential their bearers. The summons is a documented act of 
participation in social exchange. The archive, so to speak, creates and recognizes a territory, 
and as Deleuze and Guattari explain: 
The first question to be asked is what holds these territorializing marks, 
territorial motifs, and territorialized functions together in the same intra-
assemblage. This is a question of consistency: the “holding together” of 
heterogeneous elements. At first, they constitute no more than a fuzzy set, a 
discrete set that later takes on consistency.22 
The idea that consistency “holds together”—we might say, links—heterogeneity illuminates 
the real work of the summons: it is a call for the assembly of various grades, each grade 
consisting of various members, and each member—as a representative of his or her 
constituency—also a multiplicity; that is, representational capacities in politics means that 
bodies stand for other bodies. Although the summons is an authoritative demand, each 
individual response to it documents multiplicity into the archive and is, using Deleuze and 
Guattari’s term, a deterritorializing impulse: 
                                                 
clergy; earls, barons, and other magnates and nobility; knights of the shires; and citizens and 
burgesses (91). 
21 Modus, 81. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 323. 
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The territory itself is a place of passage. The territory is the first assemblage, 
the first thing to constitute an assemblage; the assemblage is fundamentally 
territorial. But how could it not already be in the process of passing into 
something else, into other assemblages?23 
We will recall that the summons itself is a duplicate—one that summons, one that demands a 
response—which means that the Modus writes territorializing procedural texts as likewise 
acts of deterritorialization. Manuel DeLanda expands upon the deterritorializing impulse 
when he explains that the component parts of assemblages at different scales exchange 
bodies among themselves; that is, that small-scale organismic concerns are the constituent 
parts of larger-scale assemblages, but institutional assemblages are likewise more than the 
sum of their parts, since they also include component parts that pertain to more than simply 
their institutional assemblages.24 Understanding the summoning and recording of the 
parliamentary assembly as both territorializing and deterritorializing helps make more visible 
the heterogeneity implicit in the formation of a parliament, and, likewise, the heterogeneity 
implicit to parliamentary process itself. A heterogeneity is “held together” by linkage and 
letting go. 
 It is striking how much of the Modus is devoted to marking the occasion of assembly. 
In addition to the first nine chapters outlining in detail who is obliged to attend, Chapters X-
XII describe the opening speeches, which extend the liminal space of the assembly and focus 
attention on the process of opening parliament. As the members of parliament are arriving, 
forming the parliamentary territory over a six-day period, its boundaries are likewise 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, 9-11. 
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opened—we might say, its heterogeneities are re-linked—to the surrounding kingdom 
through a proclamation: 
On the first day a proclamation ought to [be] made, first in the hall or in the 
monastery or in some public place where parliament is being held, and 
afterwards publicly in the city or town that all who wish to present petitions 
and plaints to parliament should deliver them during the five days following 
the first day of parliament.25 
Over this same period, “when parliament for the greater part is assembled and 
congregated,”26 the three opening speeches—the sermon, the formal declaration on the 
causes of parliament, and the King’s speech—anticipate that the political process will create 
an archive of expressions that will enlarge the parliamentary assemblage. Deleuze and 
Guattari aptly point out the stakes of expression, stating that “[t]he expressive is primary in 
relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily 
appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being. Not in the sense that these 
qualities belong to a subject, but in the sense that they delineate a territory that will belong to 
the subject that carries or produces them.”27 The opening expressions of parliament make it a 
space of belonging. Belonging both in the sense that the assembly is a space of 
intersubjectivity, and also in Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of possession—the 
opening proclamations invite expressions into the archive that mark the parliamentary 
territory, but which also open up that territory. In fact, as Chapter XXV states, “[t]he clerks 
of parliament will not refuse anyone a transcript of his process,” and those who cannot pay 
                                                 
25 Modus, 84. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 316, emphasis mine. 
  
43 
will receive it free of charge.28 The archive, that is, is a process of expression that does not 
limit parliament to a static “being,” because that process is an archive of shared experience 
and continual assembly. In this sense, the opening territorialization and deterritorialization of 
the Modus stress that the act of assembly is an act of becoming-parliament. 
The Modus’ opening focus on assembly calls attention to formation—itself a 
process—as becoming, and the social bonds that such assemblages produce within 
parliament suggests that the entire political process is likewise a becoming-parliament. 
Becoming is a term from Deleuze and Guattari, and as Cliff Stagoll notes, it implies “the 
pure movement evident in changes between particular events [….] Rather than a product, 
final or interim, becoming is the very dynamism of change, situated between heterogeneous 
terms toward no particular goal or end-state,”29 or, as LaCapra might argue, historical 
becoming is “repetition with change.”30 Of course, political process has goals, motives, 
and—as the entire parliamentary archive shows—political drives. The effectiveness of 
parliament is not in its final products but in its processes and movements; parliament works 
to continue debate and makes debate parliament’s “goal”—if we can expand our 
understanding of a “goal” to be the continuation of a process. The Modus’ example of the 
committee of twenty-five31 in its chapter “Concerning Difficult Cases and Decisions” offers 
an example of this work. In instances where a difficult case refuses consensus and threatens 
                                                 
28 Modus, 91. 
29 Cliff Stagoll, “Becoming,” in The Deleuze Dictionary, ed. Adrian Parr, 21-23 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2005), 21. 
30 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, xvi. 
31 The committee of twenty-five never appears in the parliamentary rolls, and therefore most 
likely never occurred. See Weber, “The Purpose of the English Modus,” 158; Kerby-Fulton 
and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture,” 161-62; and Giancarlo, Parliament and 
Literature, 87. However, considering the Modus as a theoretical text enables a discussion of 
the conceptual work that this committee adds to parliament’s clerical intellectual culture. 
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to terminate discussion, “the earl steward, the earl constable, and the earl marshal, or two of 
them shall elect twenty-five persons from all the peers of the kingdom” to resolve the 
matter.32 However, what is rather striking about this committee is its process of reduction: if 
the initial twenty-five cannot come to agree, they may elect and reduce into twelve members, 
twelve to six, and so forth, until one person remains, “and in that case only his ruling will 
stand above the whole parliament.”33 Matthew Giancarlo describes the committee of twenty-
five as a “fantasy of univocal voice combined with the idea of a personified and 
individualized collective,” one which attempts to iron out difference in parliamentary 
process.34 However, given the Modus’ overall insistence on the continuation of process, we 
could better understand the type of theoretical work proper to the committee of twenty-five 
as a dynamic group experience that changes the landscape of debate, and/or preserves debate 
to the end. 
Although the committee is “self-abolishing,” as Kerby-Fulton and Justice argue,35 and 
therefore seems to seek resolution, I think any critique requires a full appreciation of how its 
procedural complexity precisely continues the parliamentary process and thus is a 
continuation of group experience, including what doubtlessly would have been the difficult 
task of repeated reduction, voting, election, and negotiation. Each iteration of the committee 
requires, so it seems, further debate, and therefore, in a moment wherein parliament threatens 
to stalemate, the committee of twenty-five harnesses a debate about debate. But more 
important to recognize, the committee of twenty-five does not stop debate, hoping to arrive at 
                                                 
32 Modus, 87. 
33 Ibid., 88. 
34 Giancarlo, Parliament and Literature, 86. 
35 Kerby-Fulton and Justice, “Reformist Intellectual Culture,” 162. 
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some fantasy of univocality. The Modus continues: “[T]his one person […], who cannot 
disagree with himself, shall decide for all;” but, the Modus adds yet another contingency for 
expression: “[R]eserving only to our Lord the King and his Council the power to examine 
and amend these ordinances after they have been written, if they know how and so wish, so 
that is shall be done in full parliament, and with the consent of parliament and not behind the 
back of parliament.”36 The committee of twenty-five prolongs indecision for as long as 
possible. The Modus adds an element of vitality to the work of decision-making and to the 
traces it leaves in the archive, and these theorizations privilege the importance of the in-
between, or modes of group expression that enable a becoming-parliament, textually and 
otherwise. Although this committee is most likely a fiction, its highlighting of process 
resonates throughout the parliamentary archive; as Benjamin Thompson keenly points out, 
“[t]he process of governance is as important in the parliament rolls as its products, especially 
with respect to the community’s contribution to that process.”37 This places at the center of 
becoming-parliament a group process, and one that creates an archive for the sake of 
expression and sharing, and most importantly—as evidenced by the committee of twenty-
five’s investment in becoming—the institution’s survival. In the parliamentary space, 
political process prevents the representative work of the committee of twenty-five from being 
a closed system or promoting univocality. Political representation adds to the process of 
becoming-parliament: becoming is a social bond, an attempt to make our expressions 
shareable, and a process that constructs an archive that testifies to our survival. 
                                                 
36 Modus, 88, emphasis mine. 
37 Benjamin Thompson, “Performing Parliament in the Rotuli Parliamentorum,” in Aspects 
of the Performative in Medieval Culture, eds. Manuele Gragnolati and Almut Suerbaum, 61-
97 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 67. 
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III. Parliamentary Natality: Confronting Cultural Trauma through the Social Bond  
 At stake in becoming-parliament is that process creates an archive, and an archive is 
an expression of history. Deleuze and Guattari are useful for thinking through the political 
process as a value in and of itself, and how the deterritorialization of that process constructs 
an archive through multiplicity and plasticity rather than stasis and entrenchment. But where 
their understanding of becoming begins to limit thinking is in terms of the archive’s historical 
importance. That is, what makes the archive shareable, a “having more profound than being,” 
in my view, is its symbolic importance. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, the dangers 
behind symbols of identity are tied to “re-presentation,” or, “presenting the same world once 
again,” which they understand as static and as deviating from the in-between, as opposed to 
becoming, which “defines a world of presentation anew” and enables the multiplicity that, I 
have argued, is fundamental to the archive.38 However, eliminating re-presentation comes 
dangerously close to eliminating symbols of history and the processes that make that history 
shareable and intersubjective; when presenting the same world anew, the history of the 
signifier cannot be ignored. History, re-presentation, and the archive are all concerned with 
the survival of expression that is ideologically driven, but in the parliamentary space, 
political process prevents “symbolism” from being a closed system. 
Individuated participation in symbolic forms of communication can be part of the 
process of becoming that is so central to the parliamentary assembly. In mapping out the 
various types of semiotic expression in nature, Jesper Hoffmeyer stresses that the human 
ability to create symbolic associations was in fact central to our survival. He writes that, 
Whether it was just for fun or because it was, in fact, advantageous to the 
                                                 
38 Stagoll, “Becoming,” 21. 
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population, the habit of symbolic referencing must at some point have 
persisted long enough to be incorporated into the social network in a way that 
eventually stabilized it. If so, then hominids that exhibited the most talent in 
this regard may have also managed to thrive above average in the social 
game.39 
Key here is that advanced social cooperation relies on symbolic referencing. For example, 
the human ability to relate to one another through symbols helped to create social institutions 
such as marriage, which, given the relative helplessness of the human infant, enabled more 
effective forms of group care.40 While I do not want to push Hoffmeyer toward an essentialist 
reading of language (and thus validate Deleuze and Guattari’s concerns about the symbolic), 
Hoffmeyer’s treatment of the symbolic is useful for thinking about how repeated forms of 
expression (i.e., re-presentation) build social institutions around a shareable history. 
Hoffmeyer writes that “[t]he discourse of human rights—and by extension, of the 
constitutional state—is, in a deep sense, the consequence of a dawning self-recognition of the 
human being as a historical being.”41 Tied into our own individuated experience of belonging 
to the process of history-making is a use of symbolism that is at once shareable, 
intersubjective, and central to our survival. Symbolism helps evince the “social link,” as 
verbal language works with other kinds of expression and symbolism to treat trauma. 
Symbolic associations do not take away from the process of becoming-parliament, but in fact 
add to it: becoming is a social bond, an attempt to make our expressions shareable, and a 
                                                 
39 Jesper Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of 
Signs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 293. 
40 Ibid., 292-93. 
41 Ibid., 309. 
  
48 
process that constructs an archive that testifies to our survival. 
 The institution’s impulse toward survival is what makes it a site for working through 
and even avoiding collective trauma. The opening lines of the Modus serve as a memorial to 
parliament’s historical becoming, admitting its traumatic associations: 
Here is described the manner in which the parliament of the King of England 
and his Englishmen was held in the time of King Edward, the son of Ethelred. 
Which manner was related by the more distinguished men of the kingdom in 
the presence of William, Duke of Normandy, Conqueror and King of 
England: by the Conqueror’s own command, and through his approval it was 
used in his times and in the times of his successors, the Kings of England.42 
At each assembly, the Members of Parliament gather to a historical-political space that in the 
process of assembling serves as a memorial to that very process. Placing the history of 
assembly in conjunction with its process makes apparent the symbolic weight of parliament. 
That symbolic weight is nonetheless a becoming-parliament because its meaning, once again, 
depends on assembly—or, on deterritoralization. Symbols from the nation’s entire history, 
from Anglo-Saxon kings to the trauma of the Norman Invasion and beyond, are located at the 
center of the parliamentary assembly. But, it is a history that is constructed only by its 
members’ migration outside of their respective territories and into a space that constructs an 
archive of collective experience that nourishes a social bond even in the face of traumatic 
cultural shifts. This is a sentiment especially poignant in fourteenth-century England when 
this manual was produced. 
 Furthermore, parliament carries such symbolic weight because it continually 
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reconstitutes itself as an example of the “Natal.” For Deleuze and Guattari, the “ambiguity 
between the territory and deterritorialization is the ambiguity of the Natal […]. [T]he 
territory has an intense center at its profoundest depths; but as we have seen, this intense 
center can be located outside the territory, at the point of convergence of very different and 
very distant territories. The Natal is outside,” but strangely attractive and familiar because it 
is re-imaginable.43 Although the Modus’ historiographical introduction seems to imbue the 
parliamentary process with a fantasy of linearity across time, colonization, and space, 
parliament’s Natality makes clear that this history only results from an ongoing process of 
changes in group experience. Attachment depends on a connection with an outside—an 
other—and the outside is what enables social experience. Parliament is at the center of the 
nation and bears symbolic importance, but it is at the same time a space outside and into 
which members bring their summons, contribute petitions, and leave with a copy of the 
archive that continually adds to parliamentary history. Political process enlivens the 
archive—itself a memorial—by bringing into it the nation’s difficult decisions. By housing 
the symbolic, the Natal becomes a space of intersubjectivity and makes the political process 
into a social bond. 
 The Modus’ opening historiography also stresses that intersubjective social exchange 
enables survival. Written into the center of parliament’s founding narrative is the Norman 
Invasion, which creates a curious link between political process and cultural trauma. The 
parliamentary petition provides a textual medium for bringing issues, problems, and traumas 
into the place of assembly and integrating them into the archive. However, the Natal helps us 
to understand that the symbolic center is nonetheless a space of deterritorialization, 
                                                 
43 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 325-26. 
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multiplicity, and plasticity. As Jeremy Gilbert points out, “there is no social practice that is 
not caught up in a network of unpredictable relations which destabilizes its effects and 
significance,”44 and it is the Natal that puts into contact the unpredictability of the social 
bond with what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the Cosmos, which is witness to the 
continual flow of individuated change.45 That is to say, communication in the parliamentary 
space connects individual utterances to a larger flow of meaning. The process by which this 
occurs enables the parliamentary discourse to be one of survival, potentiality, and 
creativity—a parliamentary talking cure. 
Françoise Davoine and Jean-Max Gaudillière’s discussion of the treatment of trauma 
in psychoanalysis insists upon what my discussion would call the intersubjectivity of the 
assemblage: “Without time, without place, a piece of history that had escaped History now 
arrives, at the intersection of the singular and the plural, in the form of ‘a social link in the 
making’ […] but only if the symptom finds someone to speak to. For, in seeming to refer 
only to itself, it is simply showing that it is alone in trying to be understood.”46 Clerical 
culture’s focus on process is crucial for understanding that the parliamentary talking cure 
depends on continuing the flow of change because this flow constitutes the social link. The 
Natal is ultimately a space of care—of common profit—that does its work by expanding the 
archive, because, as the Modus states, “if no one speaks up, it must be supposed that 
everyone has his remedy, or at least been replied to as far as is possible by the law, and then 
and only then that is to say when no one who has presented a petition on that occasion 
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45 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 337. 
46 Davoine and Gaudillière, History Beyond Trauma, 11-12. 
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objects, will we release our parliament.”47 Wounds, so it seems, are treatable when allowed 
into the archive, and for this reason, parliament cannot end until everyone has spoken and 
contributed to it. The talking cure might not lead us anywhere immediately, but in so doing it 
likewise avoids trauma. 
We can best understand the Modus as a politically charged conceptualization of the 
budding parliament that uses the language of assembly and process to suggest that cites of 
political migration, or Natal spaces, are particularly useful for working through collective 
trauma by offering the experience of transformation irrespective of closure. L.O. Aranye 
Fradenburg describes the Natal as “the home that is elsewhere, that must always be ‘found’ 
again, as must the new home also be found again, and again.” It is precisely the Natal’s 
continual repurposing of re-presentation (i.e., its deterritorialization) that “has the potential to 
invite or counter trauma.”48 Institutional spaces have the potential to house the social link, 
which invites its participants ultimately to engage in practices of care within institutional 
sites. How can spaces of assembly be likewise sites of collective care, and how does 
institutionalization assist in rather than detract from this process? In turning next to 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, we see that institutionalized legal rhetoric borrowed from 
parliamentary discourse facilitates the practice of group care throughout the General 
Prologue and continuing into the assemblage of headlinks that follow between individual 
tales. 
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48 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Staying Alive: A Survival Manual for the Liberal Arts, ed. Eileen 
A. Joy (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2013), 229. 
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SECOND PLATEAU: GROUP EXPERIENCE 
 Between the cracks of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales—in the various prologues, 
introductions, epilogues, and envoys that form what we call the “headlinks”49—there hides a 
fragmented, interrupted debate poem working to sustain the fellowship’s group experience, 
rather than resolve its numerous conflicts. In fact, the sustaining of the fellowship’s group 
experience at times relies on conflict, which reconfigures the role that conflict and dissensus, 
to use Jacques Rancière’s term, play in group attachments.50 Scholarship of the Canterbury 
Tales typically focuses on the individual tales or groups of tales within definable fragments, 
and discussions of the headlinks often put the tales into conversation with one another rather 
than considering the possibility that the headlinks form an ongoing narrative—or 
narratives—in and of themselves. As a result, the headlinks are used as mechanisms that 
comment on other aspects of Chaucer’s tales proper, as opposed to valuing the bits of 
narrative that each headlink presents. That is, the “story” of the Canterbury Tales lies 
between the tales.  Of course, a more traditional approach happens because the unknowable 
order of the Canterbury Tales’ various fragments resists traditional narrative linearity, and as 
such, a discussion of the headlinks’ “narrative” likewise has to resist typical notions of 
narrative’s teleological and chronological impulses. 
 I argue that the headlinks, read within the Middle English debate tradition—which 
includes not only debate poetry, but other institutions of debate, such as the law courts, inns 
                                                 
49 For some early critical discussions of the headlinks, see Kittredge, Chaucer and His 
Poetry, 146-218, and R.M. Lumiansky, Of Sondry Folk: The Dramatic Principle in the 
Canterbury Tales (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1955). 
50 See Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. and trans. Steven 
Corcoran (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010). As opposed to consensus in group experience, 
Rancière argues that “[t]he essence of politics is dissensus,” or, the ability to present multiple 
worldviews together in conflict (38).  
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of court, university classrooms, and parliament itself—attest to debate’s potential as a care 
practice, one that sustains group experience and intersubjective bonds rather than dissipating 
their inherent conflicts. As a poetic genre, debate poetry’s narrative reflects intersubjective 
and at times free-associative movement that resists linearity and resolution in debate, and in 
group experience alike. In the Canterbury Tales specifically, allusions to legal, political, and 
rhetorical processes that, in legal contexts, facilitate political debate act as poetic mechanisms 
for holding the fellowship together in conflict. For fourteenth-century English pilgrims 
traveling from the localities to London (assembling, in fact), interactions with debate 
structures would have been contextualized alongside the formation of a nascent parliament 
and its ancillary local legal institutions, and parliament, too, catalyzed a larger consideration 
of the value of its debate within an oscillating series of both parliamentary failures and 
victories, such as the Good and Bad Parliaments of 1376 and 1377 respectively. Institutions 
of debate, and the traditions of debate poetry, inspire the language and form of the Prologue 
and headlinks. Together, the Prologue and headlinks form a frame narrative, and the aesthetic 
function of frame narratives is to hold other heterogeneous narratives together often in 
conflict and contradiction, but also in mutuality and intertextuality. 
I. Nonlinear Debate and Spontaneous Attachments 
 The unknowable order of the Canterbury Tales, in resisting traditional narrative 
linearity and an overall teleological organization, resembles what J. Jack Halberstam calls 
“forgetting.”51 Simply put, forgetting is a way of conceptualizing a queered temporality, in 
which typical teleological and Oedipal drives that bond heteronormative notions of time and 
futurity, but also family, and thus genealogical alliance, are replaced by attachments and 
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bonds in time. Whereas heteronormative conceptualizations of time are genealogical, 
privileging generational and familial attachments, and therefore, making the family unit the 
preferred mode of attachment, forgetting “forgets family and tradition and lineage and 
biological relation and lives to create relationality anew in each moment and for each context 
and without a teleology and on behalf of the chaotic potentiality of the random action.”52 The 
unknowable order of the various fragments that make up the headlink narrative requires 
readers to forget past and present interactions and instead to remain in the present as they 
read. This is not to say, however, that we literally forget the Miller and the Reeve’s argument 
in Fragment I when we revisit “quitting” between the Friar and the Summoner in Fragment 
III.53 Rather, because the unknowable order of the headlinks makes it impossible to delineate 
an absolute chronological “narrative” of the headlinks, readers must instead rely on 
fragmented interactions that summon one another, but not in any kind of temporalizing or 
ordering way. Halberstam’s “forgetting” allows readers to more comfortably resist a linear 
impulse in reading the fragmented headlinks’ narratives and instead, to allow the various 
pilgrims to “create relationality anew in each moment and for each context and without a 
teleology” as we work through the narrative. In this way, the fragmentation and the non-
teleological patterning of the headlinks exposes the capacity for debate to create relations 
anew moment by moment, as new information is presented that reshapes the contours of 
social relations. 
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 In resisting narrative linearity and resolution of debate or of narrative, Chaucer 
instead focuses on the formation and evolution of attachments, thereby presenting a theory of 
debate that, rooted in group experience, attests to debate’s potential healing function as an 
ongoing intersubjective experience that admits and sustains conflict without the dissolution 
of its parties. Of course, attachments necessarily include conflict and difference, but 
continual debate serves to hold conflict together, resisting resolution and thus valuing messy 
attachments in group process—an ethics that resonates with group experience in parliament’s 
own political messiness. If we embrace the headlinks’ fragmentation, we see that Chaucer 
forms a debate assemblage that translates the debate poetry tradition into the messiness of 
daily life, portraying debate ultimately as an agent for group care and for sustained—even if 
ugly—attachments. Likewise, the ability to translate the parliamentary experience into daily 
life attests to parliament’s own widened influence not only on citizens’ day-to-day legal and 
political life, but also on day-to-day conflicted attachments, wielding a much larger 
parliamentary phenomenon, the epicenter of which is in London, but which certainly was 
conceptualized at a much larger scale. That is to say, theories of group experience, conflict, 
debate, and deliberation both influenced the formation of the parliament, and parliamentary 
practice provided a space for a culture of debate to emerge and formalize in fourteenth-
century England. 
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II. Talking Cures: The Legal Rhetoric of Relief in the General Prologue 
The formation of the General Prologue’s “felaweshipe”54 is propelled by discussion, 
maintained by legal language, and seeks the overall aim of relief.55 Although the sundry 
pilgrims come to Southwark on their own terms either independently or in smaller groups, 
the Prologue implies a larger mutual purpose among the assembly, rooted in the discourse of 
sickness and cure. As the narrator’s discussion of pilgrimage narrows from an international to 
a specifically English perspective—beginning with “palmeres” who “seken straunge strondes 
[…] / in sondry londes,”56 and zooming in rapidly to England’s landscape, so too does the 
Prologue move from a general portrait of vitality and movement to a specific type of 
liveliness: the healing of sickness: 
And specially from every shires ende 
Of Engelond to Caunterbury they wende, 
The hooly blissful martir for to seke, 
That hem hath holpen whan that they were seeke.57 
As Matthew Giancarlo notes, describing the pilgrims as traveling “from every shires end” is 
a parliamentary allusion, explaining that “[t]he shires […] were the original and durable units 
of constituency that defined the representative practice of national assembly in England,” 
                                                 
54 Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, in The Riverside Chaucer, I.26. All quotations of the 
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enacting God’s justice on earth. See Dodd, Justice and Grace, 283-86. 
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which “gathered only at parliament-time.”58 Allusions are always recontextualizations, 
however, and this one suggests that national assembly-points such as Canterbury or 
parliament create spaces of relief from collective sickness—we can even say from cultural 
traumas—partly because of the salutary potential of the processes of seeking and assembling 
and the discursive practices that maintain them. That is, English pilgrims assemble in 
Canterbury because it is a site of healing: “The hooly blisful martir […] / hem hath holpen 
whan that they were seeke.” Chaucer configures assembly as collective care, holding 
individual and collective sickness in parliament. Chaucer further underscores the conceptual 
association among assembly, debate, and healing by referring to the pilgrims not as an 
assembly but as a “felaweshipe,” a term whose multiple valences likewise draw a connection 
between associational identity (guilds, monasteries, parliaments, pilgrims)59 and the 
intersubjective qualities that maintain them (friendship, companionship, bonds). Moreover, 
our narrator explains that all that is required to join this assembled fellowship is speech: “So 
hadde I spoken with hem everichon / That I was of hir felaweshipe anon”60—speech, 
however, that engages with the totality of the group’s constituency. 
 The Host’s proposal at the end of the General Prologue “to talen and to pleye”61 along 
the way to Canterbury likewise alludes to parliamentary debate’s ability to transform conflict 
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into contest. The Riverside Chaucer glosses “talen” as “to tell tales,”62 but “talen” also means 
to cry out, to converse, and, most telling here, to debate.63 To “talen” along the way to 
Canterbury does more than simply pass the time, because the very process of telling and 
debating promises to “doon [the felaweshipe] som confort.”64 With an eye toward group 
process, the Host questions why the pilgrims should have to wait until arriving at Canterbury 
before “[t]he blisful martir quite yow youre mede;”65 they have already begun to engage in 
care practices. The Host summons the discourse of political processes—debate and 
petition—as relief in themselves, refusing to see comfort as only at a narrative end point, but 
also as the effect of the network of nonlinear and spontaneous reactions and expressions that 
continue group experience along the way, enabling practices of reparation. The fellowship’s 
debate and contest will provide relief by continuing comfort rather than by resolving conflict. 
III. An Assemblage of Headlinks: Holding Fragmented Bonds  
 The General Prologue’s conceptualization of assembly returns us again to assemblage 
theory in a methodological consideration of the story that continues in the headlinks. 
Assemblage theory refuses teleology and linearity, and instead values capacity and 
spontaneity, which enables a reading of narrative independent of traditional linearity. 
Unresolved debate is a common feature of many Middle English debate poems, and Thomas 
L. Reed traces this feature to ludic and recreational debate performances at medieval 
universities, the enjoyment of which was produced by the artful rhetoric of response rather 
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than a clear winner.66 In questioning why the forms and processes of unresolved debate are 
so enjoyable, I suggest that participation in debate frames enjoyment in a collective practice 
of care that aims to sustain group experience and at times even heal political sickness.67 
 The non-linear, fragmented combustions of debate that the Host’s proposal incites 
throughout the headlinks invite a narrative theory of debate poetry akin to assemblage theory. 
For assemblage theorist Manual DeLanda, the sociological importance of assemblages is that 
they focus our eye on the bonds and interactions between the constituent parts of a political 
landscape rather than forcing constituent parts to form a corporate totality—or, in the 
language of the Middle Ages, a body politic. Rather than carving out definite places for each 
part of a political landscape, reading the bonds and interactions between parts opens up 
otherwise fixed social and political relationships to processes of interaction, or what 
DeLanda calls “capacities to interact with other entities.”68 We can think about the 
oftentimes-formulaic features of rhetoric, debate poetry, and parliamentary deliberation as 
processes that expand the individual’s capacities to interact with other elements of the body 
politic because the ongoing exercise of such processes connect the individual to a social 
frame—to a fellowship. The Host’s tale-telling proposal, laden with the legalistic processes 
of “juggement,” election, “conseil,” and “voirdit,”69 hardly restricts the ensuing debates in 
the headlinks; they prompt the fellowship’s capacities for interaction. Assemblage theory 
allows us to see that the headlinks summon one another when assembled together as a story 
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on their own without a concern for proper order, and it allow us to embrace fragmented 
bonds, to hold together in conflict and in fragmentation as a group care practice. The 
unfinished Canterbury Tales and its fragmented narrative enable endless capacities for 
interaction among the various fragments, in essence producing a tale that never ends, 
arranged and re-arranged to exercise the headlinks’ capacities for continual “pleye” and 
“confort.” I do not mean to suggest that we endlessly rearrange the headlinks in order to 
construct different narratives; since that, too, would satisfy our impulses toward different 
varieties of linearity. Instead, assemblage theory enables us to take comfort in resisting 
linearity altogether and simply talk about how these headlinks play together—how they 
summon one another—when read together as a story on their own without a concern for 
proper order, in order to embrace fragmented bonds. 
 Although the fellowship unanimously approves of the Host’s tale-telling “petition,” 
which they grant “by oon assent,”70 the pilgrims repeatedly discover that the fantasy of a 
unanimous voice limits the capacities for interaction and reparation, especially in such a 
mixed crowd. The fellowship’s heterogeneity underscores that one’s language does not 
belong to oneself; as Elizabeth Scala notes, communication, especially in this “companyne,” 
is a matter of extimacy.71 “Extimacy,” Lacan explains, is the “intimately exterior” quality of 
the ego; self-formation and self-expression necessarily incorporate the desires of the Other.72 
Dialogue and debate demand that the subject confront the Other in the subject’s self-
expression, but such confrontations form attachments in time that resist the subject’s 
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isolation. For example, the Host calls on the “Clerk of Oxenford” in Fragment IV, who has 
heretofore remained isolated, to tell a “myrie tale.”73 However, the Host worries that the 
Clerk’s language will be inaccessible to the group given his learning, asking that he “[t]ell us 
som murie thyng of aventures. / Youre terms, youre colours, and youre figures, / Keepe hem 
in stoor […], / Speketh so pleyn at this tyme.”74 The Host demands that the Clerk’s language 
be intersubjective, and the Clerk meets the challenge. He plans to “telle a tale which that I / 
Lerned at Padowe of a worthy clerk,”75 and continues by summarizing the prologue of 
Petrarch’s tale, the origins of which are testimony to the Clerk’s own clerkly worldview, in 
accessible language. The Clerk need not abandon his own experiences entirely, but only 
“vernacularize” them so as to allow the others to experience them in time and in the language 
of their experiences. 
 This interaction between the Host and the Clerk summons into focus a similar scene 
in the Host’s interruption of Chaucer’s Tale of Sir Thopas in Fragment VII, and this time the 
demands of extimate speech are more contentious, albeit comedic. The Host just cannot take 
anymore of Chaucer’s “verray lewednesse,” and his “eres aken of thy [Chaucer’s] drasty 
speche,”76 or, speech that is trashy and inartistic,77 abandoning the requisite “sentence” and 
“solas” that produces these tales. Chaucer the pilgrim retorts, asking, “why withow lette me / 
Moore of my tale than another man, / Syn that is the beste rym I kan?”78 Although Chaucer 
has done his best to meet the demands of the fellowship, group experience always leaves 
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room for misinterpreting the Other’s desires. But the debate that follows is not a crisis of 
misinterpretation, though the tale does end. To continue the fellowship, Chaucer must amend 
his speech, and the debate between him and the Host over the proper way to tell tales 
culminates with Chaucer insisting that there is no one right way to tell a tale, that narrative 
difference does not mean narrative incomprehension: 
And though I nat the same wordes seye 
As ye han herd, yet to yow alle I preye 
Blameth me nat; for, as in my sentence, 
Shul ye nowher fynden difference 
Fro the sentence of this tretys lyte 
After the which this murye tale I write.79 
Chaucer’s narrator insists that, although his speech is “drasty” and differs in form from more 
artful constructions of the same story, his speech is still comprehensible and shareable. He 
calls on the Host and the fellowship to meet him on his own terms, to find their voice in his. 
Although the debate temporarily halts the tale-telling contest, it also shows debate’s 
capacities to say the same thing in many different ways, that there are many ways to find 
relief rather than threat in difference. As Chaucer the Pilgrim finds, debate requires that 
group experience be dynamic, that debate allows for the terms of signification to shift—and 
that, as Fradenburg says of the always-extimate signifier, speech in groups “persists not 
timelessly but in time.”80 The debate does not create a crisis of misinterpretation or 
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signification; a new tale emerges from its collective conflict, with the understanding that any 
new tale will require its listeners to accompany that shift. 
 As Lee Patterson has pointed out, often in the headlinks, timely subjectivity (or put 
another way, the continual dynamism of the subject and its expressions in the course of her 
or his daily life) takes the form of “quite-ing”—repayment or matching—and admits 
aggression into the fellowship’s experience.81 The most famous example is the Miller’s 
promise “to quite with the Knyghtes tale” in Fragment I,82 but an even more sour “quite-ing” 
sequence occurs in Fragment III between the Friar and the Summoner. This sequence in the 
headlinks is perhaps most traditionally like a debate poem, with the Friar and Summoner 
constructing and confronting one another to allegorical proportions. The aggressiveness of 
these allegories, however, emerges from their rootedness in each pilgrim’s intimately lived 
perception of the other, from their “neighborliness”:83 Friars, like flies, “wol falle in every 
dyssh and eek mateere,”84 and Summoners all run around “[w]ith mandementz for 
fornicacioun.”85 The debate turns nasty, and the Host intervenes and tries to censor the two 
pilgrims, crying “[i]n compaignye we wol have no debaat.”86 The Host, in his role as the 
“speaker” of the pilgrimage, fears that this particular debate will threaten to overtake tale 
telling, dissolve the fellowship, and halt the processes that have sustained their collective 
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relief. But the antagonism between the two pilgrims whets their appetite for tale telling even 
more: both promise to “quite” the other with several tales over the course of the pilgrimage, 
which means that they will, willy-nilly, spark each other’s creativity, each pilgrim escalating 
their “debaat” even more and upping the ante in each tale’s portrayal of the other. In 
retrospect, the Host’s censorship threatens the group’s continuation more than the pilgrims’ 
debate; in fact, the entire course of the fragments’ escalating and dynamic quarreling enlivens 
the static General Prologue portraits by revealing ever more about these pilgrims through 
group process rather than singular observation, which in turn produces more tales. Far from 
dissolving the fellowship, the Friar and Summoner promise to maintain it so that they can 
seek narrative revenge, sustaining the contest in the process. The Friar and the Summoner 
form each other’s characters, revealing that an element of debate is listening to perceptions 
that are contrary to one’s own perceptions of the world, incorporating them, and responding 
from one’s subject position. Despite the conflict, the Friar and the Summoner agree to be one 
another’s audience. 
 Although it may sound strange to place this testy debate within a sociological vision 
of collective care practices, the willingness to be one another’s audience is at the heart of the 
headlinks’ narrative and group process. As the pilgrimage finishes its journey in Fragment X, 
culminating with the Parson’s Prologue and Tale, the Host pronounces that “[n]ow lakketh us 
no tales mo than oon. / Fulfilled is my sentence and my decree,”87 awaiting only the Parson’s 
final tale. Although the Host tries to end on a light note, encouraging the Parson to “[t]elle us 
a fable anon,”88 he also asks him to “[u]nbokele and shewe us what is in thy male,”89 to open 
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up and show what he has to say. The Host’s instructions allow room for surprise. Answering 
on his own terms, the Parson agrees to “unbokele,” but refuses the fable, offering instead a 
“meditacioun,”90 which our narrator tells us that the fellowship “[u]pon this word we han 
assented soone.”91 Even the Host instructs the Parson to “[s]ey what yow list, and we wol 
gladly heere.”92 This disagreement ends with a willingness to hear what the other has to say, 
without necessarily having to agree with it.93 The Parson’s persona exercises the fellowship’s 
capacities to listen, to be an audience. In the Canterbury Tale’s unfinished quality, we see 
that, despite narrative irresolution, there is nonetheless a kind of resolution in group 
experience that occurs from exercising capacities in time, at any moment in the group’s 
collective experience. As a debate poem, the Canterbury Tales embraces irresolution, 
fragmentation, and conflict to show that willingness to engage in these processes and to 
witness one another in time is what allows debate to sustain collective care practices. While 
the risking, and indeed the outbreak, of conflict is in the nature of social process, it can have 
harsh effects. But, the Canterbury Tales’ headlinks echo that the important work in group 
process is in the experience of division, and in the repair thereof. 
 Group experience calls upon the individual to be extimate, to account for the Other in 
the formation and expression of one’s identity. Such a phenomenon is compounded in legal 
spaces, especially because of the representational capacities of the subject before the law. 
That is, the individual in institutional spaces and in the process of group experience stands 
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for more than just herself. In turning to the episode of Lady Meed before parliament in 
Passus IV of Langland’s Piers Plowman, we see both the capacities of the individual before 
the law, but also its potential erasure. Lady Meed is initially caught between two abstract 
allegorical identities—reward and/or bribery—and such a representation limits her capacities 
for interaction and representation in the poem. However, central to group process, especially 
in institutional spaces, is the capacity to preserve the individual’s lived experience in group 
experience. Lady Meed as an individual before the law—her “being on behalf” of others, so 
to speak—demonstrates that central to confronting collective trauma is preserving its 
embodied iterations into the archive, thus constituting the social link. 
THIRD PLATEAU: THE INDIVIDUAL  
I. The Embodied Politic 
The institutional assemblage complicates classic models of the body politic and of the 
individual body before the law, which are models based on the human body.94 What happens, 
then, when the subject whose body stands for other bodies needs to communicate a specific 
embodied reality, or when the body is traumatized? How does the social link preserve rather 
than envelop the individual? Manuel DeLanda offers a critique of what he terms the 
“organismic metaphor”95 within sociological models of the body politic. He argues that using 
the human body as a model for understanding society has led to a sociological habit of 
defining society by “relations of interiority,” meaning that “the component parts [of the 
organism] are constituted by the very relations they have to other parts in the whole. A part 
detached from such a whole ceases to be what it is, since being this particular part is one of 
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its constitutive properties.”96 The classic body politic metaphor, therefore, defines the 
individual based on her or his relation to other individuals. Surely, the healing capacities of 
the social bond aid in processing large-scale group trauma, and such relations are essential to 
the parliamentary space. 
However, the individual before the law or the individual within an institutional setting 
is not only important insofar as she or he contributes to institutional processes. Particularly, 
for example, while Members of Parliament represent the “fair feeld ful of folk”97 that elected 
and sent them to Westminster, their own desires cannot be limited to the desires of the 
community—they, too, are both representative and individual, collective and singular. Or, as 
DeLanda writes, “a whole may be both analyzable into separate parts and at the same time 
have irreducible properties, properties that emerge from the interactions between parts.”98 At 
stake in focusing on interactions is that individual parts are not trapped in a closed system 
that permits no new opportunities for interactions to emerge. Instead, as DeLanda continues, 
if we are to think about bonds between parts, we ought to understand these bonds as 
“capacities to interact with other entities,” because the individual’s “capacities are not 
given—they may go unexercised if no entity suitable for interaction is around—and form a 
potentially open list, since there is no way to tell in advance in what way a given entity may 
affect or be affected by innumerable other entities.”99 The social link is a type of bond that 
likewise incites capacity, and the capacity to exercise various forms of expression is crucial 
in the treatment of trauma. Thinking about the psychoanalytic social link as exercising the 
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individual’s capacities rather than restricting them enables the bond to heal because it 
connects the individual to a social frame of interaction, but in so doing it can resist erasure of 
the individual. 
II. Allegory or Individual? The Case of Lady Meed 
 Through the framework of society outlined above, I read allegorical figures as 
functioning in similar ways as political representatives and as individuals before the law, 
whose institutional interactions must both acknowledge their individuality and also consider 
their actions as precedent for other actions—that is, as allegorical legal interactions. Such a 
reading will re-think allegorical figures as capacities for interpretation. For example, the 
figure-character of “Mede the mayde” in the first dream vision of Piers Plowman is typically 
regarded as an allegorical figure representing the ambiguity of meed, either reward or 
bribery.100 Her individual character is initially caught between two abstract models 
propounded by Holy Church and Theology, one an institution and the other a body of 
theoretical, clerical texts. Will the dreamer first sees Meed from a distance after he asks Holy 
Church to help him with his faith and to “[k]enne me by som craft to knowe the false,”101 and 
in response, Holy Church points him to the figure Fals arranging a marriage between Meed 
and “Fals Fikel-tongue, a fendes biyete,”102 his offspring. Until the end of Passus II, all we 
know of Meed is what others say and observe about her, and Holy Church introduces her as a 
corruptor of the Church institution, her corruption climbing up as far as the Vatican itself: 
“That is Mede þe mayde,” quod she, “haþ noyed me ful ofte, 
And ylakked my lemman þat Leautee is hoten, 
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And bilowen h[ym] to lords þat lawes han to kepe. 
In þe Popes paleis she is pryvee as myselve, 
But Sooþnesse wold noȝt so—for she is a bastard, 
For Fals was hire fader þat haþ a fikel tonge, 
And nevere sooþ seide sithen he com to erþe; 
And Mede is mannered after hym, riȝt as [kynde askeþ]: 
Qualis pater, talis filius. Bona arbor bonum fructum facit.[”]103 
For the institution of Holy Church, Meed is by “kynde” mannered after falseness and is heir 
to his “fikel tonge.” The ambiguity of her meaning is instead fixed, which betrays more about 
the allegorical institution of Holy Church than it does about Meed’s character; that is, Holy 
Church is portrayed as an inflexible institution, offering inflexible interpretations. Its 
capacities for interaction are thus limited. Throughout Passus I, Holy Church is incredibly 
skeptical of speech, supposedly because people can abuse it, and with their fickle tongues 
can bribe rather than practice charity. Speech, here, is for corruption rather than expression. 
Her insistence that all of Meed’s speech is of false “kynde” erases the ambiguity of the 
figuration and quality of Meed, erecting allegorical borders and shrinking her capacities. 
Here, Meed encounters the previously mentioned “totalitarian other” who forbids speech, and 
who limits speech’s capacity to engage the social link.  
 Theology’s treatment of Meed is certainly more favorable, since he values her 
capacities especially for compensation and even charity. He justifies his favorable 
interpretation by appealing to the Law. In fact, Meed’s character is even more explicitly 
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subjected to, and her actions interpreted through, the Law once Theology confronts the 
marriage “feffement104 þat Fals hath ymaked,”105 which both Symonye and Cyvylle 
“vnfoldeþ,” with a text of his own: the Bible. Whereas Fals’ charter echoes Holy Church’s 
criticism of Meed, stating, “[t]hat Mede is ymaried more for hire goodes / Than for any virtue 
of fairnesse or any free kynde,”106 Theology “tened hym,” or grew angry, and rejects this, 
interpreting Meed’s character instead by her capacity for reward or just compensation, and 
supports his interpretation with Biblical verse: 
For Mede is muliere, of Amendes engendred; 
And God graunted to gyue Mede to truþe, 
And þow hast gyuen hire to a gilour—now God gyue þee sorwe! 
The text telleþ thee noȝt so, Truþe woot þe soþe, 
For Dignus est operarius107 his hire to haue— 
And þow hast fest hire to Fals; fy on þi lawe!108 
Unlike the institution of Holy Church, clerkly Theology sees Meed as heir to “Amendes,” a 
word that in the theological tradition refers to penance or atonement.109 Holy Church might 
have little patience for the imperfection of human will, but Theology praises Meed for her 
capacity to repent, and reminds Fals that the compensation for “everyone who has faith in 
[God’s son]” is not death but “eternal life.”110 God, too, practices meed through Christ’s 
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salvation, and those who labor for Christ’s mission deserve “his hire to have.” While this is 
certainly good news for Meed, and while Theology’s defense is more flexible in 
accommodating human lived experience, his interpretation of Meed is likewise bounded 
within a closed textual framework, and therefore does not accommodate her particular lived 
experiences. 
 Of course, Theology can refute Fals’ legal charter because Theology, too, has texts at 
his disposal. Much like in the Wife of Bath’s Prologue, the entrance fee into these debates is 
access to a clerkly archive, despite the Wife’s assertion that, “[e]xperience, though noon 
auctoritee / Were in this world, is right ynogh for me / To speke.”111 Steven Justice argues 
that this archive was often barred behind library walls and inaccessible to the comune, and 
the 1381 Peasants’ Rebellion—a traumatic event in English history with intimate ties to Piers 
Plowman—in part sought to free these texts from their chained bookshelves and grant wider 
access to textual and documentary culture, or to widen the social bond.112 Thus, the rebels 
sought to incorporate their lived experience—put their bodies into—the archival tradition in 
an attempt to widen the subjective field of textual interpretation, and in so doing, reflect 
themselves in the institutions they had to navigate. Once again, trauma changes the landscape 
of debate, and the rebels seek an iteration of the social link that accounts for their bodies. It is 
Theology’s idea to “ledeþ [Mede] to Londoun, þere lawe is yshewed”113 in order to 
determine whom Meed can marry, further placing Meed’s individual character between 
institution and law, her capacities for action and identity bounded to a textual culture that at 
times struggles to amend itself to individual circumstance. It is with institutional and 
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theological abstractions heaved upon her that she enters the poem, so far speechless, despite 
our skepticism of her purportedly “fikel tonge.” 
 However, Meed does have an individual, human reaction to being subjected to the 
law, and one that is not necessarily determined by any particular allegorical trait associated 
with “Meed.” When Drede (Judgment) discovers that the King intends to capture Meed and 
her retinue and try them at Westminster, Drede quickly warns Fals and “bad hym fle for 
fere.”114  In fact, Meed is the only one to remain, and the poem offers no hindrances to 
explain her staying; doing so is her choice: 
All fledden for fere and flowen into hernes; 
Save Mede þe mayde na mo dorste abide. 
Ac trewely to telle, she trembled for fere, 
And ek wepte and wrong whan she was attached.115 
From the time that Meed was introduced in the first dream vision, these lines are the very 
first instance where she acts on her own accord rather than through the description or 
interpretation of others, and her actions indeed portray a very human response: fear, weeping, 
and embodied anxiety.116 The poem also describes the others who accompany Meed, 
including Falsness, Gyle, and Lyere, as fearful; however, among the retinue, the most 
detailed description is of Meed’s actions, and despite the fear that she and the others feel, she 
stays. Therefore, the poem singles her out through the difference in her actions—that is, her 
                                                 
114 Ibid., B.II.210. 
115 Ibid., B.II.234-37. 
116 The amount of description devoted to anxiety in the texts in this dissertation shows traces 
of a larger cultural trauma, as well. That is, locating the response to wide-scale trauma in 
literature might also require attending to descriptions of anxious narrators, or anxious 
allegorical characters. 
  
73 
Will, her human function given by God. In this instance, arguing that Meed is merely an 
allegorical figure becomes difficult because the poem, however subtly, distinguishes her 
from the other figures through an affective and anxious response to the law, and one that is 
not exclusively linked to her allegorical qualities as “Meed,” but instead presents her 
humanity. 
  The poem’s treatment of Meed shifts with her arrival at the King’s court at the 
beginning of Passus III, her own affective expression pointing to her individual agency. The 
only other characters that thus far attend to Meed’s desires rather than to her existence in 
abstraction are the King and his clerk. The King, of course, is likely also an allegorical figure 
of kingship, but he must also be the individual king because the King always has two bodies, 
and therefore is always allegorical to an extent.117 But his allegorical status does not preclude 
his individual will; the King, so it seems, faces similar issues as a subject before the law. The 
beginning of Passus III contextualizes Meed within a much more human, rather than strictly 
allegorical, setting, reminding us that the institution can house the Natal space and host the 
social link. They calm her, recognize her fear, and comfort her, and the King’s first command 
is to “[call] a clerk—I kan noght his name— / To take Mede þe maide and maken hire at 
ese.”118 The justices enter her room and “[c]onforted hyre kyndely by Clergies leve, / And 
seiden, ‘Mourne noȝt, Mede, ne make þow no sorwe.[’]”119 Most important, however, is that 
they comfort her by promising to consider her own desires in the legislative process, thereby 
granting her individuated access to institutional process. The King proposes that 
I shal assayen hire myself and sooþliche appose 
                                                 
117 See Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies. 
118 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.III.3-4. 
119 Ibid., B.III.15-16. 
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What man of þis world þat hire were leuest. 
And if she werche bi wit and my wil folowe 
I wol forgyuen hire þis[e] giltes, so me God helpe!120 
As we know, the Commons in fact refuses Meed’s desires and instead, condemns her in 
parliament, as I discuss later. However, the King’s offer to extend mercy to Meed is 
conditional, and, arguably, the Commons work to prevent the corrupt potential of meed in 
politics; that is, Meed’s marriage arrangements could easily become a back-room deal 
between her and the King instead of being subjected to the legislative process. Regardless, 
the King’s court comforts Meed by attending to her will; the social link as an intersubjective 
exchange prevents the individual from being swallowed up by her social context. The Law—
the symbolic order—while totalizing, is also a flexible, open system insofar as its signifiers 
share meaning among the bodies that inhabit it.121 Having one’s will acknowledged, 
especially before the law, is itself comforting and extends the capacities of the law to 
encounter one’s lived experience. 
 Returning to DeLanda’s “capacities for interaction” causes me to question why 
Meed’s interactions with other characters are rarely read as unfolding within an open system. 
To put it another way, if Meed’s entire allegorical identity lies in the ambiguity of meed (i.e., 
either reward or bribe), why does the narrator interpret her interactions as allegorically 
contained solely within corruption and bribery? In fact, Meed’s character, when read as an 
individual, helps to complicate Holy Church’s simple, straightforward sermon in Passus I by 
                                                 
120 Ibid., B.III.5-8. 
121 For a full discussion of the symbolic order, especially in relation to intersubjectivity, see 
Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in 
Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink, 197-268 (New York: Norton, 2002). 
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confronting generalized edict with the ambiguities of lived experience.122 Holy Church ends 
her sermon by distinguishing “charite” from “coveitise,” arguing that “chastite wiþouten 
charite worþ cheyned in helle. / Manye curatours kepen hem clene of hire bodies; / Thei ben 
acombred wiþ coveitise, þei konne noȝt out crepe.”123 As the friar reminds Meed before her 
confession, many “men hath leyen by thee bothe,” and Meed’s character is repeatedly 
portrayed as unchaste—even the parliament calls her “an hore.”124 However, her 
unchasteness is a metaphor for the amount of meed she doles out to “lewed men and lered 
men” both, and throughout Passus III, once she arrives at the King’s court, she often freely 
gives. Given Holy Church’s sermon in Passus I, why is Meed’s giving not considered 
charity, especially her financing the expensive window that also finances sinners’ salvation? 
Holy Church’s own discussion of chastity and charity implies that Christians ought to give 
freely not with their bodies but with their goods, but Meed’s giving is nonetheless 
continually described as unchaste, even when “[t]he leeste man of hire meynee a moton of 
golde” receives.125 Meed’s excessive giving, in addition to participating at times in 
institutional corruption or sway, also at times creates bonds of community with those who 
are otherwise outside of community, namely the poor and the sinful. Her giving has the 
                                                 
122 In discussing “lived experience,” I refer to Reed’s discussion of “experiential realism,” 
which he defines as often in tension with conclusive and rigorous processes for arriving at 
matters of “Truth” in debates and debate poetry (13). While the particulars of a given case 
were certainly regarded as less important than absolute Truths, debate poems show the limit 
of man’s ability to judge such truths when our own reasoning is impacted by sensuous world 
experience. I argue here one step further, that not only is this what Reed would consider to be 
part of the “ludic function” of the debate poem, but that in the space of the law and of 
parliament in particular, lived experience is indeed part of the way we understand abstract 
ideas. See Reed, Middle English Debate Poetry. 
123 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.I.194-96. 
124 Ibid., B.IV.166. 
125 Ibid., B.III.24. 
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capacity for incorporation, and charity can lead to salvation. Even if in bastardized form, 
Meed exercises an anxiety about community-making and group salvation within a corrupt 
institutional setting: how do we know if we can give our way to heaven when institutional 
edicts rarely reflect our living institutions, or the way we live with our institutions? The law 
is dangerous when it denies her subjectivity and legislates subjective reality without taking 
account of lived experience. 
 Meed, by contrast, showcases the capacity for debate to sustain the individual before 
the law and uses deliberation to incorporate actual lived, bodily experience into the court 
archive. Meed reminds her rival Conscious—with whom she debates before the king—of his 
own bodily failure, compared with her loyalty, in working with the King of Normandy, 
insisting that, “In Normandie was he noȝt noyed for my sake— / Ac þow þiself, sooþly, 
shamedest hym ofte: Crope into a cabane for cold of þi nayles, / […]  Ther I lafte wiþ my 
lord his lif for to saue.”126 True, Meed concludes her defense by listing the various social 
benefits to meed, including its ability for kings to “make pees in londe,” and therefore, that 
“[n]o wiȝt, as I wene, wiþouten Mede may libbe!”127 However, she frames her own 
abstractions in embodied, lived experience, enabling her to conclude that meed in fact is a 
mechanism for survival. While Meed’s offenses are many, deliberative process helps to 
complicate abstraction and to incorporate lived experience into the implementation of the 
Law. Contrasting sermon with debate, edict with deliberation, highlights that legal spaces 
preserve the individual—as opposed to the allegorical subject—by housing political 
processes that enable living process to emerge. In a legal space, the testimony and the 
                                                 
126 Ibid., B.III.189-97. 
127 Ibid., B.III.221, 227. 
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petition preserve lived experience alongside requisite legal process. Testimony and petition 
preserve the desire for the subject to survive and grant entry into the social link. 
III. Being on Behalf: The Subject before the Law 
 By granting Lady Meed a subjective reality, I have attempted to show how we can 
use assemblage theory, enhanced by an embrace of deliberation, to complicate allegory and 
allegorical figures, and to show the potential difficulties of the representative subject in legal 
spaces. In moving onto the explicitly parliamentary arena in Passus IV, the individual 
petition presents in similar terms as the allegorical subject: at once a representation but also a 
document that records living processes and desires for survival into the archive. To maintain 
the Natal function of the archive, parliamentary process must preserve individual complaint 
rather than wholly incorporate it. This plateau has added a conceptual layer to the social link, 
namely, that incorporation does not imply the erasure of the subject but, instead, its in-
corporeal-ation:128 encountering the individual body rather than swallowing it up into an 
appendaged model of the body politic. I suggest a model of representation that preserves the 
individual subject at the same time as that individual body likewise represents, but does not 
erase, other bodies. This is about preserving the body so that trauma and individual complaint 
can become in-corporeal-ated into lived experience and social life. 
                                                 
128 I am trying to distinguish “incorporation,” which I see as placing the subject into the body 
politic, from “incorporealation,” which I understand as preserving the individual body within 
a larger socially-embodied context. I likewise see a possible and problematically double 
meaning with the concept of “incorporation.” “To put into body,” yes, but when our models 
of body are likewise imagined in increased scale to models of body politic, in-corpor-ation 
likewise means “to put into a hierarchized body.” Incorporealation, I hope, preserves a model 
of body that celebrates the capacities for interaction of the body rather than the fixed bodily 
political model. 
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 Peace’s petition grants him access to the King’s Parliament, and similar to Lady 
Meed, testifies to the individual’s (here traumatic) lived experience before the law in order to 
find resolution through group process and debate. The allegorical layer of Peace’s petition 
against Wrong generalizes the function of the petition, as petitions generally attempt to 
address an individual or collective wrong for the sake of restoring individual or collective 
peace. Likewise, Peace’s petition testifies to a traumatic upheaval of his intimate social 
bonds, and he undergoes the parliamentary process as a means of restoring them: 
And þanne com Pees into parlement and putte vp a bille— 
How Wrong ayeins his wille hadde his wif taken, 
And how he rauysshede Rose, Reignaldes loue, 
And Margrete of hir maydenhede maugree hire chekes.129 
He continues to describe the property loss and damage that Wrong has caused, in addition to 
the violation of these intimate bonds. Peace’s attachments and means of survival have been 
shaken, and the parliament is charged with at once categorizing these offenses as “Wrong” so 
that the proper legal processes can restore them, and also executing the law in a way that 
preserves the intimacy of the wrong—or, its real, lived consequences. 
 The problem, however, is that Meed sidesteps the deliberative, social, political 
process and over-values the individual’s ability to right Wrong. Rather than allowing the 
petition to summon the law’s capacities for restoring intimate attachments, Meed proposes 
mercy, replacing the bond with payment: 
Thanne gan Mede to maken hire, and mercy bisouȝte, 
And profrede Pees a present al of pure golde. 
                                                 
129 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.IV.47-50. 
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“Haue þis, man, of me,” quod she, “to amenden þi scaþe, 
For I wol wage for Wrong, he wol do so na moore.” 
Pitously Pees preyed to the Kynge 
To haue mercy on þat man þat mysdide hym so ofte.130 
True, Meed again advocates for mercy, and she attempts to “amenden […] scathe.” She 
illustrates another way of easing suffering, she being the daughter of Amendes, as Theology 
tells us. In so doing, however, Meed participates in the erasure of the individual that she 
herself struggles against throughout the first dream vision: that is, Peace is encouraged to 
accept a treaty—to make peace—instead of restoring his lost bond and recuperating his 
means of survival. Gold offers general security, but it does not resuscitate his lost life to 
which he is attached and of which he was “Wrong-ed.” A back-room compromise overvalues 
the capacity of the individual in group process and denies the individual petition into the 
Natal archive. The very process that sustained Meed’s subjectivity is denied to Peace by 
Meed’s plea for mercy and payment. 
 The full impact of overvaluing the individual in group process is made manifestly 
clear when closed-door arrangements are contrasted with the full force of parliamentary 
process. The shift in my argument here reflects what I see as a shift in the poem: Meed can at 
once represent a struggle for individual identity in legal-representational spaces while also 
underscoring the need for those spaces because of the group processes that they preserve. 
That is, we need both the individual and a process that preserves capacities for interaction. 
Meed, too, does have the capacity for corruption as part of her allegorical and human 
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ambiguity—that is also part of her “kynde.” Reason rejects mercy, and in response, Meed 
begins to execute justice as she sees it on an individualized level:  
Clerkes þat were confessours coupled hem togideres  
Al to construe þis clause, and for þe Kynges profit, 
Ac noȝt for confort of þe commune, ne for the Kynges soule, 
For I seiȝ Mede in the moot-hall on men of lawe wynke.131  
Just as Holy Church’s sermon shows the potential for erasing the subject for the sake of the 
institution, so too do Meed’s actions distinguish the King’s profit from common profit to 
attend to the risks of privileging the individual. Trauma can result from a crisis of over-
individualization that lacks attachment to social context, just as the institutionalized erasure 
of the subject can be traumatic. 
 But the duty of parliament here is to offer processes of incorporealization, even if that 
means halting action. Meed’s work aims to seek resolution, but in so doing values 
conclusiveness over continual process. In response to Meed’s actions, parliament chooses to 
reform itself, calling Meed “an hore,” a response echoed by the King who realized that 
“Mede almoost hadde shent it [the law]”132 and consequently allows Reason to rule the realm 
instead of Meed. Despite the ostensible conclusiveness of these actions and the containment 
of Meed’s identity once again within the allegorical confines of bribery, these rulings are 
conditional: “But the commune wole assent.”133 That is to say, before action may be 
finalized, the commons must consent to the King’s shift in power, and Passus IV ends before 
the Commons grants this consent; the implied action happens off-stage. If Meed is to be 
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found guilty in Parliament, it must be through a process of debate that encounters Meed’s 
individual actions rather than simply acquiesces to the negative capacities of Meed’s 
abstractions. Like the petition, Meed’s actions record the individual into the archive. As 
Levinas might say, parliament must preserve the face,134 must incorporealate rather than 
incorporate. The individual petition from Peace before the parliament is what enabled this 
process to begin and to work, and parliament attends to the lived experiences that both Holy 
Church and Reason deny through over-abstraction. The Commons must assent so that 
abstract reasoning is not the law’s only course of action. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has stretched across texts in the parliamentary archive, has blended 
poetry with procedure, in order to argue that the parliament and its archive form an 
assemblage particularly suited to house group experience and to preserve embodied 
experience in institutional settings. The capacities of the institution affect the kind of group 
processes that can take place within institutional settings, and group process can preserve 
lived experiences before the law rather than abstract them into wholly allegorical affects. The 
clerical authors of these texts—the anonymous author of the Modus, Chaucer, and 
Langland—all explore the capacities of parliament’s institutional and cultural milieu and 
complicate traditional notions of the body politic in order to offer a more flexible, 
fragmented, and capacious parliamentary body. The three plateaus that I offer—the 
institutional, the group, and the individual—demonstrate that an engagement with 
contemporary assemblage theory helps us to understand that parliament through its archive 
                                                 
134 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburg: Duquesne, 1969). 
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was conceptualized as expanding the capacities of the body politic at multiple levels of social 
experience. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
POLITICAL PROCESS AND ATTACHMENT IN GEOFFREY CHAUCER’S PARLIAMENT OF FOWLS 
 There is a critical consensus surrounding Geoffrey Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls 
that considers the poem’s ending to be “inconclusive.” As a result, the scholarship tends to 
fixate on what specifically is left unresolved, and what the consequences of irresolution are 
for both the poem and for Chaucer’s milieu. Thomas L. Reed places the Parliament within 
the tradition of debate poetry, a genre that he argues owes its debt to more institutionalized 
practices of debate at universities, in the legal profession, and in parliament.1 When 
translated into a poetic context, Chaucer’s debate poem becomes one example among many 
of a cultural “aesthetics of irresolution,” not singular to debate poetry itself, but which 
infuses other contexts for debate into its poetic structure. Rosemarie P. McGerr expands on 
this idea and points out that the Parliament’s inconclusive ending highlights a larger cultural 
“resistance to closure in medieval discourse” more generally, arguing that poetic irresolution 
specifically across Chaucer’s oeuvre is tied to a much larger valuing of open-endedness in 
matters of “truth” within medieval discourse.2 
The cultural comfort with, and the value placed on, open-endedness reveals a kinship 
with the intellectual clerical culture forming between Oxford and Westminster. This culture, 
however, was not bound exclusively within the limits of the institutions, but instead 
contributed to what Ann Astell calls the “clericalization” of the Three Estates (i.e., the clergy, 
the nobility, and the commons) in the fourteenth century. Astell writes that, “[a]s the 
                                                 
1 See Reed’s chapter on “Institutional Context and Poetic Content” in Middle English Debate 
Poetry, 41-96. 
2 Rosemarie P. McGerr, Chaucer’s Open Books: Resistance to Closure in Medieval 
Discourse (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998). 
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universities struggled for independence from municipal and ecclesiastical control, they 
became a direct and indirect force for a complex clericalization of the previously existing 
estates.”3 Common among the studies cited above is a general conclusion that the 
Parliament’s inconclusive ending is another example of the trope of irresolution that is 
inarguably found in many instances in late medieval literature and medieval discourse. These 
readings underscore that late medieval intellectual culture in England was invested less in 
settling matters of “truth” and defined “knowledge,” and more in developing the processes of 
learning, debating, and speaking with each other. 
 Yet, citing Chaucer’s poem as one example among many does not attend enough to 
the fact that the particular process at the center of this particular poem is a debate in 
parliament, and in the space of parliament. In fact, very few critics have read the poem within 
a specifically parliamentary context, and those who have, such as Matthew Giancarlo, 
similarly conclude that the parliament was yet another institution that lent formal 
characteristics and tropes to a developing vernacular poetry that was in search of its own 
formal traits. Others, such as Gwilym Dodd, see the inconclusive ending to Chaucer’s poem 
as a sign of his disappointment in parliament’s political chaos: “The bird parliament is 
incapable of overcoming the disparate interests of its members. It cannot unite and agree on a 
single common strategy and is therefore unable to act for the common good.”4 This assumes 
that a “single common strategy” is the only way to act for the common good. However, 
commonality is not the same thing as homogeneity, and depends on the recognition of 
                                                 
3 Astell, Chaucer and the Universe of Learning, 21. 
4 Dodd, “Changing Perspectives,” 307. However, this claim is curious, as Chaucer served in 
the so-called Wonderful Parliament of 1388, several years after having written the 
Parliament of Fowls, c. 1380. Why he would actively serve as a Member of Parliament for 
Kent after losing faith in the institution is worth questioning. 
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difference, not its erasure. Instead, the rise of the institution and its increasing power 
(especially when contrasted with its waning influence in Elizabethan England) offered a 
context through which pre-existing literary forms, such as debate poetry, could encounter 
contemporary developments in political process. 
 While Chaucer’s poem is certainly part of the debate poetry tradition, and while 
inconclusiveness or irresolution is certainly a trope of that tradition, readings that fixate on 
the “inconclusive” ending of Chaucer’s debate poem do more to identify features of the poem 
that place it within a larger literary tradition than they do to think about why 
inconclusiveness might be an aesthetic fitting to the parliamentary process. More important 
than locating Chaucer’s poem within the tradition of debate poetry, Chaucer places the 
institution of parliament within that selfsame tradition—alongside the dream vision genre—
in order to conceptualize how we might value, through its very aestheticization, parliament’s 
own processes of deliberation. Rather than fixating on what is left unresolved in parliament, 
examining parliamentary process through the aesthetics of debate poetry and dream vision 
allows us to see that Chaucer uses specific literary forms to value and to further 
conceptualize the benefits of a model of governance that foreground continual deliberation 
(and the joy we glean from it) rather than a model geared toward outcomes and resolution. In 
fact, it is a fantasy that parliament had conclusive endings, as “a supplicant rarely got an 
answer while Parliament was in full session, and often remained unsatisfied [….] Regardless 
of how these ‘unheeded’ disputants felt about their lots, the analogy between such 
parliamentary open-endedness and the irresolution of certain Middle English debate poems 
[…] is immediate and compelling.”5 The parliament rolls, too, corroborate that parliamentary 
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business was often inclusive and ongoing and not resolved while its body was formally 
assembled. The inconclusive ending of Chaucer’s Parliament does not signal the institution’s 
failure but rather makes a bold statement about its entire purpose: parliament concerns itself 
with ensuring a site for ongoing processes of assembly and deliberation. Since the poem’s 
content largely concerns the processes of journeying, assembling, and debating, and exercises 
methods of prolonging resolution, rushing through the majority of the poem to label it as 
inconclusive betrays an allegiance to a more outcomes-driven paradigm of governance that is 
absent in the poem. Instead, Chaucer and his archive ask us to consider processes as ends in 
and of themselves. 
I. Intimacy and Common Profit in the Narrative Frame 
 The Parliament of Fowls opens with a narrative frame that features Chaucer’s 
narrator, clerkly in his reading practices, tirelessly in search of knowledge on the topic of 
love. While the frame—which consists of the first 105 and the final seven lines of the 699-
line edited version of the poem6—references several classical texts bearing auctoritas, the 
main text at the center of the Narrator’s reading is Macrobius’ Commentary on the Dream of 
Scipio. Cicero’s Dream and Macrobius’ Commentary on it might seem strange choices, 
considering that the Narrator’s quandary is love. However, Macrobius’ encyclopedic text was 
among the most important throughout the Middle Ages in its effort to preserve and compile 
classical thought on a wide range of issues, including dream theory, and certainly would have 
been within the archive of clerkly reading.7 By opening the Parliament with a text in this 
                                                 
6 Chaucer, The Parliament of Fowls, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson. All 
citations hereafter will refer to line number. 
7 William Harris Stahl, “Introduction” to Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, 
ed. and trans. William Harris Stahl (New York: Columbia UP, 1952), 1-65; 9-10. 
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archive and with an archive more generally (and a text that itself is an archive), Chaucer is 
placing his parliament’s work—and I argue, the work of the Parliament itself—within a 
framework of texts that concern common profit and an intellectual culture of learning, and 
that think about ways of successfully living together and loving in political spaces. 
Moreover, reading through this archive is a process that requires time and arguably, is a 
process less fixated on finding immediate and definite solutions.8 
The focus in the poem’s narrative frame on learning, contemplation, and consultation 
offers a way of reading the Parliament that moves away from a teleologically-insistent, 
outcomes oriented, anti-parliamentary model fixating on the poem’s inconclusiveness (as if 
the easing of conflict and the leisure to take time were of no use prima facie). Instead, the 
frame presents the contemplative process as both collaborative and soothing. As mentioned 
above, the first stanza witnesses the narrator grappling with the problem of love, a problem 
that later becomes the topic of debate in the dream vision’s parliament. The poem opens by 
citing and translating the opening lines of another text in Chaucer’s clerkly archive: 
Hippocrates’ Aphorisms (i.e., “Ars longa, vita brevis”).9 The medical text written c. 400BCE 
begins by advising the physician to “not only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also 
to make the patient, the attendants, and externals cooperate.”10 Chaucer immediately situates 
his poem in the context of the philosophy of care and prepares the reader to interpret learning 
and problem solving as lengthy and difficult processes that require individual attention to 
                                                 
8 This is perhaps an example of how love poetry changes when political contexts change. No 
longer is it the process of aristocratic exchange focused on houses and hospitality, but now 
also on parliament and the political processes central to it. 
9 Hippocrates, Aphorisms, ed. and trans. Francis Adams (Boston: The Internet Classics 
Archive, 1994-2000), http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/aphorisms.html. See Section 1.1. 
10 Ibid. 
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“good”—to do what is right—and also the cooperation of various elements toward that good. 
However, as Chaucer’s and Hippocrates’ aphorism both suggest, these processes take so 
long, in fact, that they might not even be accomplished in a single lifetime—or, given the 
inconclusiveness of the Parliament, in a single poem: “The lyf so short, the craft so long to 
lerne, / Th’assay so hard, so sharp the conquerynge / The dredful joye alwey that slit so 
yerne.”11 As the narrator soon reveals, “Al this mene I by Love,”12 not medical care, but 
already Chaucer draws an association between Love and healing, a trope also common to the 
amor hereos, or love-sickness, tradition.13 However, although one layer of the ensuing 
parliamentary debate at the center of the dream vision is about marital and amorous love, the 
way in which Chaucer frames the idea of “love” through an allusion to medical care broadens 
the definition of “Love” (capital “L”) for the entire poem. By Love, we do not only mean 
amorous love, but a larger idea about care of the Other, reflected in the imagery of the 
intersubjective relationship between doctor and patient. Such an expansion of terms broadens 
the significance of Love’s association with healing to think about care practices more 
generally as healing agents. When considered in these terms, it is no wonder that care of the 
Other is a “craft so long to lerne,” a lifelong process that refuses easy closure: it is a 
“dreadful joye” that “slit so yerne,” that is, not only rewarding, but also at times a seemingly 
insurmountable task, and for that reason necessarily continuous. 
 Part of the narrator’s anxiety about Love stems from his own inexperience with it. 
However, he reveals that his inexperience lies in the actual practice or execution of Love, but 
                                                 
11 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 1-3. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 For a full discussion and references to the tradition of amor hereos, see Mary Frances 
Wack, Lovesickness in the Middles Ages: The “Viaticum” and Its Commentaries 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990). 
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he seems to have no trouble learning about it. He explains that: 
Ful al be that I knowe nat Love in dede, 
Ne wot how that he quiteth folk here hyre, 
Yit happeth me ful ofte in bokes reede 
Of his myrakles and his crewel yre.14 
While it might seem that reading replaces actual knowable experience, the narrator’s 
frequent scholarly visitations to Love’s archive is itself an experience of creating a bond with 
the ideas of others that enables him to focus more on learning than on achieving a definite 
knowing. The regularity of the narrator’s reading practices suggests a close attachment to his 
archive, and that attachment is transformative not because he “knowe[s]” the content of these 
texts “in dede,” but because his continual visitations focus his efforts on creating a bond 
rather than on mastering the material. When contrasted to the anxiety described above, 
clerkly reading practices provide a pleasurable antidote to not knowing: “Of usage—what for 
lust and what for lore— / On bokes rede I ofte, as I yow tolde.”15 That is to say, his “usage,” 
or his “habitual activity” of reading,16 equates pleasure and learning; moreover, in a 
performative move, Chaucer’s narrator extends this pleasure to his own reader, reminding 
them that they have in fact read about his reading habits themselves just a few lines prior. 
When coupled with the opening allusion to Hippocrates’ philosophy of medical care, the 
narrative frame presents the archive as transformative because it requires a constant attention 
that in turn bonds reader to text. Reading has transformed the “craft so long to lerne” from an 
overwhelming task to one of “lust” and “lore.” 
                                                 
14 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 8-11. 
15 Ibid., 15-16. 
16 MED, s.v. “usage (n.),” 3a, accessed on August 21, 2018. 
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 The drive to learn rather than to know is what reinforces the attachment with the 
archive. In search of comfort, the narrator picks up a book, which “was write with lettres 
olde, / And thereupon, a certeyn thing to lerne, / The longe day ful faste I redde and yerne.”17 
The assumption that an old book would of course impart knowledge seems to at first reflect a 
commitment to auctoritas and established knowledge (and Macrobius certainly qualifies), 
and this is only underscored by the narrator’s expectation of a “certeyn thing to lerne,” 
namely that he yearns after a definite solution to his problem. If only scholarship and 
parliamentary process were so easy. Instead, upon engaging in his reading practices, the 
narrator’s attitude morphs into what McGerr terms a “resistance to closure,” and he finds 
relief in the openness of the archive: 
For out of olde feldes, as men seyth, 
Cometh al this newe corn from yer to yere, 
And out of olde bokes, in good feyth, 
Cometh al this newe science that men lere.18 
The harvesting metaphor celebrates that the value of the archive is not that it stores fixed 
knowledge, but that it is home to a vast amount of old knowledge that, through continual re-
encounters, provides an endless source of relief in the form of nourishment. Chaucer presents 
the yearly encounter with the archive—and later, the yearly assembly of the bird 
parliament—as continually creating new knowledge through the repetition of this process. 
The archive creates a bond to a social framework, and this social bond relieves helplessness 
and forecloses isolation. Lack of closure enables continual relief. Our narrator claims so 
                                                 
17 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 19-21. 
18 Ibid., 22-25. 
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himself when, immediately after his knowledge-harvesting metaphor, he claims that “[t]o 
rede forth hit gan me so delite / That al the day me thoughte but a lyte.”19 The process of 
reading forth is so pleasurable that the day passes without much notice; the process is 
delightful and enriches living. 
 Key to the narrator’s experience with the archive is that it transforms him. His 
description of his own emotional state changes from not knowing “wher that I flete or synke” 
before reading to “rede forth hit gan me so delite” afterward. What relieves his anxieties is 
that the process of bonding resists closure. The narrative frame decodes the poem’s 
inconclusiveness because its focus on clerkly scholarly practices—of reading and re-reading, 
visiting and re-visiting, dream vision and re-vision—as healing practices complicates any 
critique of the dream vision parliament’s circular debate as simply fool’s speech because of 
its circularity. In fact, the cycle of returning-to in order to learn rather than to know, and the 
relief that this process of returning-to provides, is the framework for attachment in 
psychoanalysis, as well; the attachment between analyst and analysand, and the necessary 
inconclusiveness that it entails, suggests that inconclusiveness can facilitate healing. Later in 
the poem in Nature’s bird parliament, inconclusiveness allows the parliament to continue its 
work annually and offers a defense of its regular recurrence. Though it might not arrive at a 
resolution each time it assembles, what LaCapra terms “repetition with change” still offers 
another type of progression; after all, something changes, and it will change again. 
 The narrator’s reflection on the bond created by continual re-visitation that opens the 
poem also scaffolds his exposé on common profit, which ought to affect how we in turn read 
the work of common profit. The book that has given the narrator such “delite” is “Tullyus of 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 27-28, emphasis mine. 
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the Drem of Scipioun,”20 and, as Stahl notes, because Cicero’s Dream of Scipio was passed 
down to the Middle Ages through Macrobius’ Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, 
Chaucer’s narrator most likely spent his day reading both the Dream and Macrobius’ 
Commentary together. Chaucer was proficient enough in Latin that the short Dream of Scipio 
on its own most likely would not have taken him “al that day” to read, suggesting that his 
day-long pursuit included both Cicero’s brief Dream and Macrobius’ lengthy Commentary.21 
While this text might seem an unusual choice given his preoccupation with “Love,” the 
narrator’s choice further suggests that his preoccupation with Love has much larger 
implications beyond romantic encounters, as stated above. In the narrator’s brief summary of 
the Dream, he focuses on the ghost of Affricanus’ visitation to Scipio, and in transitioning 
from a general anxiety about Love to a treatise on common profit, our definition of common 
profit should be read through the narrator’s previous ruminations on love. That is, although 
the poem moves onto a much larger social idea such as common profit, the narrator does not 
let us readers forget about the experience of attachment that begins the poem and carries it 
through his exposé on common profit. There is no discontinuity between the narrator’s 
opening anxieties and his subsequent reading practices; instead, they are adjacent because we 
should read them together, a practice in holding together and reading heterogeneity. 
 Love in the narrative frame attunes the reader to intimacy, fondness, and attachment, 
and so as the topic shifts to common profit, the reader must not leave these terms behind. 
Cicero’s Dream of Scipio thinks similarly, but augments the scale of attachment from the 
individual to the commonwealth. The Dream, told through the perspective of Scipio, opens 
                                                 
20 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 31. 
21 Stahl, “Introduction,” Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, 53. 
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by describing the intimate kinship between him and King Masinissa, whom he visits. 
Chaucer’s narrator begins his summary of the Dream with their initial embrace, preserving 
the fondness between them: 
Fyrst telleth it, whan Scipio was come 
In Affricke, how he meteth Massynisse, 
That hym for joie in armes hath inome; 
Thenne telleth [it] here speche and al the blysse 
That was betwix hem til the day gan mysse.22 
The fondness that Chaucer’s narrator identifies between Scipio and Masinissa transitions 
readers from the discussion of love and attachment in the first part of the frame to the 
narrator’s ruminations on common profit. However, their love suggests that—rather than 
distracting Chaucer’s narrator from his current problems with lovesickness—we ought to 
undertake the work of common profit with the same tenderness and intimacy. Through the 
relationship between Scipio and Masinissa, Chaucer offers us a vision of common profit that 
foregrounds the social bond as central to this work and the affect that attends it. Furthermore, 
Chaucer draws a subtle parallel between his own narrator’s reading practices and Scipio’s 
encounter with Masinissa: both are so engulfed in, renewed by, and take such pleasure in 
their encounters that time seems to slip away; both are absorbed, a characteristic of 
attachment behaviors. 
 Chaucer’s source for the dream vision, the version passed down through Macrobius, 
offers an even fuller description of their embrace, and emphasizes even more so the 
consuming nature and healing powers of intimate attachments and social bonds: 
                                                 
22 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 36-40. 
  
94 
[T]he old man [Masinissa] embraced me with tears in his eyes, and after a 
pause, gazing heavenward, said: “To you, O Sun on high, and to you other 
celestial beings, my thanks are due for the privilege, before I pass from this 
life, of seeing in my kingdom and beneath this very roof Publius Cornelius 
Scipio, at the mere mention of whose name I am refreshed [recreor]; for the 
memory of that excellent and invincible leader never leaves my mind.”23 
The original Latin indeed uses the word “recreor”—I am refreshed, renewed, revived24—to 
describe Masinissa’s reaction to Scipio. In his old age, Masinissa’s attachment to Scipio 
revives and overwhelms him; on the one hand, this affective reaction demonstrates the 
healing powers of attachment, but on the other hand, it shows the emotional effort that such 
healing requires: with tears in his eyes, for a moment he is speechless and can only hold. I 
belabor the point about their embrace because holding offers a social analogy for the archive. 
Here, Masinissa’s attachment is held as a memory in the archive of his mind that never 
leaves him. Particularly in Macrobius’ version, the mind is an archive holding memories that 
upon revisiting can refresh and rejuvenate; old fields do indeed yield new crops that sustain. 
What if the image of an embrace serves as a model for common profit, preserving bonds in 
order to be refreshed by them? The archive, too, holds onto our attachments as an assemblage 
of salient signifiers. 
 Once Scipio’s conversation with Masinissa ends, he falls asleep, and his grandfather 
“Affrycan,” Scipio the Elder, greets him in his dream, whom the narrator describes as “his 
                                                 
23 Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Scipio’s Dream,” in Macrobius, The Commentary on the Dream 
of Scipio, 67-77, Chapter I.i.2. 
24 Latin Dictionary, s.v. “recreo (v.),” accessed August 21, 2018, http://www.latin-
dictionary.net. 
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auncestre, Affrycan so dere.”25 Scipio likewise has a strong attachment and fondness for his 
grandfather, who acts as his celestial tour guide through the dream vision that follows. 
Because Scipio is asleep, he, like Masinissa, stores an attachment in the archive of his mind, 
the recollection of which is expressed with fondness. According to Macrobius, who passed 
down dream theories from antiquity to the Middle Ages in the Commentary, and who was 
considered to be the leading authority on dreams throughout the Middle Ages,26 only some 
dreams are valuable in “foretelling the future” and in gifting dreamers with “the powers of 
divination.”27 For Macrobius, “The dream which Scipio reports that he saw embraces the 
three reliable types [of dreams] mentioned above [i.e., enigmatic, prophetic, and oracular], 
and also has to do with all five varieties of the enigmatic dream [i.e., personal, alien, social, 
public, and universal].”28 Some dreams are able to use their content to permit “the attentive 
soul to perceive the truth,”29 and thus in this case, the attachment with Affrycan archived in 
Scipio’s memory also connects him with truth at the universal scale. These attachments lead 
us to more universal, celestial revelations, and they help develop more intimate connections 
with abstract ideas like “truth” or “common profit.” Our intimate social attachments act as 
guides for developing more abstract social bonds that motivate our working toward the 
common good. 
 Chaucer’s narrator goes on to tell of the lessons that Scipio learned from Affrycan, 
which turn out to be about the everlasting and eternal work of common profit. Of course, 
Chaucer distills Macrobius’ fuller version and commentary on the dream, in which 
                                                 
25 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 41, emphasis mine. 
26 Stahl, “Introduction,” Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, 13. 
27 Macrobius, Commentary, I.III.8. 
28 Ibid., I.III.12. 
29 Ibid., I.III.20. 
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Macrobius tells us that he believes that pursuing common profit in political life is one of the 
pathways leading to eternal life, writing that “the purpose of the dream is to teach us that the 
souls of those who serve the state well are returned to the heavens after death and there enjoy 
everlasting blessedness.”30 Chaucer, however, more explicitly involves all estates and levels 
of society in working for the state and universalizes the attachments that we can develop to 
common profit, writing: 
Thanne telleth it that, from a sterry place, 
How Affrycan hath hym [Scipio] Cartage shewed, 
And warnede hym beforn of al his grace, 
And seyde hym what man, lered or lewed, 
That lovede commune profyt, wel ithewed, 
He shulde into a blysful place wende 
There as joye is that last withouten ende.31 
The close attachment that Scipio has with his tour guide guides him not only to a higher 
calling, but also to an attachment with that higher calling. The narrative frame teaches us that 
the various deep, intimate attachments that we have in our daily lives also help us to develop 
more intimate and tender attachments to the public good, or “common profit,” as Chaucer 
would say. Attachments are of a celestial importance because they lead us to the heavens, but 
we should not forget that what leads to thinking about and valuing common profit and the 
state are a series of initial intimate attachments, and that we ought to pursue common profit 
with this same tenderness. Macrobius essentially says so himself when he writes that, “[m]an 
                                                 
30 Ibid., I.IV.1. 
31 Chaucer, The Parliament of Fowls, 43-49, emphasis mine. 
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has political virtues because he is a social animal. By these virtues upright men devote 
themselves to their commonwealths, protect cities, revere parents, love their children, and 
cherish relatives; by these they direct the welfare of the citizens.”32 Political virtues guide all 
levels of social experience, and accordingly, Macrobius’ definition of “the political” here 
seems more aligned with our notion of the social bond—that is, politics is social experience 
at any level. Perhaps talking about one’s attachment to the state, or developing a tenderness 
for common profit, sounds strange when in our contemporary political discourse, those like 
Michel Foucault have offered a vocabulary for thinking about the individual’s connection to 
the state along the lines of self-policing;33 however, I offer another set of terms for thinking 
about the individual’s role in public life. Why must the rhetoric of “love of country” belong 
only to conservatives? Instead, political attachments can be cast in the language of the social 
bond, the social link, the embrace. 
 Associating common profit with eternal life underscores that the work of common 
profit is likewise eternal, offering another way to understand the poem’s and the parliament’s 
inconclusiveness. To return to Chaucer’s inclusion of those who are “lered or lewed,” he 
predicts the division between the “noyse”34 of the common birds and the eloquent “ple”35 of 
the three eagle suitors that continue Nature’s parliament’s work but also seem to lead 
nowhere in terms of resolution. Furthermore, we can read that both “noyse” and “ple”—
whether it be “lered or lewed”—work toward common profit. Despite their class differences, 
                                                 
32 Macrobius, Commentary, I.VIII.6. 
33 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 
1995). See especially his discussion of the “panopticon,” 195-230. 
34 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 312. 
35 Ibid., 485. 
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neither kind of speech immediately solves the problem at the center of the debate; no matter 
who works toward common profit, the work seems unending and inconclusive. 
 Macrobius offers a larger perspective for understanding the never-ending nature of 
common profit’s work. In his Commentary, he discusses how, although perusing divine 
matters is a higher calling than pursuing a political life, devoting one’s life to earthly 
governance nonetheless also offers a pathway to eternal life: 
 Cicero is right in claiming for the rulers of commonwealths a place where 
they may enjoy a blessed existence forever. In order to show that some men 
become blessed by the exercise of virtues at leisure and others by virtues 
exercised in active careers, he did not say with finality that nothing is more 
gratifying to that supreme God than commonwealths, but added a 
qualification, nothing that occurs on earth is more gratifying. His purpose was 
to distinguish those who are primarily concerned with divine matters from the 
rulers of commonwealths, whose earthly achievements prepare their way to 
the sky.36 
Macrobius limits his thinking about working for the commonwealth to rulers, but Chaucer 
very clearly develops this idea to account for the political changes of the fourteenth century. 
The institutionalization of parliament, that is, extends the active life in Chaucer to all three 
estates, those who are “lered and lewed.” With a more egalitarian vision of political virtues, 
we can read the “noyse” of the lower birds in Nature’s parliament not in a way that 
condemns them, but as their participation in earthly pursuits that lead to eternal life. 
Although the term “noyse” has been used to suggest the unproductivity and circularity of 
                                                 
36 Macrobius, Commentary, I.VIII.12, emphasis original. 
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common speech,37 Macrobius clarifies the eternality of the task at hand, and therefore, that 
all speech will be circular to some extent, because working for the commonwealth as a way 
to heaven ends only upon earthly death. Furthermore, the signifier always circulates; this is 
why it is so helpful, but also why it is so frustrating to fantasies of control. We are not 
frustrated that we have accomplished nothing, but instead, the thing that we are 
accomplishing is an eternal task that will eventually lead to eternal life.38  
The adjacency of love to common profit in the frame, then, makes visible the naïveté 
of expecting clean answers to emerge from a necessarily messy political process. While this 
messiness can be anxiety-producing, frustrating, and irresolvable, it provides a path to eternal 
life because the alternate is far worse: death, violence, and perpetual conflict. The narrator 
                                                 
37 Steven Justice in Writing and Rebellion discusses Walsingham’s use of the term “noise” to 
describe the sounds of the Peasant’s Rebellion. He argues that by reducing their language to 
“noise,” Walsingham denies their participation in civil discourse (207). However, Chaucer 
equates the effectiveness of “noyse” with “pleyting” to both elevate the status of noise, and to 
show that both modes of language participate in civil discourse to the same effect: no one 
mode comes any closer to resolution than another. 
38 I have always had a hard time taking seriously Troilus’ “epiphany” upon his death at the 
end of Troilus and Criseyde once he ascends into heaven and sees how small the problems of 
the earth seem in comparison to the largeness of the heavens: “And down from thennes faste 
he gan avyse / This litel spot of erthe […] / And dampned al oure werk that foloweth so / The 
blynde lust, the which that may nat laste, / And sholden al oure herte on heven caste” 
(Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, in The Riverside Chaucer, 471-585, V.1814-25). After five 
books containing almost entirely scenes of dialogue and extimate reflection, the earth’s 
unimportance seems unlikely. Of course, Macrobius falls in this same tradition, and Chaucer 
uses the term “lytel” to describe the earth in the Parliament of Fowls, as well: “Thanne 
shewede he [Affrican] hym [Scipio] the lytel erthe that here is, / At regard of the hevenes 
quantite” (57-58). But, we get there by taking seriously our attachments here: common profit 
and devotion to our social bonds in both instances leads to the heavens and to eternal life. 
The MED notes that while “lytel” can denote a lack of importance and size (1a-b), it also 
serves, as it does today, as a term of affection (2); the earth’s littleness is the very thing 
which minimizes its stature next to the heavens and thereby solidifies our attachment to it—
it’s our little earth. Fradenburg argues in Staying Alive that cuteness serves an evolutionary 
role to facilitate bonds between infants and caregivers, or between helpless creatures and 
their caretakers (179). Little things deserve our care. I read Macrobius and Chaucer’s little 
earth along these terms. 
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initially describes his reading experience, we will recall, with “delite,” and as stated above, 
this delight results from the archive’s ability to connect the narrator with a larger, endless 
social framework that relieves his initial isolation. After his summary of Scipio’s dream, the 
narrator reflects this time on his feelings after he has finished reading (rather than on the 
reading process itself), admitting the anxiety that accompanies putting down the book: “[T]o 
my bed I gan me for to dresse, / Fulfyld of thought and busy hevynesse; / For both I hadde 
thyng which that I nolde, / And ek I ne hadde that thyng that I wolde.”39 The narrator 
discovers that to find answers does not mean finding all the answers—anymore than it means 
finding only one—and that making progress does not mean finding resolution. True, there is 
a healing potential to irresolvable political processes, but there is also an anxiety over 
irresolution. The narrator is “Fulfyld of thought and busy hevynesse”—filled full, but also 
satisfied by this “hevynesse,” or uneasiness and anxiety40—as a result of his reading. 
Especially noteworthy is that, although the narrator seems at least partially dissatisfied with 
his reading, the dream that he has of Affrican after he falls asleep continues his 
contemplative process: “Can I not seyn if that the cause were / For I hadde red of Affrican 
byforn / That made me to mete that he stod there.”41 The process is certainly messy: anxiety 
about love turns into reading about common profit, which then develops into new anxieties 
that form the basis of a dream vision. However, this emergence makes clear that 
contemplative processes benefit from (because they continue) changes in perspective. The 
pursuit of knowledge yields more crops when the harvest includes diverse voices, even 
though the process might take longer. The archive is endless not only because it is vast, but 
                                                 
39 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 88-91. 
40 MED, s.v. “hevines(se) (n.),” 5b, accessed August 30, 2018. 
41 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 106-08. 
  
101 
also because it is multivocal. The archive’s multivocality creates anxiety but also sustains 
attachment. 
Turning for a moment to the end of the poem, and thus the other end of the narrative 
frame, the narrator’s dream and the parliament both end inconclusively, and parliament does 
seem out of reach. Stunned and awake, the narrator hits the books and digs even deeper into 
the network of texts available to a clerical intellectual culture that have heretofore appeared 
throughout the narrative frame, or the archive that frames Nature’s Parliament and continues 
the work of debate: 
I wok, and othere bokes tok me to, 
To rede upon, and yit I rede alwey. 
I hope, ywis, to rede so som day 
That I shal mete som thyng for to fare 
The bet, and thus to rede I nyl nat spare.42 
The crisis of an otherwise detached mental landscape is integrated into an archival 
assemblage, and, moreover, his experience in that potentiating dream changes how he reads. 
The archive does not interpret the work of parliament but extends it. Likewise, the extensive 
archive devoted to common profit and parliamentary procedure suggests that parliament’s 
formality is meant to make us aware that no amount of writing, narrative structure, or 
political process will make the necessarily complex process less complex or more definitive: 
the social is undecidable. Similarly, Rosemarie McGerr argues that “the poem suggests that 
reading in search of education and improvement does not necessarily end at the conclusion of 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 695-99. 
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a particular text but is an ongoing process for seeking a greater end,”43 though I would 
quibble with “a greater end,” since the end is not in sight or even in mind. The archive 
preserves voices over time and in time—whatever the specific intentions of its contributors, 
the archive “rehearses” a vast array of experiences until it can eventually provide relief from 
current and future problems—until “som day / That I shal mete som thyng for to fare / The 
bet.” Perhaps next year, or perhaps never; but, to echo Fradenburg, “the Natal is the home 
that is elsewhere, that must always be ‘found’ again.”44 The archive, too, serves a Natal 
function as a place to which we return, and return again; the process of digging, searching, 
deliberating is what heals. As a site of Natality, the archive holds together, embraces, and 
rehearses heterogeneity. It, too, is a site of assembly. 
II. Political and Psychological Process in the Dream Vision 
Chaucer’s Parliament connects political deliberation to mental processes by housing 
its Natal parliament in the dream vision genre. By placing a debate poem within the dream 
vision genre, Chaucer locates the psychological ramifications of deliberative processes and 
adds a psychological layer to parliament’s conceptual development. As noted, psychological 
healing frames the debate, but the inclusion of the dream vision genre expands the debate’s 
healing capacities into the mentally constructed parliamentary space, suggesting that Chaucer 
plays with equating parliamentary process with mental process. That is, Chaucer suggests 
that parliamentary process is psychological. Especially given the role that attachment 
behavior plays in the exercise of common profit in this poem, and in the motivations behind 
political process, perhaps it is not particularly surprising that the narrator’s attachment to 
                                                 
43 McGerr, Chaucer’s Open Books, 85. 
44 Fradenburg, Staying Alive, 228. 
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Affrican guides him through the gates and into the space of the parliamentary dream world. 
Chaucer explores the psychological roots and ramifications of political process through a 
figuration of otherness, however, that both continues and complicates attachment. Based on 
Macrobius’ dream theory that the day’s occupations can spark our dreams,45 or what Freud 
will later refer to as “day residue,”46 the narrator postulates that, just as “The wery huntere, 
slepynge in his bed, / to wode ayeyn his mind goth anon,”47 so too do his own reading 
practices affect his dreams:  
Can I not seyn if that the cause were 
For I hadde red of Affrican byforn 
That made me to mete that he stod there; 
But thus seyde he: “Thow hast the so wel born 
In lokynge of myn olde bok totorn, 
                                                 
45 Interestingly, Macrobius’ explanation that our day’s occupations can reappear in our 
dreams only occurs in his discussion of the two dream types to be ignored, namely, the 
nightmare and the apparition. He writes that “[n]ightmares may be caused by mental or 
physical distress, or anxiety about the future: the patient experiences in dreams vexations 
similar to those that disturb him during the day” (I.III.4), and that “[t]he apparition 
(phantasma or visum) comes upon one in the moment between wakefulness and slumber, in 
the so-called ‘first cloud of sleep’” (I.III.7). Although the apparition seems similar to the 
oracular dream, which likewise includes apparitions, apparitions in the oracular dream reveal 
the future to the dreamer rather than stir confusion, and Macrobius classifies the figurations 
of Africanus and Aemilius Paulus in Scipio’s dream as oracular because “the two men who 
appeared before him revealed his future” (I.III.12). Important to note is that the difference 
between apparitions and oracles is their orientation toward the future: apparitions express 
anxiety about the future, while oracles foretell it. It appears that Chaucer plays with these 
classifications in his description of “day residue”: while the figuration that appears is the 
oracular Affrycan who for Chaucer does indeed produce anxiety throughout his journey in 
his dream, the narrator’s justification for why Affrycan might have appeared shares language 
similar to Macrobius’ description of nightmares. Anxiety and attachment here overlap.  
46 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation of Dreams: The Complete and Definitive Text, ed. and 
trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1955), 560. 
47 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 99-100. 
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Of which Macrobye roughte nat a lyte, 
That sumdel of thy labour wolde I quyte.”48 
Affrican continues the concentration on attachment that the narrative frame begins: not only 
does he foreground Macrobius’ own relationship to his text as one of care—he “roughte nat a 
lyte”—but he also promises to “quyte” the narrator’s devoted contemplation of Macrobius’s 
text. Of course, this word has a double valence in Middle English, as we know from the 
Prologue to the Miller’s Tale: to “quyte” is either to reward or to seek revenge.49 Therefore, 
Chaucer explores the psychological ramifications of process by including in the dream vision 
a figuration of otherness and attachment, but as indicated above, one that admits conflict. 
“Quytting” reframes attachment, and the narrator and Affrican’s relationship will 
further develop throughout the dream journey to suggest that attachments, too, create 
conflict. The narrator does not develop an intense attachment with his guide, since Affrican 
eventually leaves him. However, his initial attachment with his guide, an attachment that 
breeds conflict in the text, eventually leads him to the larger parliamentary space, further 
acknowledging that individual attachments lead into, prompt, or melt into political 
attachments, however aggressively. Love of the Other, then, can and must include conflict. A 
politics of psychoanalysis understands the intimate connection between attachment and 
conflict; in fact, Lacan writes that transference depends on aggression between analyst and 
analysand because such aggression allows the subject to explore her or his own boundaries 
with regard to the Other.50 Cooperation and cure leave space for conflict. In the remainder of 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 106-12. 
49 MED, s.v. “quiten (v.),” 2-3, accessed August 21, 2018. 
50 Jacques Lacan, “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Finke, 82-101 
(New York: Norton, 1996). 
  
105 
this chapter, I will explore the connection between aggression or conflict and political 
attachments to argue that that parliamentary process is conceptualized in Chaucer as a space 
that holds heterogeneity together in conflict. 
III. Holding Together in Conflict 
 Affrican’s reward to the dreaming narrator pointedly creates a permeable membrane 
between healing and conflict. The dream begins with Affrican leading the narrator to a 
bifurcated gate with two contrary pieces of verse written above either of the gate’s halves, 
which offer two models or modes of experiencing difference. On one side, the gate tells that 
“[t]horgh me men gon into that blysful place / Of hertes hele and dedly wounded cure,”51 
while the other half warns that “[t]horgh me men gon […] / Unto the mortal strokes of the 
spere / Of which Disdayn and Daunger is the gyde, / […] Th’eschewing is the only 
remedye!”52 The language of sickness and cure frames the entrance into the garden and the 
journey that the narrator takes through it to the eventual parliament. In fact, entering the same 
gate promises to “cure” the heart’s deadly wounds and to cause more of (presumably) these 
same wounds or “strokes.”  Even more curious than the polarity between these two verses is 
that they frame the same entrance: since there is no fork in the road, the gate is a both-and. 
The plush garden on the other side resembles the “grene and lusty May”53 that the healing 
half of the gate foretells, but the wounding side is also true: the only “remedye” to the 
“mortal strokes” is to avoid or to “eschew” them, both of which are true in parliament, and 
both of which describe its processes. The legal, spiritual, and medical converge in seeking 
“remedye” to wounds insofar as relief is similarly figured in all three. Entering the gate is 
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entering a parliamentary space, and the gate makes clear what could happen if such a space 
did not exist: no cure for deadly wounds. Avoiding wounds (and we will recall that the 
original meaning of “trauma” in Greek is “wound”) leads down the same path as getting 
them, which presents the double potential of group process. The very processes through 
which we cure or avoid our traumas have the potential to erupt into violence: assembly can 
become swarming or rebellion, deliberation can become dueling. However, in this figuration 
of the parliamentary space, both of the gate’s verses are accomplished simultaneously. 
Entering the gate promises “dedly woundes cure,” so long as we avoid violence, or the 
“mortal strokes of the spere.” 
 Psychoanalysis offers another way to understand the gate’s bifurcated promise, 
namely, that the overlap between wound and cure suggests that successful group experience 
does not reject conflict but incorporates it into a social framework as a means of 
acknowledging and thus treating it. Davoine and Gaudillière are concerned mainly with the 
role that trauma can play in the psychoanalytic practice, and they argue that the “social link” 
functions by providing a social context to which a traumatized patient may connect in order 
to incorporate trauma into an intersubjective framework, thus refusing its isolating 
capacities.54 Accordingly, they argue that analysts should open their own traumas up to their 
analysands, and vice versa, as a way of using the attachment between analyst and analysand 
as a site for experimenting with incorporating traumatic experiences, in whatever form of 
expression they take. For them, the transmission of trauma is its very treatment, and I 
understand this to mean that the shareability of trauma—that is, refusing trauma’s 
unincorporability—is the work of the social link. Transmission becomes treatment, the 
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unincorporable becomes social. Translated up in scale to the parliamentary process, the 
treatment of social wounds does not reject conflict but holds together in conflict. 
 The gate that Chaucer’s narrator encounters holds conflicting meanings together and 
admits that such an embrace also stirs anxieties. Chaucer’s narrator “gan astoned”55 at the 
sight of the gate, and in perhaps one of the most vivid and imagistic pieces of Chaucerian 
poetry, the narrator describes the paralysis of his indecision over whether to enter as akin to a 
piece of iron fixed between opposite magnetic pulls: “Right as betwixen adamauntes two / Of 
evene myght, a pece of yren set / Ne hath no myght to meve to ne fro—.”56 What’s more, 
“myght” describes not only the even strength of each pulling force, but also the narrator’s 
(here portrayed as the iron’s) own lack of ability to withstand either pull, implying that his 
paralysis is not a lack of movement but a struggle for or against movement, and that his 
paralysis comes at a great strain. The narrator’s daytime anxiety over his inability to know 
“wher that I flete or synke”57 reappears as conflicting magnetic pulls. Holding together in 
conflict can cause a paralysis that appears immobile and frustrating. But although progress 
moves no closer to resolution, the apparent lack of movement is the result of conflicting 
forces gaining expression; terming this “paralysis” takes no account of vibrations of 
difference that nonetheless move in place, which is a metaphor, too, for parliament’s 
contemplative work and ability to sit with conflict. 
 The strongest moment of attachment between Affrican and the narrator is also the one 
with the most conflict: in response to the narrator’s paralysis, he tells us that, “Affrycan, my 
gide, / Me hente and shof at the gates wide,” and then tells him that he need not be afraid to 
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enter, “For this writing nys nothing ment bei the, / Ne by non but he Loves servaunt be.”58 
Though ultimately playful and helpful, Affrican’s shove is also aggressive, compounded by 
his teasing afterward about the narrator’s dullness.59 For group experience to provide 
“remedye” does not necessitate an absence of conflict; in fact, conflict can generate 
movement, so long as we attune ourselves to movement as such rather than toward a defined 
outcome. After some more instructive teasing, the narrator concludes his description of the 
encounter with Affrican’s embrace, writing, “With that myn hand in his he tok anon, / Of 
which I confort caught, and wente in faste.”60 Affrican and our narrator holding hands 
perhaps provides the best imagery of holding together in conflict because the embrace here 
betrays vulnerability and comfort. Affrican’s (playful) aggression is what heals; conflict 
indeed remedies the wound. Much as the readerly narrative frame contextualizes the entire 
poem’s clerkly regard for processes of healing, so too does the gate frame the dream vision’s 
anxiety about the conflict central to this healing. 
IV. Parliamentary Ecology 
Thus far, the Parliament of Fowls has located its vision of common profit primarily in 
a series of individual attachments: the clerk with his archive, Scipio with the king and with 
his dream guide, and now, the narrator with his dreamed apparition. However, the imagery of 
the poem shifts from a series of intimate attachments to an ecological representation of 
parliamentary multiplicity, Nature’s Parliament, of course, being the central “place” of the 
dream vision. The dream vision works to imagine both the Natal and a political migration 
toward the Natal space, facilitated by a series of attachments. Affrican’s embrace carries the 
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narrator into a landscape that itself holds difference together, forming a diverse ecological 
assemblage that imagines the kind of place that such sustained and multiple attachments can 
construct: 
But, Lord, so I was glad and wel begoon! 
For overal were that I myne eyen caste 
Were treës clad with leves that ay shal laste, 
Each in his kynde, of color fresh and green 
As emeraude, that joye was to sene.61 
This is the first explicit use of “kynde” in the poem, a term that in this instance weds the 
diversity of the natural landscape with the political diversity of the Three Estates, the word 
“kynde” of course rooted in these two discourses.62 Chaucer constructs a Natal space by re-
imagining intimate attachments as ecological heterogeneity, and the logic of the dream world 
allows these ideas to merge into each other to suggest their mutual dependence. The diversity 
of “kynde” re-focuses our attention on Parliament’s “place-ness.”63 The landscape celebrates 
the parliamentary environment by imagining the garden as a place of ecological multiplicity 
and diversity that is vivacious and thrives, constructing a place in which the narrator sees 
“nothyng dede.”64 As Chaucer’s narrator migrates ever closer to Nature’s Parliament, he 
witnesses parliament’s own multiplicity of “kynde” radiating outward in influence over the 
landscape to create an allegorical vision of a parliamentary ecology. Put another way, the 
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narrator need not even arrive at Nature’s Parliament in order to witness the effects of its 
multiplicity, and the dream vision uses place-ness to imagine parliament’s capacity to expand 
its conceptual influence beyond its chambers, thus making a case for its cultural significance. 
Multiplicity territorializes by including the garden into the parliamentary assemblage, and 
parliament’s own aesthetics of thriving multiplicity also deterritorializes Nature’s Parliament 
so as to avoid limiting its capacities for influence to any specific place or territory. As 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, the Natal is both at the center and outside.65 
 The path our narrator takes is indeed a political migration toward the Natal bird 
parliament, and the catalogues of “kynde” throughout his journey through the parliamentary 
ecology reflect the eventual catalogue of birds that marks the assembly point of Nature’s 
Parliament.66 We can most compellingly read the narrator’s description of the trees that 
compose the garden’s landscape as an allegorical narrative of political process—from 
conflict to peace—and how such processes provide structures (or guides) through which we 
arrive at political and spiritual healing, despite both antagonism and deliberation: 
                                                 
65 For readings that link naturalism to political identity, see Fradenburg, “Among All Beasts: 
Affective Naturalism in Late Medieval England,” in Rethinking Chaucerian Beasts, ed. 
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66 Parliament as a Natal palace is even more pronounced when we consider that the birds of 
every “kynde” migrate to Nature’s Parliament: “Ye knowe wel how, Seynte Valentynes day, 
/ By my statut and thorgh my governaunce, / Ye come for to chese—and fle youre wey— / 
Your makes” (386-89). The Parliament of Fowls combines annual bird migration and mating 
rituals with governmental assembly as a way to conceptualize the significance of the very 
processes of assembly that make up the first quarter of the Modus (Chapters I-VIII). Much 
like Chaucer’s later Canterbury pilgrimage that spans from the seat of government to the seat 
of religion (see Chapter 1), the journeys to parliament upon which each Member embarks 
bear symbolic importance: the journey marks the simultaneous territorialization and 
deterritorialization of the parliamentary space. Like an archive, the Natal parliament is a 
space both outside of and also at the center of holding together. 
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The byldere ok, and ek the hardy asshe; 
The piler elm, the cofre unto carayne; 
The boxtre pipere, holm to whippes lashe; 
The saylynge fyr; the cipresse, deth to playne; 
The shetere ew; the asp for shaftes pleyne; 
The olive of pes, and eke the dronke vyne; 
The victor palm, the laurer to devyne.67 
Certainly, catalogues of “kynde” are a common trope in classical and medieval poetry, and 
this one reflects a similar catalogue of birds at the beginning of Nature’s Parliament. Chaucer 
employs this trope here in the garden in order to offer a roll call reminiscent of the 
summoning of the parliamentary assembly seen in the Modus tenendi parliamentum, a roll 
call that foregrounds that the multiplicity of the eventual assembly indeed promotes 
ecological and political vitality (i.e., this is a space in which there is “nothyng dede”). 
Moreover, the allegorical narrative within this roll call admits the various possibilities of 
multiplicity, but one that ultimately upholds difference as productive of political life. 
 Recalling the narrator’s previous assertion that anybody, whether of a “kynde” “lered 
or lewed,” can work toward common profit, he describes the trees in terms of their 
contributions to political life. That is to say, how does each species contribute to the natural 
beauty and vitality of the ecology? The strength and hardiness of the oak and ash trees build 
and create. But such edification is not always joyful: creation is shortly followed by the elm’s 
own use to build “cofre,” or coffins. The cypress is used “deth to playne,” arguably necessary 
after the warlike imagery of the “shetere ew” and the asp that makes “shafters pleyne.” 
                                                 
67 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 176-82. 
  
112 
Despite such conflicts, however, the “olyve of pes” and the “dronke vyne” mark a shift in the 
catalog of trees, switching the narrative from war to the capacity for peace and celebration, 
completed at the end of the stanza with the “victor palm” and the “laurer to devyne.” Built 
into the ecology of the garden is the full range of political experience: war and peace, 
mourning and celebration, humanity and divinity. And most importantly, while this 
landscape admits both love and strife, the catalogue’s allegory (itself an archive of various 
experiences) ends the political process with the “devyne”:68 common profit indeed leads to 
eternal life. Although Affrican disappears, this is nonetheless the world of Macrobius’ 
Commentary, reimagined as a threshold to the Natal Parliament.  
 Both Scipio’s and our narrator’s dreams allow readers to imagine political process 
through several overlapping episodes and at various scales of experience in order to admit its 
many possibilities. Much like an actual dream, the episodic structure of the narrator’s own 
dream vision transitions rather seamlessly from the garden to the Temple of Venus. The 
structure of the poem, however, plays with the separation between the Temple and the garden 
in order to at once mark them as different spaces, but also to admit their mutual integration. 
After the narrator finishes his description of the garden, a new stanza marks another aspect of 
the environment that the narrator notices. Tucked under one of the allegorical trees is the first 
of many allegorical figures that belong to the adjacent Temple of Venus: “Under a tre, 
besyde a welle, I say / Cupide, oure lord, and his arwes forge and file.”69 Although marked 
by a separate stanza, the vision of Cupid is incorporated into the narrative of the tree-lined 
landscape, and as the narrator continues, we realize that these allegorical figures have been 
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there all along—“Tho was I war of Plesaunce anon-ryght,”70 our narrator just had not yet 
noticed them. The structure of the dream vision, then, creates a permeable membrane71 
between the space of vitality and the space of “sikes” and “swoghes”72 to which it leads, 
refusing an easy separation between vitality and anxiety, or between the multiple ways of 
imaging political process. Indeed, they often overlap. 
 The dream vision genre upholds a membranous relationship among the multiple 
places of the dream—the Edenic garden, the Temple of Venus, and Nature’s Parliament—in 
order to imagine the multiple places, institutions, and structures through which political 
process can occur. While the Edenic, idealistic garden imagines diversity as central to a 
thriving ecology, the Temple of Venus is also located in the Edenic garden, but offers a 
simultaneous and overlapping vision of the capacity for political entrenchment in institutions. 
Contrary to the raucous debate in Nature’s Parliament and the thriving ecological diversity of 
the parliamentary garden, the Temple of Venus imagines the parliamentary “plaint” not as a 
continuation of deliberation but as an expression of continual suffering. The concept of the 
“plaint” in Middle English includes both petitions before the law and lament, 73 and despite 
the Temple’s beauty and its continuation of the Love theme at the center of the poem, 
“plaints” to its many sovereign figures stymie deliberation between sovereign and commons. 
The parliamentary “plaint” is here re-imagined as an unanswered lament, certainly another 
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possibility in the conceptualization of the fate of the petition, and one that is nonetheless 
transformative regardless of its outcome. 
 With unanswered “plaint” comes an inability to distinguish “kynde,” or the embodied 
reality of the individual complainant, instead reimagining a landscape of thriving as one of 
univocal suffering. Within the Temple, the “noyse” of Nature’s Parliament is figured as 
“sykes hoote as fyr / I herde a swogh that gan aboute renne, / Which sikes were engendered 
with desyr,”74 and the narrator discovers “[t]hat al cause of sorwes that they drye / Cam of 
the bittere goddess Jelosye.”75 Unlike Nature’s Parliament, in which the “noyse” of the birds 
eventually reveals distinct voices, the “sykes” and “swoghes” within the Temple erase 
difference and maintain only a uniform suffering that envisions parliamentary complaint as 
lament. This depiction of common complaint culminates with a scene of actual “pleinynge” 
to sovereign Venus, “To whom on knees two yonge folk ther cryde / To ben here helpe”;76 
instead of leading to deliberation, the scene shifts to murals on the wall surrounding Venus 
that feature lovers whose pursuit of love (or whose pursuit of “plaint”) leads to their eventual 
death. The gate predicts the multiple and simultaneous ways in which we can imagine the 
parliamentary institution’s capacities for the exercise of its political processes. The narrator’s 
dream journey likewise admits that, given these starkly different visions of parliament’s 
conceptual influence, the institutional spaces that we construct and the processes by which 
we live together-in-difference do indeed matter. The outcomes of each space in the dream 
vision matter less than the processes by which the various elements within heterogeneous 
spaces communicate. 
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V. The Parliamentary Sovereign 
 Despite another seamless transition between the Temple of Venus and Nature’s 
Parliament, the starkest contrast between the two places is the representation of the 
sovereign, specifically its mode of relating to the commons. The first thing that the narrator 
notices after leaving the Temple and entering “ayeyn into the place / That I of spak, that was 
so sote and grene,”77 is Nature herself. Whereas only the sovereigns in the Temple of Venus 
are individualized through their descriptions, the assembly of birds that Nature has 
summoned to her Parliament actually form part of her description: 
And in a launde, upon an hil of floures, 
Was set this noble goddess Nature. 
[…] 
Ne there nas foul that cometh of engendrure 
That they ne were prest in here presence 
To take hire dom and yeve hire audyence.78 
The Middle English “audience” has three appropriate connotations in this context: the 
“capacity for hearing or listening,” a “council,” and the “opportunity to be heard.”79 Nature’s 
place as the sovereign relies on her capacity to listen, sculpting a much more intersubjective 
relationship between the assembly of birds and the sovereign that such an assembly 
legitimizes. The Modus’ chapter “Concerning the King’s Speech” instructs the sovereign “to 
ask the clergy and laity naming all their grades […] that they should all diligently, seriously 
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and heartily labour to consider and deliberate on the business of parliament”;80 thus, in both 
conceptualizations of the parliament, a key feature of sovereignty is deliberation rather than 
the closed-eared portrayal in Venus’ Temple. Nature is there to listen, and her identity as 
sovereign is constructed by the presence of birds “[o]f every kynde that men thynke may.”81 
That is to say, the multiplicity of the bird parliament reflects a much more fluid identity for 
the sovereign; she gives her “dom,” but in return, the birds are guaranteed a voice in that very 
process. 
 As previously stated, Nature’s “dom” is far from conclusive at the end of her 
parliament. Her first “statut,” in fact, incorporates deliberation into the very act of giving a 
“statut,” so that petition and decision are both invitations for intersubjective engagement. She 
opens parliament by telling the bird assembly, “Ye knowe wel how, Seynt Valentynes day, / 
By my statut and thorgh my governaunce, / Ye come for to cheese—and fle your wey— / 
Youre makes.”82 The business at hand, of course, is the same business that has occupied the 
poem heretofore: love, and specifically here, a marriage agreement. But Nature’s very 
process of governing through her “statut” is a demand to choose. Furthermore, Nature 
continues her “statut” by clarifying that with each individual bird’s “choice” is also a process 
of consent, insisting that “in this condicioun / Mot be the choys of everich that is heere, / 
That she agre to this eleccioun, / Whoso he be that shulde be hire feere.”83 That is, each male 
bird’s choice requires the female bird’s agreement; the business of parliament is less a matter 
of easy decision-making and more a matter of the right way to deliberate en route to any 
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decision, whether that decision is of sovereign or common origin. Just as the multiplicity of 
the commons constructs the very identity of the sovereign, Nature’s Parliament 
conceptualizes sovereignty as itself constructed through deliberative processes rather than 
uniform decree. 
VI. Conflict in Parliamentary Process 
 The interlocution among the garden, the Temple of Venus, and Nature’s Parliament in 
the dream vision is a performative move that holds together the many possible modes of 
becoming together in political life. I say “performative” because the dream vision refuses a 
uniform conceptualization of the parliamentary space and the processes therein, but infuses 
conflicting conceptualizations into worlds that themselves conflict. Put another way, the 
slippery boundaries between each space in the dream vision suggests that a crucial part of 
parliament’s work is to create a space that hosts an audience for conflicting worldviews. 
Jacques Rancière makes a case for the “configuration of [politics’] own space,” arguing that 
the function of politics “is to make the world of its subjects and its operations seen. The 
essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one.”84 
Politics is the process by which we imagine new modes of living, but these imagined, not-
yet-existing modes indeed conflict with the other worlds in which we live. He continues by 
expanding the importance of overlapping worlds: 
Political argumentation is at one and the same time the demonstration of a 
possible world in which the argument could count as an argument, one that is 
addressed by a subject qualified to argue, over an identified object, to an 
addressee who is required to see the object and hear the argument that he 
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“normally” has no reason to either see or hear. It is the construction of a 
paradoxical world that puts together two separate worlds.85 
Consequently, “[c]onsensus is the ‘end of politics’: in other words, not the accomplishment 
of the ends of politics but simply a return to the normal state of things—a non-existence of 
politics.”86 As previously stated, the Natal space is an ideal conceptual site for working 
through both individual and larger-scale cultural traumas precisely because the simultaneous 
“no-where” but also “every-where” of the Natal (i.e., its deterritorializing capacities) put 
unincorporable worlds into contact with one another. As Rancière argues, political 
argumentation is not meant to be a battle for political supremacy, but rather a 
conceptualization or theorization of new capacities for politics in the world. Political 
argumentation shares a common purpose with the Modus tenendi parliamentum and the 
Parliament of Fowls insofar as they all root these conceptualizations in the world. The site of 
politics—which I have been referring to here as a parliamentary Natality—demands an 
audience for politically conceptualized worlds so that they do not remain unincorporable but 
instead are made real through social links, however amicable or antagonistic those links 
might be. The Modus and Chaucer’s Parliament need not raze the political landscape in order 
to assert the supremacy of one political worldview; they create spaces for argumentation as a 
substitute for violence and destruction, rhetorical or real. 
 Indeed, both the tercel eagles’ monologues and the Commons’ debate both seem 
circular in their lack of resolution; however, speech that preserves difference nonetheless 
mitigates the capacity for difference to erupt into violence. Readings of the poem that 
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condemn the parliamentary debate as fool’s speech ignore that the ongoing, even if at times 
tedious, “noyse”87 squashes the threat of violence that nearly erupts in the middle of 
parliament. Once Nature sees that the debate is headed nowhere, she requests that each class 
of birds elect a representative to speak on their behalf. What pushes the parliament along is a 
parliamentary process of sorts reminiscent of the committee of twenty-five discussed in the 
Modus in Chapter 1, and it does so by simultaneously redirecting the circuitous debate while 
also avoiding the violence that can erupt when debate breaks down. This section is worth 
quoting in full: 
The terslet seyde thane in this manere: 
“Ful hard were it to preve by resoun 
Who loveth best this gentil formel heere; 
For everych hath swich replicacioun 
That non by skilles may be brought adoun. 
I can not se that argumentes avayle: 
Thenne semeth it there moste be batayle.” 
 
“Al redy!” quod these egles tercels tho. 
“Nay, sires,” quod he, “if that I durste it seye, 
Ye don me wrong, my tale is not ido! 
For, sires—ne taketh not agref I prey— 
It may not gon as ye wolde in this weye; 
Oure is the voyse that han the charge in honde, 
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And to the juges dom ye moten stonde.”88 
The threat of parliamentary violence certainly has its historical counterparts, and as the 
Parliament of 138189 demonstrated, migration can all too easily morph into swarming. The 
November 1381 parliament was delayed from November 4th to November 9th because of a 
threatening display of assembly. According to the Rolls for that parliament: 
[A] great dispute had broken out between my lords the duke of Lancaster 
[John of Gaunt] and the earl of Northumberland [Henry Percy], which had 
caused complaint to be made to the king and alarming rumours to circulate 
amongst the people, because of the great force of men-at-arms and archers, 
arrayed in warlike manner, who had come to parliament for one or other of the 
parties. And as our lord the king, his council, and the lords of the realm had 
been fully occupied in arranging a peaceable and effective settlement, our said 
lord the king caused the same parliament to be adjourned for once more until 
the following Saturday […] so that in the meantime he could hear the said 
duke and earl and, with the help of our Lord, put an end to their dispute.90 
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Of course, the difference between these threats of violence is that the Rolls (at least 
temporarily) suspend the work of parliament, whereas the Parliament summons its 
deliberative capacities to avoid conflict. However, both the Parliament’s election and 
Richard’s role in mediating Lancaster and Northumberland’s skirmish use deliberation to 
stop parliament’s work, redirect it, and start it anew. These movements are in and of 
themselves marked accomplishments: speech might not lead to full resolution, but it does 
move away from violence because it can be refigured without wounding the body and hence 
without, or with less, trauma—again, the Greek meaning of “trauma” being, of course, 
“wound,” “rupture.”  
 Worth mentioning is the obvious point that debate does not always work. However, 
parliamentary processes nurture speech’s full potential rather than eliding it altogether: 
deliberation leads to election, and then to representation: “Oure is the voys.” For Fradenburg, 
“representation does not obscure existence, but magnifies and re-stylizes it on another 
level.”91 In both instances above, speaking on behalf of (or mediating) enables re-figurations 
of conflict, and the work of governing makes representation an act of sharing, especially of 
the Natal, which is admittedly both fraught and intimate. Giancarlo argues that the falcon’s 
rhetorical move in speaking on behalf of the assembly “collapses the plural into the singular” 
and “opens up a space that would otherwise be occupied by physical conflict and, 
presumably, it will enable the assembly to find the one voice needed for resolution.”92 The 
Natal’s deterritorializing impulse is, on the one hand, what enables its intersubjective 
qualities: the center of the territory is outside, which is what connects it to other territories, 
                                                 
91 Fradenburg, Staying Alive, 230. 
92 Giancarlo, Parliament and Literature, 160. 
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depending on one another, in an array of intersubjective assemblages. But on the other hand, 
the shareable quality of the Natal, in fostering the social link, also poses the threat of violence 
or conflict. But here, language facilitates becoming and group experience, and this movement 
avoids traumatic upheaval. Too often, too, the failure of the 1381 rebellion, like Lollard 
dissent and its brutal suppression, have been taken precisely as failures, rather than as 
archival achievements “holding together” certain heterogeneous demands than can be read 
again in the future. 
 Despite what seems like each parliament’s desire to settle these problems 
permanently, the Rolls testify that this process is endless, and in this way arguably necessary. 
Questions of parliamentary representation evolve into questions on political counsel. If it 
were possible to claim an overall narrative for the Rolls, it is a story about the constant 
determination to define just counsel, to weed out negative or excessive influence over the 
king, and to remain a regularly present source of monarchical accountability as an assembled 
(hence heterogeneous) and elected body. In January 1327, during parliament’s deposition of 
Edward II, the Commons worked to ensure that bad counselors like the Despensers would 
never again gain such unchecked influence.93 Likewise, in the Good Parliament of 1376 
under Edward III, what Ormrod describes as the “procedural novelty” of impeachment was 
developed, because it seemed to the Commons “that if their said liege lord had always had 
                                                 
93 PROME, parliament of 1327, C 65/1, item 33: “Also, the community prays: that suitable 
and wise men be placed around the king, who will give him good counsel, and that they be 
chosen by the great men, and that none of them, or any other great man of the realm, or 
anyone from the king’s household, neither great nor small, or any official who shall be under 
the authority of the king or supported by him or by another person, or by the mandate of 
letters, parties or quarrels by which the common law is disturbed. And if it is found that 
anyone has done this, let it be explained at the next parliament and let him be removed from 
the king’s council. And that the injured party shall recover his damages against him.” 
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loyal counselors around him, and good officers, our same lord king would have been well 
enriched with treasure, and therefore would not have much need to charge his commonality 
by means of a subsidy.”94 And in Richard II’s 1381 parliament, the Commons attempted to 
create an archive of counsel, requesting that “the said degrees and estates should take it upon 
themselves severally to write down the faults found in governance, together with advice on 
the corrective remedies to be applied, so that the lords and commons, […] may with reason 
the better proceed to an effective decision to amend that which is to be amended in the said 
governance.”95 Hence, during a period of more than fifty years, from 1327 to 1381, 
parliament’s work is never completely conclusive: counsel is ongoing, and it requires and 
benefits from periodic revision. To say that parliament is unsuccessful because its work 
cannot be accomplished in a single session is simply false, since the 1327 and 1376 
parliaments were contemporarily celebrated victories in parliamentary history. Parliament’s 
own narrative through the Rolls presents its work as continuously developing methods of 
counsel, quite simply because some problems take time. 
VII. “Inconclusiveness” as Continuation 
 A concern over time is the case in Chaucer’s parliament, as well. The common and 
noble birds offer extensive amounts of advice to Nature and the formel alike, and as Nature 
notes, “I have herd al youre opynyoun, / And in effect yit be we never the neer.”96 As a 
result, Nature’s solution is to begin processing this parliament’s counsel by allowing the 
formel eagle to make her own decision as to whom she wishes to marry: “But finally, this is 
                                                 
94 PROME, parliament of 1376, C 65/30, item 15. 
95 PROME, parliament of 1381, C 65/37, item 28. 
96 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 618-19. 
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my conclusioun, / That she hireself shal han hir eleccioun / Of whom hire lest.”97 The 
formel’s decision, however, is to deliberate with or counsel herself, to contemplate: 
“Almyghty queen, unto this yer be don, / I axe respit for to avise me, / And after that to have 
my choys al fre.”98 If we can alter our framework for evaluating political success away from 
fantasies of accountability and outcomes, we can more productively read her decision as 
successfully acknowledging the power of possibility and reinvention. The formel eagle’s 
delay ensures that this assembly will meet again in a year’s time; in fact, because the 
parliament of birds meets annually on Saint Valentine’s Day, this poem offers a model of 
governance that values contemplation and careful decision-making through the use of 
constant counsel in order to ensure common profit. Also, the annual bird migration to the 
Natal parliament structurally resembles the psychoanalytic process in the time it grants and in 
the space it constructs to repeatedly revisit problems through intersubjective experience. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to overlook the similarities between our narrator’s own 
contemplative reading “for to fare / the bet,” and the formel eagle’s request “for to avise me”: 
both reveal the importance of the poem’s narrative frame for interpreting the dreamwork. 
That is, we read the formel’s decision to consider her counsel to be as productive as we read 
the narrator’s desire to extend his dream by digging through the archive. Also, again, 
contemplation is a springboard for attachment: the formel will ruminate on her suitors’ 
speech, and such rumination will “end” with yet another assembly. By encasing the 
parliamentary process in a dream vision that also parallels its own frame’s endless pursuit of 
                                                 
97 Ibid., 620-22. 
98 Ibid., 647-49. 
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knowledge, Chaucer’s parliament offers a vision of governing that draws a parallel between 
recurring (and psychoanalytic) mental processes and parliamentary deliberation. 
 Such a model is not entirely without precedent, and Chaucer celebrates in his own 
poem moments in parliament that did not avoid adjournment simply for the sake of rushing a 
decision. As stated above, Richard II postponed the assembly of the 1381 parliament in order 
to resolve the conflict between Lancaster and Northumberland. But that parliament witnessed 
another temporary adjournment. As Christmas was approaching, parliament had stagnated in 
its discussions with Richard on whether the Commons would extend the wool subsidy to 
fund Richard’s government. As quoted above, the Commons made clear that if the king 
maintained proper counsel, his government would have the necessary finances to support 
itself and would not be required to tax an already impoverished, and already discontent, 
comune, which discontent was one very important motivation behind the recent summer 
rebellion. Also, the king’s wedding was approaching. As a result, the king temporarily 
adjourned parliament, and requested that the Commons consider his requests, to which they 
replied that “before their return they should go back to their own communities, and that each 
in his own country should make such explanation that the same commons would be more 
willing to aid and grant money to our lord the king than they were at present.”99 Parliament is 
adjourned to satisfy the needs of both king and Commons, with the explicit charge of further 
contemplation and deliberation. That is to say, although parliament is adjourned, its work 
extends back out to its multiple territories and continues the work of counsel. The work of 
the Natal is both composed of and composes its surrounding territories. When parliament 
                                                 
99 PROME, parliament of 1381, C 65/37, item 37. 
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reassembled in January 1382, the Commons temporarily granted the wool subsidy both to 
satisfy present need and ensure another parliamentary migration. 
 As in the 1381(-2) parliament(s), there is a conclusion to the Parliament of Fowls, so 
long as we are attuned to common profit. Before Nature adjourns parliament until the 
following year—“A yer is nat so longe to endure”100—the common birds are finally able to 
choose their mates: 
And when this werk al brought was to an ende, 
To every foul Nature yaf his make 
By evene accord, and on here way they wende. 
And, Lord, the blisse and joye that they make!101 
Dodd’s argument that because the birds cannot arrive at a single solution they are “therefore 
unable to act for the common good” misinterprets what is good for the comune. Even though 
the eagles are unable to reach a decision, the lower birds nonetheless leave with their 
mates—in this sense, the work of the parliament has absolutely been accomplished. In fact, 
arguing that this parliament is “inconclusive” reveals a kinship with the royalist agenda more 
so than with common profit; that is to say, this parliament is only inconclusive if its only 
business were the singular marriage agreement between the formel eagle and her potential 
suitor. Our narrator has already taught us that there is no single way to work for common 
profit, and in this case waiting privileges taking seriously, contemplating, and revisiting 
counsel. The Parliament of Fowls, rather than registering its discontent or hopelessness with 
the nascent parliament, is gently reframing what we understand as political progress. If we 
                                                 
100 Chaucer, Parliament of Fowls, 661. 
101 Ibid., 666-69. 
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were to move away from a teleological political narrative in which each parliamentary 
assembly left its mark of accomplishment in the archive, and instead embrace the work of 
recurrence, we might arrive at a politics of psychoanalysis. 
 All this is to say that we need to broaden how we measure political progress. I end by 
suggesting that parliament was more than an institution: it was an intellectual and expressive 
movement that captured the public imagination. When viewed in this light, the work of 
governance becomes less concerned with outcome and more with process—not only in the 
sense of bureaucracy, though that certainly had its place in both dysfunction and in ensuring 
the institution’s rootedness in the political landscape—but more importantly, as an 
intellectual and expressive movement that valued a long-term narrative of recurrent thinking 
and of emergence. And moreover, it was a conceptual movement committed to the 
implementation of ideas in the real political process. Focusing so much on processes that 
hold together attachments ensures that conceptual ideas like those in the Modus do not just 
remain there: the archives themselves participate in the theorization of an institution in the 
making. The Modus tenendi parliamentum and the Parliament of Fowls both share a 
commitment to becoming that extends their work through an archive: they value an 
archeology versus a teleology.102 In Chaucer’s Parliament specifically, there are ample 
opportunities for wounds and death: our narrator is in limbo between floating and sinking; 
the gated entrance to the garden leads to either life or death; the suffering in the Temple of 
Venus sits adjacent to Nature’s vital parliament; violence is always on the cusp of speech, but 
never quite surfaces in the debate. The Parliament of Fowls is not a poem about trauma, but 
                                                 
102 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage 
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1970), 459-93. 
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this is precisely the point: it is a poem about processes for avoiding wounds, and this is done 
through the continuation of group experience. Parliament is a site concerned with forging 
attachments, and this is what makes parliament and its archive places for survival. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
AFFECTIVE RHETORIC OF COMPLAINT: PIERS PLOWMAN AND PETITIONARY CULTURE 
 The enduring image that opens the first dream vision in Piers Plowman is the 
Prologue’s “fair feeld ful of folk,” which captures the individual’s and the comune’s 
struggles navigating a socio-political landscape marked by institutional abstractions and 
estates satire.1 How does an individual or a community express particular affects in a world 
marked by institutions? As seen with Lady Meed in Chapter 1, institutions can foist upon the 
individual abstract, representational identities, which risk erasing the lived experience of the 
subject before the law. Langland’s narrator must also endure this struggle by learning to 
navigate the abstractions that he encounters in his dream world. Will almost immediately 
falls asleep at the beginning of the B-Prologue, and he finds his dream world to be a 
confusing and unknown “wildernesse, wiste I neuere where.”2 Will’s first reaction is fear, 
due to a lack of understanding about how to navigate his environment. However, as Will 
looks toward the east, he sees two allegorical structures that situate him by guiding his 
affective response to his landscape: 
As I biheeld into þe eest an heiʒ to þe sonne, 
I seiȝ a tour on a toft trieliche ymaked, 
A deep dale byneþe, a dungeon þerinne, 
                                                 
1 Evidence for the importance of the image of the “fair feeld ful of folk” lies in Piers 
Plowman’s revision history: the three lines that describe the “folk” are consistent across the 
A, B, C, and Z texts with only orthographic differences distinguishing them. Clearly, this 
image was important enough to be the poem’s stable opening across Langland’s (and 
clerical) revision process. 
2 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.Prol.12. All citations from Piers Plowman will include 
version letter, Passus, and line numbers. 
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Wiþ depe diches and derke and dredfulle of siʒte.3 
While the abstractions that Will observes are not immediately clear, they do orient his 
affective responses, initiating his own journey and wandering through the various institutions 
that Will encounters. Will’s descriptions of the “tour” as “trieliche ymaked” (i.e., excellently 
made)4 and the “dongeon” as “dredfulle of siȝt” (i.e., a fearful sight)5 are affective 
descriptions, or at least trigger affective reactions in Will, and Will’s affective responses 
orient him within an otherwise alien socio-political milieu. 
Navigating abstracted, institutional landscapes not only produces affects in the 
wanderer, but also requires affective responses for successful navigation. Later in Passus I, 
after Will asks the Boethian figure Holy Church what these places are, 6 he discovers that the 
tower and the dungeon are allegorical representations of heaven and hell respectively. In the 
tower lives Truthe, “fader of feiþ,”7 and in the dungeon, “Therinne wonyeþ a wiȝt þat Wrong 
is yhote, / Fader of falshede.”8 While Will’s dream wilderness is at first glance a landscape 
unknown, and despite his confusion about what he sees, from Malvern Hills, where Will 
stands, a glace eastward would position Will toward London; that is, he nonetheless orients 
himself by looking, however loosely, toward England’s institutional center—toward a site of 
institutional Natality, a communal place of origin that is always outside of one’s immediate 
context, and to which one must always journey. This journey and his wanderings are fueled 
by his affective reactions to what he sees. Institutions and their abstract representations are 
                                                 
3 Ibid., B.Prol.13-16, emphasis mine. 
4 OED, s.v. “tried (adj.),” 2a., accessed October 19 2016. 
5 Ibid., “dreadfully (adv.),” 1, accessed October 19 2016. 
6 Emily Steiner, Reading Piers Plowman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013); 21-27. 
7 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.I.14. 
8 Ibid., B.I.63-64. 
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not bereft of affect, but depend upon it for successful navigation. And navigating institutions 
produces affect. 
 The poem’s description of the “fair field ful of folk” uses the rhetoric of common 
petitions to enable individual or collective wanderings through institutional landscapes. The 
abstractions of Truth and Wrong and the affects that they produce lead Will next to living 
mankind. The two allegorical “faders”9 are bookends to something not abstracted but living, 
to a dynamic society, a “fair feeld ful of folk,” where people live and perform the actions of 
their daily lives, and where “folk” negotiate their ways through a world that, as for Will, both 
situates them and troubles them. Noteworthy, however, is that the language of the 
parliamentary petition forges the interactions among the folk. Will sees “[a] fair feeld ful of 
folk fond I þer bitwene— / Of alle manere of men, þe meene and þe riche, / Werchynge and 
wandrynge as þe world askeþ.”10 “Askeþ” is a term in Middle English that corresponds with 
the Law French terms “prier” and “supplier,” which populate the opening lines of a common 
petition, or its salutatio. The standard formulas for the beginning of a common petition’s 
salutatio are “Item, prie la commune,” or “Item, supplient les communes.” The verb prier 
translates as both “to pray” (i.e., “Also, the commons pray…,” a typical translation) and also 
                                                 
9 Noteworthy, too, is that folk exist between two Fathers; they are bounded by two types of 
Law, in the Lacanian understanding of the Law of the Father—the very things which admit 
entrance into the symbolic order and open systems of language, but which also can threaten 
oppression by that very same integration into language. The Lacanian role of the Father as 
the entryway into the symbolic order likewise speaks to the fourteenth-century individual’s 
lived experience navigating and living with and within their various institutions. 
Specifically, the individual or Everyman’s access to parliament was both textual and oral 
through petitions, which were written and read before parliament. Entry into language is 
itself an intersubjective relationship, with all its freedoms of individual utterance and 
possible oppression by prescribed linguistic formulations. In this way, I read “abstractions” 
here along these same lines to mean the abstracted ideas upheld and executed by 
institutions, cultural or more literal. 
10 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.Prol.17-19. 
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as “to ask for,” and thus the Piers B-Prologue borrows from petitionary rhetoric and 
translates it into the Middle English vernacular, accessible to “alle manere of men.”11 
Furthermore, “supplier” translates as “to petition,” but the more literal “supplicate” likewise 
summons the rhetoric of the “ask.” The Middle English “askeþ” thus summons the language 
of petitionary complaint. Here, the rhetoric of the petition introduces the reader to the full 
range of “folk” that form society and to the bonds that hold together “all manere of men, þe 
meene and þe riche,” along with its problems and pleasures. Petitionary language is binding: 
it places demands on the folks’ working and wandering, but it also binds disparate people in 
an imperfect community. The ask, and also the rhetoric of the petition, is intersubjective, 
community forming, and affective. 
 The opening stanzas of the Piers B-Prologue thus begin the first dream vision and the 
entire poem by describing complaint—the petition, the ask—and its corresponding 
documents as affective expressions. This is not to understate, however, petitions’ 
standardized and carefully crafted rhetorical form. Dodd documents the parliamentary 
petition’s routine five-part structure, but concludes that such standardization implies that 
“administrative and legal convention was actually more important in determining the form 
taken by the petition than any consideration to have the petition ‘speak the language’ of those 
in whose name it was written.”12 However, as we shall see, these forms did not erase the 
language of the particular individual or community in favor of standardized institutional 
forms, as though rote bureaucratic form were the key mechanism for navigating institutions 
of complaint. All existing signifiers have been used before, and in combinations similar to 
                                                 
11 J.H. Baker, ed., A Manual of Law French (New York: Routledge, 2016), s.v. “prier (v.).” 
12 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 294. 
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new ones, which has never exhausted our creativity. Accordingly, there is no hard-and-fast 
distinction between formulae and “original” speech. In introducing the folk, the petitionary 
language of the “ask” is joined to the folks’ “wandrynge,” which suggests that while 
petitionary (read, institutional) forms can be binding, they also enable folk “of alle manner of 
men” to wander and navigate the world and its institutions that mark its landscape. 
Standardized form provides “scripts” for expressing affect in parliamentary contexts, and 
these formal qualities open the way for wild affects to enter into bureaucratic spaces. 
“Affective scripts” preserve the individual within institutional contexts, and access to 
standardized, bureaucratic forms enables the expression of individuated affect. The Prologue 
bookends human lived experience between two abstracted “realities” because, like the 
language, style, rhetoric, and formulae of the petition, which we can abstract into a genre 
with common qualities, such formulae nonetheless leave room for both individuation and 
intersubjectivity. 
I. Ars dictaminis and the Parliamentary Petition: Increased Capacities for Governance 
and Intersubjectivity 
 Describing the field of folk’s wanderings through the petitionary language of the 
“ask” summons the rhetoric of the common petition, a type of petition submitted before 
parliament to the king on behalf of groups of individuals, towns, or on behalf of the entire 
Commons. Most critics agree that the parliamentary context for Langland’s B-text revisions 
was the Good Parliament of 1376, and the hallmark of this parliament from a bureaucratic 
standpoint is the deluge of common petitions entered on the parliament rolls—126 in total. 
Although the history of the parliamentary petition begins some one hundred years prior 
during King Edward I’s Parliament of 1275, these were private petitions that individuals 
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submitted to the king; not until Edward III’s parliaments do we see Common petitions 
entered into the parliament rolls. However, the distinctions between private and common 
petitions in terms of style and arrangement reveal that during the one hundred year history of 
the parliamentary petition, from 1275 to 1376, the language of the petition becomes more 
affective, the structure of the petition becomes simplified in order to highlight the portions of 
the petition that are affectively laden, and the success of a common petition often depends on 
the clerk’s ability to offer affective narratives that contextualize the ask within a pathos-
driven framework. These affective narratives sought to create a relationship between the 
petitioning parties and the king in which the language of the petition is allegorized as an 
affective bond between the king and the comune. Finally, although the history of the 
parliamentary petition does not begin until King Edward I’s parliament of 1275, and the 
common petition does not appear until Edward III’s parliaments, the petitionary form already 
had a longstanding ancestor in the art of letter writing, or the rhetorical tradition of the ars 
dictaminis. 
 Despite the petitionary form’s long history within the genre of prose discourse dating 
back to classical antiquity, the use of the parliamentary petition for seeking redress was not a 
gradual procedural development over time, but rather resulted from a deliberate and sudden 
shift in government policy initiated by Edward I’s law reforms in the 1270s.13 Prior to 
Edward I’s reforms, the individual’s only option for seeking remedy was through common 
                                                 
13 See Dodd, Justice and Grace, 189; John Maddicott, “Parliament and the Constituencies, 
1272-1377,” in The English Parliament in the Middle Ages, eds. R.G. Davies and J.H. 
Denton, (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1981), 63, quoted in Guilhem Pépin, “Petitions from 
Gascony: Testimonies of a Special Relationship,” in Medieval Petitions: Grace and 
Grievance, eds. W. Mark Ormrod, Gwilym Dodd, and Anthony Musson (York: York 
Medieval Press, 2009), 122. 
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law, which was often under the jurisdiction of local legal institutions, such as local courts of 
assizes, and, many times, conflicts of interest at the local level precluded remedy. For 
example, redress sought against an offence by a local official or lord had no other avenue 
than through local institutions, which often resulted in a lack of remedy for many petitioners, 
the stagnation or manipulation of political process, and resulting toxicity in political 
attachments and trust of justice due to the corruption of local legal institutions.14 In an 
example from a parliament in the sixth year of Edward I’s reign, the Hereverton family 
petitioned parliament because they were ejected from their tenements by their neighbors 
“without judgment of court.” Worth noting is that through the parliamentary petition below, 
the Herevertons have a second chance at remedying their situation, and as they do so, they 
conceptualize the petition and parliament as offering a more reliable care practice than is 
available through common law: 
[T]hey appeared at the court of Bromsgrove immediately after this ejectment 
and complained to the bailiff of Bromsgrove immediately of this ejectment and 
made a fine to the bailiff for him to make an enquiry into this and do them 
justice in the matter, as by his office he ought to do; the bailiff granted them 
the enquiry and fixed a certain day for them and had summoned the 
neighbours. On which day the bailiff, the plaintiffs and the neighbours who 
had been summoned appeared. Then the bailiff answered the plaintiffs 
aforenamed that their adversaries were powerful and had a great heart and so 
he would take no enquiry. And so William of Hereverton, Emma of 
Hereverton and Maud de Hereverton seek remedy of this of the king’s court, 
                                                 
14 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 11, 29. 
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as the land belongs to the ancient demesne of the king and none dare get 
remedy at common law.15 
In trying to resolve their legal matters, the Herevertons first complained to the local bailiff 
for remedy and justice, “as by his office he ought to do.” That is, the background narrative in 
the petition is careful to explain that the bailiff has an obligation to provide remedy and to 
bring the case back into the purview of the law. However, on the day of the trial, the bailiff 
decided that because the Herevertons’ neighbors were “powerful and had a great heart,” the 
case was dismissed and justice was not served. As the Herevertons’ case shows, corruption in 
common law due to class difference often precluded remedy, and thus petitioners 
conceptualized parliamentary petitions as providing an alternative route for receiving justice. 
In fact, the Herevertons go so far as to say that “none dare get remedy at common law,” 
presumably because the lands in question belong to the king. But this brief rhetorical flourish 
at the end of the petition does more than establish jurisdiction: it villainizes the corruption of 
common law procedures and provides early signs of the kind of affective language that 
populates common petitions roughly a century later. 
 Despite the Crown’s increasing reach into the legal business of localities, Edward I’s 
reforms provided a “supplement” rather than an alternative to common law procedures. In 
offering a supplemental path to remedy, not only did parliamentary petitions allow citizens to 
seek remedy directly from the king and his parliament in written form, but the process also 
held local officials accountable and extended royal authority to the localities, since redress 
for local grievances was no longer only under the purview of local legal institutions.16 
                                                 
15 PROME, parliament of 1278, item 51, emphasis mine. 
16 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 33. 
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Edward I conceptualized his parliament as expanding opportunities for peaceful legal remedy 
via petitionary—textual—interactions.17 Prior to 1275, redress from the Crown was only 
available through oral supplication; transforming the process of supplication from only oral 
to both oral and written—that is, petitions were read aloud before the king and his council—
encouraged an opportunity for justice by formally enrolling the petitioner’s complaint into 
the official parliament roll and her or his body into the parliamentary space.18 Put another 
way, parliament itself provided a centralized space, both physical and archival, and a 
centralized process (itself a care practice) for expanding the citizens’ capacities for 
interacting with the law, with legal institutions, and with the Crown in an embodied way that 
itself was driven by textual access. The petitionary process prompted these shifting capacities 
for attachment to the King through remedial justice, and gave petitioners agency in their own 
contributions to the parliamentary archive by recording grievance into the archive.  
 The image of the fair field of folk wandering through the various institutional 
abstractions in the Piers Plowman Prologue can likewise be considered “petitionary” because 
it allegorizes the petitioner’s day-to-day experience navigating the increasing bureaucracy 
that supported the increased intake of parliamentary “asks,” which bureaucracy I will spend 
time briefly describing. Given the increased opportunity for citizens to enroll their 
grievances, traumas, and complaints into the parliament rolls, the petitionary process in 
particular made the parliament essential for the running of ordinary, day-to-day medieval life. 
Petitions required inventing bureaucratic processes and expanding state departments to be 
                                                 
17 Ormrod, “Introduction: Medieval Petitions in Context,” in Medieval Petitions: Grace and 
Grievance, 1-11; 9. 
18 Paul Brand, “Understanding Early Petitions: An Analysis of the Content of Petitions to 
Parliament in the Reign of Edward I,” in Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance, 99-119; 
117. 
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able to receive, process, and respond to them, and the individual petitioner would have had to 
navigate these various processes, but not on their own. The parliament was a central, 
regularly-meeting intake point for a variety of petitions, which facilitated the petitioner’s 
“wandryinges” by gathering petitions before sending them off to the appropriate councils and 
state departments.19 Likewise, it was parliament that provided the most transparent process 
for the trial and resolution of complaints, in direct contrast to local legal processes.20 In these 
ways, the increase in government bureaucracy was not simply a royal power grab, but served 
as a care practice—supplementing current common law by filling in its gaps in justice—that 
recognized the individuality of each complaint, and the receivers of petitions in parliament 
routed them to the sites where they would have the best chance of meeting redress, if redress 
were deemed appropriate—for example, to the Chancery or the Exchequer. For example, the 
Herevertons’ petition received the following answer: “Let suit be made in the court of 
chancery,” which, rather than deflecting remedy onto yet another bureaucratic office or 
process, extends the complaint by routing it to its appropriate site, thus ensuring its survival. 
In contrast to the bailiff’s answer that “he would take no enquiry,” petitionary practices 
elongate complaint; elongation here is not simply a frustrating bureaucratic process, but also 
a care practice. The expansion of bureaucracy around the petition increased the involvement 
of key state departments in confronting and processing the affective experiences of the 
individual and the comune, and this recognition of individual complaint is reflected in the 
petition’s simultaneous fixed form and wide range of affective content included across 
parliamentary petitions. 
                                                 
19 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 52. 
20 Ormrod, “Medieval Petitions,” 7. 
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 The origins of the parliamentary petition date back to the classical rhetorical tradition 
of prose composition, which already asserts the centrality of communicating and creating 
affect as a means toward successful persuasion in prose composition. The most widely 
circulated prose rhetorical manual of the Middle Ages was the Rhetorica Ad Herennium, 
formerly attributed to Cicero, which lays the foundations for not only the petition’s eventual 
form, but also for stirring the emotions of the reader-audience as a way of receiving a 
favorable outcome for one’s request.21 Towards the beginning of the Rhetorica, the author 
asserts the importance of securing the goodwill of one’s audience by appealing to the 
affective bonds that exist between the petitioner and the audience. This is accomplished in 
part by describing one’s own affective state, because this will appeal to the bond between the 
parties involved in the discourse. It states that “[f]rom the discussion of our own person we 
shall secure goodwill by […] setting forth our disabilities, need, loneliness, and misfortune, 
and pleading for our hearers’ aid, and at the same time showing that we have been unwilling 
to place our hope in anyone else.”22 These pathos-driven descriptions of one’s emotional 
state not only segue into an appeal for aid, but also highlight the bond that is already there 
between the two parties. Furthermore, the appeal to aid establishes the art of discourse as 
fundamentally petitionary in nature, suggesting that this text is an ancestor to the more 
immediate ancestor of the petition: the ars dictaminis tradition. 
                                                 
21 During the Middle Ages, the Rhetorica Ad Herrennium was attributed to Cicero, but it 
later was discovered that he did not in fact write the Rhetorica; the author remains unknown. 
See Harry Caplan, “Introduction,” to [Cicero], Rhetorica Ad Herrennium, ed. and trans. by 
Harry Caplan (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1954); vii-xl. 
22 [Cicero], Rhetorica Ad Herrennium, ed. and trans by Harry Caplan (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1954), I.V.8. All citations of the Rhetorica will include book, section, and line numbers 
hereafter. 
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  Petitionary form was modeled on a widespread, recognizable rhetorical genre: the 
ars dictaminis, or the art of letter writing. The use of this familiar rhetorical form made the 
petition less alien to petitioners, who would have already been familiar with letter writing. In 
fact, because the petition was modeled on another widely familiar genre, and because the 
petition made the ars dictaminis form even more widespread, petitionary form eventually 
“represented a legitimate and readily understood method of approaching the king with a 
grievance; it was therefore, potentially, a very useful mechanism for the politically 
disenfranchised to legitimize their more revolutionary demands for reform.”23 In accordance 
with the ars dictaminis, Dodd documents that private petitions were initially structured in 
five parts: the salutatio, or formal greeting to the addressee; the exordium, or the introduction 
to the complaint; the narratio, or the narration of circumstances leading to the complaint; the 
petitio, or the text of the actual request; and finally, the conclusio, or the ending salutation.24 
Dodd explains that petitioning was such a “ubiquitous activity in late medieval England that 
we should not assume that formal training at Westminster was necessarily needed for a 
capable clerk to become proficient in writing out such documents.”25 While literacy was 
certainly required to execute such form, access to scribes familiar with petitionary form was 
widespread, and a number of professional document writers both within and outside of 
                                                 
23 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 295. 
24 For an extended discussion of petitionary form and its connection to the ars dictiminis 
tradition, see Dodd, “Writing Wrongs: The Drafting of Supplications to the Crown in Later 
Fourteenth-Century England,” Medium Ævum 80, no. 2 (2011): 217-46; and Camargo, 
Medieval Rhetorics of Prose Composition: Five English Artes Dictandi and Their Tradition 
(Tempe: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1995). 
25 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 306-7. 
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parliament, and even within and outside of London, were capable of assisting petitioners.26 
Because of the close alliance between the ars dictaminis and the parliamentary petition, the 
petition was a common rhetorical form that was recognizable among the middle class (both 
literate and illiterate, as letters could be read aloud), university students trained in the 
rhetorical arts, and courtly audiences accustomed to using the ars dictaminis for government 
correspondence alike. Such recognition opened up legal process to a wide range of people 
and reinforces that petitionary and letter-writing rhetoric, form, and language was ubiquitous, 
and even household knowledge. Letter writing was already conceptualized as a means by 
which one person requested something from another by appealing to favor and grace—that 
is, to attachments and emotions—thus making this form the proper way to appeal to an 
authority through affective rhetoric in daily life.27 Such a common form allowed room for 
individuation, however, which was accomplished through the affective rhetoric used in 
crafting the particular language of the supplication. 
 The parliamentary petition adopted this consistent rhetorical form, but the wide range 
of content possible for a petition and the rhetoric that supplemented the “facts” of the 
complaint make the petitionary form a highly affective genre. As opposed to emotion—the 
socially constructed descriptors of feelings—affect is the embodied and bodily expression of 
feeling. This distinction is significant because one aspect of petitionary form was its 
embodied oral and aural performance, and such embodiment is consistent with the rhetorical 
art of delivery, which often takes advantage of the human body’s role in rhetorical 
                                                 
26 Dodd, “Writing Wrongs,” 238. However, it should also be noted that the ars dictaminis 
was widely taught, both in official and unofficial capacities, at Oxford, both for students and 
in vocationally-based courses (223). 
27 Ibid., 223. 
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performance through paralanguage (i.e., gesture, vocal rhythm, intonation—that is, affect or 
the embodied display of emotions, which enhances the intersubjectivity of rhetorical effect). 
Although petitions were certainly textual creations, Ormrod explains that petitions were also 
written for embodied practice, describing the performance of petitioning before parliament as 
“‘live’ performance, being read out, summarised or indeed embellished by royal clerks and 
legal attorneys before the king and council”;28 indeed, display behavior. In fact, the Rhetorica 
spends considerable time describing one’s tone of voice in the delivery of prose texts. For 
example, when describing the rhetorical technique of amplification—the elongation of a 
narratio—the Rhetorica author states that “[t]he tone of Amplification either rouses the 
hearer to wrath or moves him to pity.”29 Although petitioners were not required to appear 
before parliament in person, individual petitioners often met with greater favor if they did, 
which makes the petition a supplement to the petitioning body,30 while the body bolsters the 
affective appeal of the petition. Therefore, the appeal to pathos in language of petitions 
scripts the embodied delivery of complaint, while the textual body of the petition 
supplements the individual body in the parliamentary archive and in parliamentary 
proceedings proper. That is, petitionary pathos stylizes the embodied delivery of complaint in 
order to bolster the sense of attachment between petitioner and audience, making the 
performance of petitionary form an intersubjective experience before the law.31  
                                                 
28 Ormrod, “Medieval Petitions,” 9. 
29 Rhetorica, III.XIII.23. 
30 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 292. 
31 It is noteworthy that stylized complaint is also part of the long rhetorical tradition of the 
petition specifically. In the Byzantine Empire, for instance, some petitioners wrote in verse to 
impress the emperor with their literary skills, while, as Serena Connolly notes, “others 
presented themselves as stock characters: ‘the hen-pecked husband, the poor father of a large 
family’” (60), which again combines stock generic form with individuated stylized 
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  This intersubjective quality of the petition is further emphasized by what will be the 
focus of what remains of this chapter, namely, the common petition, which emerged out of 
the private petition in the reign of Edward III. The Commons adopted a number of private 
petitions as part of the Commons’ larger agenda and presented them to the king and council 
as “common” complaints, that is, as petitions submitted on behalf of the entire comune to the 
king. The emergence of the common petition not only changed the diplomatic of petitionary 
rhetoric to emphasize the collective nature of a complaint, but also developed the 
intersubjective processes of debate and deliberation that were necessary in forming the 
Commons’ complaint agenda, as we will see in the collectively crafted common petitions in 
the Parliament of Rats and Mice below. During Edward III’s reign, the increased need for 
parliamentary business to resolve issues related to the wars with France diminished the 
importance and time granted to private petitions; whereas attending to the demands of the 
Commons was crucial owing to the Commons’ control over taxation needed to fund war, 
private petitions did not have such leverage.32 As a result of Edward III’s decreased interest 
in resolving private petitions, the Commons as a body took up the petitionary mantle and 
adopted private petitions whose resolution seemed to have a widespread consequence for the 
larger commonweal. As a result, Dodd suggests that “the skills of articulation and persuasion, 
as well as knowledge of legal and administrative matters […] gained added value as 
constituencies contemplated the diminished chances of having their grievances properly 
addressed unless the Commons were persuaded that their case was worth taking up and 
                                                 
expression. For further discussion of ancient petitionary practice, see Connolly, “Petitioning 
in the Ancient World,” in Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance, 47-63. 
32 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 116. 
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sponsoring as a common petition.”33 As a result, the rhetoric of private petitions seeking the 
endorsement of the Commons developed to include assertions of common profit34 and 
elaborated narratios that provided more background for a complaint.35 Likewise, I propose 
that the salutatio and exordium decreased in importance in common petitions because the 
narratio and petitio portion of the petition began to carry the affective weight of the overall 
petition. In other words, during the reigns of Edward III and Richard II, private petitions 
made more of a concerted effort to connect individuated complaints to larger concerns of the 
realm, and the rhetoric of community and affective descriptions of grievances contributed to 
the petition’s increased awareness of collectivity. This, too, is an example of the social link; 
after all, petitions were inspired by real traumatic experiences, and contextualizing one’s 
trauma within a larger concern for the Commons forecloses isolation. 
 An example of the rhetoric of common profit can be seen in Item 186 among the 
common petitions submitted before the Good Parliament, which called for an assurance that 
parliament meet annually to address the realm’s grievances with reduced potential for 
government corruption in administering justice. Part of the persuasiveness of this particular 
petition is its pathos-driven description of past procedure and of future resolution, and this 
pathos enhances the collectivity of the petition by likewise enhancing the attachment to its 
rhetoric. That is to say, affective rhetoric bolsters the audience’s attachment to the particular 
complaint. The petition reads: 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 147, emphasis original. 
34 Ormrod, “Murmor, Clamour and Noise: Voicing Complaint and Remedy in Petitions to the 
English Crown, c. 1300-1460,” in Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance, 135-55; 137. 
35 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 149. 
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Also, the commons pray: that it might please him to establish by statute in this 
present parliament that a parliament should be held each year, to correct 
errors and deceits in the realm, if any are found. And the knights of the shires 
for these parliaments should be chosen by common election from the best men 
of the said counties, and not certified by the sheriff alone without due election, 
on a certain penalty. And the sheriffs of the counties of the realm should be 
chosen in the same manner from year to year, and not appointed by bribery in 
the king’s court, as they used to do, for their own profit and by procurement of 
the maintainers of the region, to sustain their deceits and evils and their false 
quarrels, as they have commonly done before this time, in destruction of the 
people.36 
At its core, this is a request that attempts to diminish corruption in the election of the 
Members of Parliament in the localities (or, perhaps originally, in a shire, later extended to 
all shires to meet the purposes of the common petition), and that such procedures should be 
maintained from year to year. However, the stylization of the complaint both emphasizes its 
common nature and employs affective rhetoric to cast this as an issue of public morality. The 
statute—itself a public genre—is meant to correct “errors” and “deceits” done to the comune. 
The petition goes on to imply that such “deceits” in this case are done by sheriffs, a favorite 
target of common petitions, at which point the petition’s language becomes more legalistic, 
being sure to outline the desired outcome amidst the overall pathos of the petition. The 
petition ends by amplifying the moral tenor of the complaint through affective rhetoric, 
casting common profit against the sheriff’s “own profit” to “sustain their deceits and evils 
                                                 
36 PROME, parliament of 1376, item 186, emphasis mine. 
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and their false quarrels.” Noteworthy is that affective language is employed here to 
emphasize the contrast between common profit and individual profit, the overall conclusion 
to which is the avoidance of the “destruction of the people.” Although the common petition 
uses affective rhetoric to enhance the stakes of the grievance, just as important is the clear 
delineation of legal statute and legal process in which such a rousing of affects must result. 
Here, both the means by which the petition persuades and the overall legal effects are 
emphasized; outcomes were important, but without the rhetoric to rouse support for such 
outcomes, the king’s compliance might not be as easily met. In this case, the king assented to 
all aspects of the request. 
 In addition to the changes from private justice to common profit in petitionary 
diplomatic, the overall arrangement of common petitions shifted to amplify the narratio and 
petitio portions of a petition, which is where the affective labor of complaint takes place. As 
seen in the example above regarding the election of Members of Parliament, the salutatio and 
exordium are abbreviated, whereas the narrative and petition proper are elongated via the 
rhetorical technique of amplification. In Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Documentum de modo et arte 
dictandi et versificandi, the most widely circulating ars dictaminis manual of the Middle 
Ages, the author spends a considerable amount of time discussing the importance of 
amplifying material so that “a simple statement may be developed with a few simple 
ornaments and that a facile meaning may be enlarged by more ornate language.”37 However, 
such elongation and amplification of the complaint is not for the sake of mere ornamentation, 
but instead for expressivity—to amplify the affective tenor of the complaint. For example, 
                                                 
37 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi, ed. Roger P. 
Parr (Milwaukee: Marquete UP, 1968), 3.70. All citations will include chapter and line 
number. 
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among the common petitions enrolled in the Good Parliament was one “Concerning justices 
of assizes,” which met a sympathetic response from Edward III and his council: 
 [salutatio] Also, the commons pray: [narratio] that whereas various justices 
are assigned to be justices of assizes in the regions where they live and where 
they have their lords, masters, kinsmen and allies, none of the poor can have 
recovery because of the favour which is shown to the aforesaid. [petitio] 
Wherefore may it please the said council, in way of charity, to ordain that no-
one should be a justice of assizes in the region where he is resident and might 
side with the people of the region without other justices from outside the 
region being associated with them. But may it please him to ordain justices 
from distant places, who will do justice to the small as well as the great, and to 
the poor as well as the rich.38 
In addition to circumventing corruption in local politics by including non-local justices in 
local disputes, the Commons petitioned to resuscitate their political attachments by praying 
to the king and council in the petitio that, “en oevre de charite” [“in way of charity”], they 
provide remedy. “Charite” can be translated simply as “charity,” but it also carries 
connotations of “love” or “affection,”39 thus using the language of attachment to the king to 
prompt reform of local governance. The king’s answer was favorable (“It pleases the king”), 
and, in fact, he instructs in the Parliament Rolls that “he who feels himself aggrieved should 
complain, and justice will be done to him,”40 not only remedying past and current grievance, 
but also inviting complaint from those in the future, thus maintaining juridical “affection” by 
                                                 
38 PROME, parliament of 1376, item 75. 
39 Baker, Manual of Law French, s.v. “chierte (n.),” 1. 
40 PROME, parliament of 1376, item 75. 
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way of promised legal redress by combining both forensic and deliberative rhetorical genres. 
Furthermore, in a small but effective rhetorical appeal in the petitio, employing the discourse 
of care allowed the Commons to affirm a primary attachment to the Crown over local 
institutions, thus summoning the king’s obligation to provide justice via discourses of proper 
lordship, which includes the dispensation of charity, here reframed in terms of juridical 
caritas. 
 Petitionary form and rhetoric becomes increasingly ubiquitous throughout the one-
hundred-year history of formal written complaint leading to the Good Parliament. In fact, the 
embodied stylization of petitionary rhetoric added to the widespread familiarity of petitionary 
form, as writs with decisions over parliamentary petitions were dispatched to sheriffs 
“ordering the viva voce proclamation, in county courts, markets and other public places, of 
statutes arising from the responses to the common petitions.”41 That is, even the illiterate had 
access to these legal formulae by hearing the results of petitions proclaimed publicly, through 
a live performance by a legal professional who read writs aloud. What drew the public’s 
attachment to these forms are the expansions of affective rhetoric occasioned by the rise of 
the common petition, developing a language and form that enabled access rather than 
restricted it. The dual oral-textual nature of petitions preserves the rhetorical tradition’s 
emphasis on invention, arrangement, and delivery, making the petition a highly affective, 
embodied, and performative genre. 
II. Affective Rhetoric: Debating Petitions in the Parliament of Rats and Mice 
 How did the culture of complaint, and the construction of affective bonds upon which 
petitionary rhetoric depended, affect contemporary understandings both of parliament and of 
                                                 
41 Ormrod, “Murmor, Clamour and Noise,” 143-44. 
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the affective experiences that its political processes produced? Frustration was an affect that 
attended many bureaucratic processes, including petitioning and debate, especially in the 
aftermath of the Bad Parliament of 1377’s reversal of the Good Parliament’s political 
accomplishments. Reading the Parliament of Rats and Mice alongside the Good Parliament 
of 1376 and the subsequent Bad Parliament of 1377 need not be restricted to topical allegory, 
for both parliamentary portrayals actively participate in understanding the affects and 
attachments that motivated the majority of parliament’s work, namely, the petition.42 We can 
read the Rat Parliament and the Good Parliament together in a way that highlights the 
complexity of the political processes, and the frustration and disappointment that can attend 
slow political processes, that had been forming throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. 
 The Parliament of Rats and Mice explores the connection between the joint processes 
of debating and petitioning: petitions brought before parliament sparked other bureaucratic 
and political processes, among them debates over the final decision to be made among the 
Commons. The Parliament of Rats and Mice uses petitions as the impetus for debate in order 
to display the messiness of political process and examine the conflicting attachments that 
petitions can conjure. In fact, the form of the debate in the Rat Parliament is structured as a 
common petition under revision, constructing competing narratios and petitios that the 
                                                 
42 As Nicole Lassahn demonstrates, Langland’s was only one of many narratives of the Good 
Parliament to coexist, and therefore, the impact of the Good Parliament was as much political 
as it was artistic, given the number of narratives, songs, chronicles, and poems produced in 
its aftermath. All accounts, like Langland’s, are conceptual rather than definitive and 
authoritative records. For more, see Lassahn, “Langland’s Rats Revisited: Conservatism, 
Commune, and Political Unanimity,” Viator 39, no. 1 (2008): 127-56. On the production of 
political pamphlets and broadsides produced in the wake of the Good Parliament, see Oliver, 
Parliament and Political Pamphleteering, 29-55. 
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assembly of rats and mice debate. The debate in Langland’s Rat Parliament, as will be shown 
below, is structured as a collectively-composed common petition, being revised in the 
process of slow debate. Noteworthy is that the debate is not a haphazard or chaotic 
polyphony of voices, but rather that the petitionary form offers a structure that enables the 
process of debate to unfold. 
 The opening lines of the Parliament of Rats and Mice introduce the problem at hand 
by affectively describing the relationship between the rats and mice and the cat of the court. 
This introduction to the problem uses affective scripts to enhance the appeal to common 
profit that the assembly seeks to resolve. The cause of this parliament is that a cat of the court 
antagonizes the rats and mice, and the assembly seeks a solution to a problem that heretofore 
has been left unresolved: 
Wiþ þat ran þer a route of ratons at ones 
And smale mees wiþ hem: mo þan a þousand 
Comen to a counseil for þe comune profit; 
For a cat of a court cam whan hym liked 
And ouerleep hem liȝtliche and lauȝte hem at his wille 
And pleid wiþ hem perillousli and possed hem aboute.43 
Common complaint is the topic of the debate, and the particular site for complaint is none 
other than the parliament, a site of expressive political affect. This initial narratio begins 
with the rhetoric of common profit, but a declaration of common profit is then strengthened 
by a narratio that briefly describes the perils of the situation; that is, in order to be 
rhetorically successful, common profit must be cast in an affective narrative. The 
                                                 
43 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.Prol.146-51, emphasis mine. 
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descriptions of the cat’s action are terrifying and frustrating: the “cat of a court cam whan 
hym liked / And ouerleep hem [the mice and rats] liȝtliche and lauȝte hem at his wille,” 
implying, much like the Herevertons, that this high-ranking cat faces no accountability in his 
office or actions. The narratio continues this fear as the reader discovers that the cat “pleid 
wiþ hem perillousli and possed hem aboute.” That is, lack of accountability leads to peril and 
political disruption. Therefore, the debate that follows is framed using the rhetoric of 
common profit and affective descriptors to enhance claims to common profit, two key 
features of a common petition before parliament. By attending to the petitionary structure of 
the introduction and the ensuing debate, the Piers Plowman B-Prologue casts petitionary 
form as dynamic as it structures the complexity of the debate that follows. 
 With the petitionary language and purpose of complaint in the Rat Parliament 
established, the ensuing debate forms over not only the specific remedy to be proposed, but 
also over what the problem even is to begin with, and of the competing attachments that such 
conflicts produce. The first words of dialogue in the Rat Parliament debate are unattributed, 
but they offer a continuation of the introductory narratio, namely that “if we grucche of his 
gamen he wol greuen vs all, / Cracchen vs or clawen vs and in hise clouches hold.”44 Not 
only does the second part of the narratio explain that the cat’s behavior is cause for 
complaint, but also that until now there has been no recourse, for if they “grucche,” or 
complain, then the cat will “greuen” the commonweal. The rhetorical effectiveness of this 
line casts the topic of common profit, a key component of any petition’s argument, in an 
affective lens, for in the current situation, complaint leads to collective grief outside of 
parliament. Without the petitionary capacity of parliament, there exist no socio-political 
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processes for resolving this complaint. Despite the petition’s lack of success in ultimately 
being approved by the assembly, parliament nonetheless maintains its place as an arena for 
otherwise unvoiced complaints. As the unnamed speaker concludes, he offers a brief petitio 
that reveals the capacities of petitionary process: “Miȝt we wiþ any wit his will wiþstonde, / 
We myȝte be lords olofte and lyuen at oure ese.”45 Rather than toppling social order by 
becoming lords themselves, the rats and mice seek to live in ease as lords do. That is, 
petitionary process allows those with complaints the potential to live in ease—the unnamed 
speaker conceptualizes petitionary process as a collective care practice. The initial petitio 
seeks not to redefine the socio-political landscape by disrupting class hierarchy, but instead 
to use wit—formed through a process of collective debate—to produce a more favorable 
affective position and to re-craft the narrative that they currently face. The petitio seeks to 
craft the potential for a new story about the bonds that exist between rats and cats. 
 The “raton of renoun” that speaks next attempts to revise the unnamed speaker’s 
narratio and petitio and cast it within the petitionary rhetoric of reason, the next step in the 
collectively-revised common petition under dynamic review. At first glance, especially to our 
modern eyes, accountability for high-ranking governmental officials sounds reasonable. In 
fact, even medieval readers are led to sympathize with the rat because he is renowned46 and 
he claims that his ideas are motivated by reason: “reson me sheweþ.”47 Claims to reason 
certainly bolstered the rhetorical appeal of common petitions. However, “renown” not only 
implies fame—the primary reason why critics have associated the rat with Peter de la Mare, 
first-ever speaker of the Commons in the Good Parliament—but it also refers to rumor or 
                                                 
45 Ibid., B.Prol.156-57. 
46 Ibid., B.Prol.158. 
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report, or unsubstantiated claim. That is, the rat is a storyteller, and when applying the 
rhetorical form of the petition to his speech, we see not only that narrative is crucial to the 
success of a petition,48 but also that the narrative he presents misses the affective reality of 
the mice and rats. Ormrod explains that “petitions were not merely the outpouring of real-
life, hard-luck stories but artful constructions designed to get something done.”49 However, 
this need not be a firm distinction, since expressivity, too, is an accomplishment in itself, 
especially for the polis, as it is anti-totalitarian. In line with generic expectations, the rat 
offers a stylized and leading narratio, but one stylized by reason rather than affect: 
“I have yseyen segges,” quod he, “in þe Cite of Londoun 
Beren beiȝes ful briȝte abouten hire nekkes, 
And somme colers of crafty work; vncoupled þey wenden 
Boþe in wareyne and in waast where hem leue likeþ, 
And ouþer while þei arn elliswhere, as I here telle. 
Were þer a belle on hir beiȝe, by Iesus, as me þynkeþ, 
Men myȝte witen wher þei wente and awey renne.[”]50 
The narratio that the rat tells is meant to re-craft the relationship that exists between the cat 
and the rats and mice. The situation that the rat describes is that in the city of London, men 
wear collars, associated with liveries marking attachment and affiliation to a lord, and that 
                                                 
48 Despite the consistency in form and structure across the petitions, the narratio and petitio 
parts of the petition highlight the “individuality and the scope that existed […] to make the 
complaint ‘stand out’” (Dodd, “Writing Wrongs,” 238). Narrative thus was of extreme 
importance to maintaining the particularity of the individual complaint once placed into a 
common form and to craft a particular attachment between the king and petitioner that would 
lead to a favorable outcome. 
49 Ormrod, “Medieval Petitions,” 11. 
50 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.Prol.160-66. 
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such liveries enable these men to freely move around the city. However, the proposal to bell 
the cat is not vindictive or aggressive but instead can be seen as a care practice: the proposal 
is for the good of all, including the cat. That is, with the bell and collar around his neck, the 
cat can move freely as he pleases, but the rats and mice will also be able to move freely in 
response. While claims to reason certainly bolstered the effectiveness of petitions, here the 
raton of renoun misses the affective reality of the situation: nobody is willing to bell the cat, 
because doing so might induce trauma. 
 In the petitio that follows, the rat offers a two-part proposal that seeks to modify the 
behaviors of how each class interacts. However, the affective tenor of the debate over the 
petition that ensues proves that reason alone is not enough to make a petition successful. The 
rhetoric of reason in first part of the petitio, however, disguises the affective response: 
“‘reson me sheweþ / To bugge a belle of bras or of britȝt siluer / And knytten it on a coler for 
oure commune profit / And hangen it vpon þe cattes hals[’].”51 Of course, the rhetoric of 
“reason” would most likely bolster claims to common profit, stressing that the action against 
them is “against law and reason” and to appeal to the Crown’s “right and reason” in 
providing remedy.52  Here, the affective rhetoric of the petitio is elided, and as such, the 
proposed attachment lacks an affective basis, or lacks a rooting in the affective reality and the 
emotional states of the parliament. That is, the petitio does not recognize vulnerability. 
Despite the lack of affective scripts to carry the discourse on common profit, however, the 
rat’s idea of common profit is still rooted in carving out more productive attachments among 
social groups. The second part of the rat’s petitio stresses reading the other through 
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intersubjective means, namely, how to read the cues of the cat’s proposed bell (i.e, the first 
part of the petition): “And if hym list for to laike, þanne loke we mowen / And peeren in his 
presence þe while hym pleye likeþ, / And if hym wraþeþ, be war and his wey shonye.”53 
Rather than a vindictive or vengeful move, the belling proposal gives each party the ability to 
read the other through paralanguage, stressing that the desire for intersubjectivity motivates 
the reasoned belling proposal. 
 The parliament refuses to adopt this petition because the new political process that it 
proposes (namely, to bell a cat) is not rooted in the affective reality of the rats and mice in 
parliament, nor does it attempt its argumentation through pathos-based description. That is, 
the proposal does not account for their fear, and thus, judging the proposal as a failure of 
action misses its misrepresentation of affect. Although the rats as a deliberative body 
“assented”54 to the rat of renown’s petition, we learn that 
Ther ne was raton in al þe route, for al þe reaume of Fraunce, 
That dorst haue bounden þe belle aboute þe cattes nekke, 
Ne hangen it aboute his hals al Engelond to winne 
And helden hem vnhardy and hir counseil feble,  
And leten hire laboure lost and al hire longe studie.55 
The grandiose logical style of the rat’s narratio and petitio contrasts with the emotional tone 
of the rat assembly’s deliberation afterward, as seen in the lines above. The full affective 
response that arises in the debate corrects this petition’s appeal to reason, which reads 
abstractly when compared to the lived affective experiences of the rat parliament. Although 
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abstract reason suggests a particular action, that action ignores the rats’ self-assessed 
unhardiness and feebleness to take not all action but this particular action. That is, the 
assembly is not unwilling to act in general, but to go along with this one action due to the 
rat’s misreading of parliament’s current affective state. Here, allegory makes use of affective 
response to insert a lived contour into the petitionary process. 
 Once the rat parliament is unable to rally behind the raton of renoun’s petition, the 
petitionary process begins again. It becomes difficult to assert that either of these petitions 
“fail” simply because their proposals are not acted upon immediately; instead, one process 
conjures another, and in each iteration, the petitionary process becomes more attuned to 
affect. That is, in the Parliament of Rats and Mice, debate enlivens petitionary rhetoric, and 
group process assists in revising the final rhetoric used by the assembly to effectively 
communicate its affective reality. The rats realize that the action in the petition just offered 
neglects their fear, and so the petition proposed by “a mous þat much good kouþe”56 reflects 
the fear of belling the cat, translating the debate over the previous petition into a new 
petition. Like the rat’s original proposal, the mouse’s petition is composed in two parts: the 
narratio and the petitio. The mouse’s narratio re-contextualizes the problem not as a desire 
to bell a cat so as to become “lordes olofte,” but to deal with the cat as a matter of survival. 
That is, this third version of the narratio attempts to offer a new narrative that draws out the 
desire for survival: 
“Thouȝ we hadde ykilled þe cat, yet sholde þer come anoþer 
To cracchen vs and al oure kynde, þouȝ we cropen vnder benches. 
Forþi I counseille al þe commune to late þe cat worþe, 
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And be we neuere so bolde þe belle hym to shewe.[”]57 
The mouse’s response is not so much a counterproposal as it is a revised version of the 
narratio given by the rat above: belling the cat will not work simply because there are so 
many other cats in court—that is, the very reason why the belling proposal was initiated 
(because nobility wear liveries on their necks, so bell them) is also the reason why it will 
fail—because all nobility wear collars, the rats and mice would have to bell them all. The 
new narratio reframes the belling incident as a threat to social order, not because it would re-
form relationships anew, but because the commons of rats and mice are afraid to approach 
the cats; there is no social or political process that is safe that would enable a re-forming of 
such relationships. The mouse proposes safety, not status quo. The petition does not fail, but 
through petitionary process, the mice and rats have a better understanding of why they are 
acting as they are, and why their relationships are the way they are: there is no safe socio-
political process for approach outside of the parliament to help them achieve their goals. 
Rather than the failure of parliament, this reifies parliament as a space for safe political 
debate and for imagining new ways of social organization. Parliament is concerned here with 
matters of survival, and in the parliamentary archive, there is space for ensuring survival 
through a connection with the affective reality that motivates petitions to begin with. While 
critics have declared that the assembly is once again inconclusive (a similar complaint lodged 
against Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls, as we recall), what has been accomplished is a 
sharper definition of the assembly’s affective topography, and this is accomplished through 
petitionary form. Ignoring the process by which this debate is both constructed and by which 
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it evolves likewise ignores the growth of affect throughout the debate, which is enabled by 
petitionary process rather than an endorsed outcome.  
 Frustration is the one final affect to consider in this B-Prologue episode because it 
accounts not only for the ambiguous tone of the Rat Parliament, but also for the dismal 
portrayal that it has received in Piers Plowman scholarship—namely, frustration with 
bureaucracy. The attachment that actors in a political system develop toward political 
narratives is why narrative or narratio is so central to the petitionary ask—it does more than 
contextualize the petition, but rather shares the political narratives that motivate our 
individual and collective action. The scholarship on the revisions in the B-text has focused 
more on abstracting political action rather than on helping to embody the affective realities of 
the Good Parliament. Most likely written after the Good Parliament of 1376, during which 
the lead reformer, the Black Prince, died, and the Bad Parliament of 1377, in which all the 
reforms of the Good Parliament were reversed by John of Gaunt, coming to grips with the 
suddenness with which the narrative of the political landscape shifted, and the political 
advances made and now reversed, must have been devastating. Whereas critics use the 
Parliament of Rats and Mice to decode Langland’s shifting political leanings over the course 
of the A-, B-, and C-text revisions, we instead see that petitionary rhetoric and the 
attachments that it intentionally creates are at the foundation of sovereign power and of a 
parliamentary model of governance.58 Petitionary rhetoric includes an attachment to political 
narrative through which the ask is registered. Attending to petitionary form and rhetoric 
rescues the narratives of history from an abstract past and enlivens them through the 
affectively-constructed narratives and demands that they produce. As in the Rat Parliament’s 
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debate, rhetorical formulae provide a structure to the debate, not to rob it of vitality, but to 
create a space for affective expression not through chaos but through formal aesthetic 
elements that always shape our expressions to one another. 
III. ESTATES SATIRE AND LIVING POLITICS: REVISIONS TO THE A-TEXT 
 Langland used the events of the Good Parliament as a catalyst for a larger 
conceptualization of petitionary process and rhetoric, and this becomes evident when 
comparing the A-text Prologue to the B-text revisions. The A-Text of the Piers Plowman 
Prologue begins as an allegory of the corruption of society and an estates satire, underscoring 
that society is corrupt because each of its constituent parts is corrupt. For this reason, Helen 
Cooper argues that the A-text is the most political of the poem’s three versions, claiming that 
the chronology of the three poems and the evidence of their circulation suggests that the A-
text was the inspiration for John Ball’s insurgent letters in the Peasants’ Revolt, an alternate 
reading to the dominant narrative that supposes that the B-text played this role.59 Perhaps, 
also, the A-text is less meandering and more focused on the estates satire of the “fair feeld,” 
given the absence of the parliament fable and the allegory of the commonweal. The 
“political” as conceptualized in the A-text is much more wedded to estates satire, whereas the 
B-Texts revisions add the lived drama of the body politic to the otherwise allegorical 
catalogue of actions. Put another way, the B-text develops the lived experience of the 
individual and of groups in political-legal spaces out of the abstracted allegorical frame, 
pushing contemporary scholarly understandings of what is meant by the “political” in 
fourteenth-century England outside of the rigid representations of estates satire and into a 
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more flexible portrayal of the body politic assemblage. The expansion of the B-Prologue 
dramatizes petitionary rhetoric in order to ask what affects also attend political, bureaucratic, 
and legal processes. Considering the A-text to be more political denies notions of lived 
experience from the definition of politics, forcing our conceptualizations of the political to 
remain in the abstract and within the boundaries of catalogues of estates satire. Instead, the 
addition of the fable grounds the A-text’s political abstraction in a political scene with all of 
the complexity of group experience, exemplifying the overall foci of the B-Text revisions. 
 These B-text additions to the Prologue are inserted near the end of the A-text, amidst 
a moment that condemns priests who wish to abandon their parishes during pestilence time 
and relocate to London for easier, safer, and more lucrative jobs. Specifically, the B-text 
additions of the political scenes are inserted after what in the A-text is the penultimate stanza, 
a stanza which turns the critique of the clergy’s relocation to London to a more pointed 
critique of the clergy’s role in state government and in political life; this stanza, quoted 
below, is missing from (and perhaps replaced by) the B-text revisions. While petitionary 
rhetoric and allusions to petitionary process are present in the A-text, such representations are 
within the confines of estates satire: 
I sauȝ bisshopis bolde and bacheleris of deuyn 
Become clerkis of acountis þe King for to serue; 
Archideknes and denis þat dignites hauen 
To preche þe peple and pore men to fede 
Ben ylope to Lundoun be leue of hire bissop, 
And ben clerkis of þe Kinges bench þe cuntre to shende.60 
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This stanza reformulates the clergy’s movement as a symptom of larger-spread corruption 
caused by competing valuations of attachment: the clergy’s detachment from the comune and 
its opportunistic attachment to the king versus its pastoral obligation to care. The A-text 
mourns the abandonment of the poor in favor of obtaining posts at treasury or at the king’s 
bench, and this widespread detachment is not only desired by the lower clergy, but is also 
facilitated by bishops and archbishops higher up the ecclesiastical ladder who also shared 
these desires to flee. 
 Although this stanza does not survive the B- or C-text revisions, it begins to develop 
some of the affective responses in the Piers Plowman textual tradition that legal and political 
systems evoke in their participants. This stanza treats the petitionary process as participating 
in the crisis of competing attachments and politicizes its effects. Both archdeacons and deans 
have official positions—which the A-text Prologue calls “dignites”—that oblige them “[t]o 
preche þe peple and pore men to fede.”61 Although “dignites” are specifically high-ranking 
positions that confer authority on their occupants, this passage reframes what is central to 
clerkly positions by instead aligning “dignites” not with authority but with obligation. For the 
A-text Prologue, having a high-ranking ecclesiastical position brings obligations, and 
abandoning these obligations is not an exercise of authority but a source of shame for their 
failure to participate in the bonds that form the body politic assemblage, “þe cuntre to 
shende.” In fact, Dodd explains that the discourse of feudalism informed contemporaries’ 
expectations of good lordship, explaining that “lordship cut two ways and the petitioner’s 
affirmation of the feudal relationship could also be construed as a reminder that the king had 
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an obligation to provide justice and grace, for the sake of good lordship.”62 Moreover, the 
crisis of attachment between the clergy and the poor nonetheless testifies to the petition’s 
power to sustain—or degrade—attachments. Among the first taxonomies of emotion that 
entered England, roughly around the thirteenth century, was in Book II of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric,63 and his definition of shame is highly social, being defined as “a sort of pain and 
agitation concerning the class of evils […] that seem to bring a person into disrespect.”64 For 
Langland, the very political processes that ought to maintain attachments between clergy and 
comune are here put into disrespect, shaming not only the clergy but also the country. As a 
result, the affects in Langland’s poem are allegorical, conceptualizing the clergy’s shame on 
a larger national scale to show that petitionary rhetoric makes affects shareable.  
 The rhetoric of shame that Langland uses to describe the clergy’s misplaced 
attachments likewise frames the petitionary language in this passage as affective. In plague 
time, these same clerics who are obliged to preach to the people and feed the poor “[b]en 
ylope to Lundoun be leue of hire bisshop / And ben clerkis of þe Kinges bench,” that is, they 
run to London by their bishop’s permission.65 Permission, or “leve,”66 summons the 
vocabulary of petitionary rhetoric, which here has been co-opted for the sake of corruption. 
Langland here shows that the petitionary process is one of affective production, as well, that 
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petitioners not only convey affect, but produce it on larger scales. The individual petitions are 
allegorized precisely by way of the large-scale affects they produce—here, the consequences 
are allegorized as the country’s shame—which reminds readers that the subject before the 
law is not wholly contained but rather, as a result of entering private complaints into the 
archive, produces affects that are then shared through the results of petitions. In short, these 
petitions are shareable in part because of the affect that they produce. Thus as early as the A-
text—written before the Good Parliament’s deluge of petitions—Langland was 
experimenting in his poetry with the allegorical consequences of private petitions, and those 
consequences for him are the affects that such petitions produce both privately and on a 
larger social scale. These twinned effects make petitions allegorical. 
 The B-text’s additions transform the Prologue into a theoretical or conceptual text 
about the evolution of governance, and the various benefits and failures that attend it. 
Langland does not rescue or condemn the petitionary process, but instead plays with its 
evolution. The B-text’s overall allegory is more productive if read as a conceptual 
exploration of the ever-evolving legal-political landscape of fourteenth-century England, that 
evolution here represented as a series of three political scenes that I read as connected, while 
nonetheless consisting of separate but interrelated processes that all evolve the role of the 
petition or petitionary rhetoric. Namely, the papal election underscores the value of 
accessibility in the petitionary process; the commonweal episode values complexity in 
political process; and the Parliament of Rats uses petitionary rhetoric to launch a debate 
about collective care practices. Together, these three episodes likewise present the affects 
that attend political process, such as fear and frustration. The added political scene, itself 
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episodic, uses the dream vision structure of episodic narrative to detail the psychological 
messiness—the apparent incongruity, despite their narrative succession—of political process.  
 After a lengthy A-text description of the corruption of the clergy and their use of 
petitions to abandon their ecclesiastical obligations, it is not surprising that the narrator 
questions the Church’s overall processes of governance and problematizes their impact on 
England’s own political process. Langland reminds readers that English politics do not occur 
in a vacuum, but that political processes are permeable, and, as a result, subject to the 
influence and invasion of other social practices. In the B-Prologue, the A-text’s original 
scene described above is replaced by a scene in which the cardinals of the Church elect the 
next Pope, and Langland describes these processes as closed-door and inaccessible—that is, 
not a political environment that invites expression from the “outside” through petitionary 
process. In fact, Langland offers a pun on the etymology of the word “cardinal” that critiques 
the church’s closed-door political processes, explaining that those to whom Peter left the 
church “cardinals ben called and closynge yates / There Crist is in kiyngdom, to close and to 
shette, / And to opene it to hem and heuene blisse shewe.”67 The word “cardinal” is derived 
from the Latin cardo, meaning both “principal” and “hinge,” as in, something so principal 
that the rest hinges on it.68 Here, Langland transforms the hinge metaphor into the “closynge 
yates” of heaven, implying that access to cardinals is closed-door, and that access to “hevene 
blisse” is not granted through the cardinals through complaint or petition (i.e., through church 
bureaucracy), but rather through supplication and petition to Christ. Langland is not alone in 
his distrust of cardinals; in fact, among the record number of common petitions submitted to 
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the Good Parliament was a hefty stack of anticlerical grievances that claimed not only 
interference by the clergy into the affairs of England, but also the interference of the Church 
Institution (the Vatican and its proxies) into English politics. In a request to renew the 
Statutes of Provisors, Common Petition Item 110 in the parliament rolls describes the 
cardinals, “except two or three, [to be] enemies of the king and of the realm.”69 The very 
word used to describe the principle actors of the Church likewise casts them as outsiders to 
the realm of England, as gatekeepers that remain inside while excluding those outside, 
making England alien to itself.70 In alignment with petitionary rhetoric, the effective appeal 
of which allegorizes the harms described in a private complaint as harms committed against 
the realm, Langland allegorizes the hinge metaphor and thus transforms it into a threat 
against the commonweal. 
 The papal election offers a vision of governance that is anti-petitionary, one that 
closes down the political processes that petitions open up: 
Ac of þe Cardinals at court þat kauȝte of þat name 
And power presumed in hem a Pope to make 
To han þe power þat Peter hadde, impugned I nelle— 
For in loue and lettrure þe eleccion bilongeþ; 
Forþi I kan and kan nauȝt of court speke moore.71 
                                                 
69 PROME, parliament of 1376, item 110. 
70 Patrick Zutshi explains that often groups of petitioners together would submit petitions to 
the Pope in groups of petitions called rotuli, which were of one kind, namely, “those for 
provisions to ecclesiastical benefices. They reflect the vast increase in papal control over 
ecclesiastical appointments that took place in the fourteenth century.” For more, see Zutshi, 
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Again, Langland’s B-Prologue is attuned to the anticlerical agenda of the Good Parliament, 
which likewise critiqued the election process for Church benefices. In the “Bill against the 
pope and the cardinals,” the parliament rolls claim that when the church had “free election of 
their prelates, according to the law of God and of holy Church, […] for as long as these good 
customs were followed the realm was full of all prosperity.”72 However, the petition 
continues: “[S]ince the good customs were corrupted and obstructed by covetousness and 
simony, the realm has been full of various adversities, such as wars and pestilences, hunger, 
cattle murrains and other grievances.”73 Many of the widespread cultural traumas that 
plagued the fourteenth century (see my “Introduction” above) are here attributed to a 
corruption of political process, suggesting that improper political functioning leads to the 
sickness and traumatization of the commonweal. Conversely, processes that are open and 
uncorrupted by meedful gain contribute to the prosperity of the realm. Although love and 
learning should be critical to the Church’s election of a new Pope (as they are for Chaucer’s 
narrator in the Parliament of Fowls), Langland sees the univocality of the papal election 
process, and the presumption of power to engage in that process in an exclusive way, as a 
corruption that forecloses speech. The narrator “kan…of court speke moore,” that is, he 
could indeed offer a complaint of Holy Church. However, Langland’s narrator quite literally 
and politically “kan nauȝt of court speke moore” because there are no processes to 
accommodate an outside perspective, or a petition—the papal court is not open to complaint 
and does not facilitate attachment by enabling affective expression into political process. In 
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Langland’s political world, we find the Papal court to be another Temple of Venus akin to 
the Parliament of Fowls—the totalitarian other who refuses to listen or respond. 
IV. ATTACHMENT AND CARE IN PETITIONARY RHETORIC: THE ALLEGORY OF THE 
COMMONWEAL 
 At the root of the Good Parliament’s complaints about Church processes, and Will the 
narrator’s frustration at having something to say but finding himself operating within a 
closed political system, is a critique about the Church’s failure as an institution of care. That 
is, Langland portrays the Church and its attendant political processes as abandoning its care 
practices, seen most readily in the A-text’s complaint that the clergy abandons its 
parishioners in plague time, discussed above. In fact, practices such as the petition that 
should facilitate care practices are actually taken advantage of: supplications to bishops 
become accomplices in abandoning collective care. The language of abandonment summons 
the language of attachment, as well, and perhaps most frustrating for Langland’s narrator is 
that the very processes that ought to facilitate care by evoking affects are manipulated to 
abandon attachments and promote frustration. 
Child psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott teaches us that during the critical period in child 
development when the child begins to explore the world outside of his primary attachment 
with his mother/caregiver, the young child attaches himself to what he terms “transitional 
objects,” which “stand[] for the breast (or mother),” but which are not the mother, as a 
“defense against anxiety” resulting from a reformulation of the attachment that necessarily 
accompanies the child’s desire for partial separation but also his or her need for continued 
attachment.74 The transitional object is a self-soothing supplement to the child’s primary 
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attachment. Moreover, Winnicott argues that during the course of adult life, the transitional 
object “is not forgotten and is not mourned” because “the transitional phenomena have 
become diffused […] over the whole cultural field.”75 That culture itself is a transitional 
object implies that even as adults, we continue to seek out (and thus, never need to forget) 
our reliance on attachments because we are never without them, seeking the cultural artifacts 
that we construct as a species to sustain, repurpose, reformulate, and reinvent our primary 
attachments. Cultural artifacts, too, have a collective self-soothing function that sustains and 
reinvents attachments. Winnicott’s transitional object speaks to the soothing function of the 
attachment and its future reformulations because its primary function is to manage the 
anxiety of navigating the world, as petitionary practices try to do. It follows that institutions, 
too, are under the umbrella of Winnicott’s extension of the transitional object to “culture,” 
and thus, because institutions can play a role in the managing of anxiety by providing 
avenues for attachment, institutions function on a biopolitical level and accommodate a 
species demand for an attachment intended on soothing our interactions with the world, 
which in Piers is imagined as access to petitionary practices. 
 Attachment is so crucial for human survival because of the infant’s dependency on 
the caregiver at birth; forms of attachment are species functions that, for Winnicott, then 
become re-formulated on a larger cultural scale. For example, we create institutions whose 
processes reimagine the image of our attachments, this time on a political level, because the 
need for care and the intersubjective quality of the ask are evolutionarily engrained. Because 
infants are so underdeveloped in terms of self-care at birth (at least in comparison to nearly 
all other mammals), the function of the ask and the demand is one of survival, and survival 
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depends upon attachment to a willing caregiver. When these phenomena are “diffused […] 
over the whole cultural field,” we can understand institutionalized forms of the demand and 
of the ask to likewise serve a biopolitical function engrained in evolutionarily-driven species 
needs.76 
 However, it is important to emphasize the role of process in facilitating attachment 
behavior. According to attachment theorist John Bowlby, behavioral systems develop 
evolutionarily to meet certain set-goals in the environment, and he explains that, 
“[a]ttachment behavior […] is the result of the activity of behavioral systems that have a 
continuing set-goal, the specification of which is a certain sort of relationship to another 
specified individual.”77 Put another way, the behavioral systems associated with attachment 
do not function by arriving at a fixed and accomplishable end-goal, but rather achieving the 
set-goal of attachment requires a continual maintenance of a kind of relationship. 
Furthermore, Fradenburg explains that central to the maintenance of that relationship are 
affective forms of expression that, due to the vulnerability of living creatures, require 
attention and interpretation in order to ensure individual and collective survival. An example 
is paralanguage, which stylizes communication through gesture, tone and melody of voice, 
and facial expression.78 In fact, the field of rhetoric since Aristotle is invested in processes of 
persuasions; in Book 1 of his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines rhetoric as “an ability, in each 
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[particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.”79 While rhetoric does have an 
end-goal in sight, the art of rhetoric is in the means by which—i.e., the processes by which—
one persuades, and this includes many of the paralinguistic expressions that stylistically 
sustain attachments between infants and caregivers. 
 In the instance of the parliamentary petition, an attachment that relies on a stylized 
ask or demand has morphed into a political process that negotiates the individual’s demand 
or request with the sovereign’s response and grace. Thus the rhetoric of the petitionary ask is 
infused by, though it cannot be reduced to, the infant-caregiver attachment in the attachment 
between citizen and sovereign. Attachment is foundational to the institution of the petition 
and to the culture of complaint, the rhetoric of which enacts attachment behavior. As Ormrod 
explains, “The idea that a problem might be solved if only one could gain the king’s attention 
was deeply rooted in the political culture of the later Middle Ages.”80 Part of enacting 
attachment behavior is that the request requires attention, and the more stylized the request, 
the more likely the petitioner was to receive the Crown’s attention and to begin the process of 
attachment, which required maintenance through petitionary narrative and rhetoric. The ask 
is a species function insofar as it is linked to care practices required for survival, and we can 
extrapolate to consider the petition to likewise be a type of species function.81 
 The second stage of the political episode added to the Piers Plowman B-text—
namely, the allegory of the commonweal—uses petitionary rhetoric to show a flexible vision 
of the body politic assemblage. This episode, of course, is in direct contrast to the gate-
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keeping of the papal court. The episode begins with an idealized vision of governance in the 
body politic, but what makes this vision ideal is the flexibility of law, alluding to the 
petitionary process’s capacities to open up the letter of the law to individual circumstances. 
The prologue states, “The Kyng and þe Commune and Kynd Wit þe þridde / Shopen lawe 
and leaute—ech lif to knowe his owene”;82 that is, the idealized vision of society is one in 
which law does not apply blankly to each estate, but rather that each estate interacts with the 
law differently, and that such an arrangement shapes laws and justice (i.e., “lawe and 
leaute”). This idealized vision implies that the political process is flexible, that there is not 
one measuring stick against which the actions of a group are judged. In fact, there are hints in 
this initial description that indicate Langland’s insistence on complicating the body politic 
model of governance away from a strict hierarchical model and instead toward one that is 
more flexible, and he uses petitionary rhetoric to incorporate this flexibility: the king and 
commons together shape law, much as they do in petitionary process. The episode’s opening 
lines introduce the king and his retinue, but understand the foundations of the law to be in the 
presence of the Commons: “Thanne kam þer a Kyng: Knyȝthod hym ladde; / Might of þe 
communes mad hym to regne.”83 While “might” certainly alludes to the Commons’ 
increasing strength in the late fourteenth century, the word summons petitionary discourse as 
well, signaling that not just the strength, but the authority and permission of the Commons 
grants to the king his “regne.”84 Furthermore, the “might” of the Commons also can refer to 
the capacities of the Commons,85 which were increasing in petitionary process, as well: 
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toward the end of the fourteenth century, petitions were not only submitted to the king, but to 
and in the name of the Commons.86 The permission and the capacity of the Commons 
provide the foundations for sovereign rule, which uses petitionary rhetoric to carve out an 
attachment between Commons and king that is more flexible and multivocal, in opposition to 
the gate-keeping processes of the papal court. 
 The metaphor of the body politic upholds a fixed relationship between king and 
Commons—between head and body—but parliament complicated this relationship by 
disrupting the rigid tripartite estates model of society. As discussed in Chapter 1 above, 
DeLanda argues that the hazards of the body politic metaphor in the history of political 
philosophy have to do with the limited role of the individual in larger systems—i.e., 
“assemblages”—in an attempt to escape the hierarchical foundations of the body politic 
model. Again, the body politic is an “organismic metaphor” because it uses the human body 
as a model for understanding society, and this has led to a habit within sociological discourse 
of defining society by “relations of interiority,” meaning that “the component parts [of the 
organism] are constituted by the very relations they have to other parts in the whole. A part 
detached from such a whole ceases to be what it is, since being this particular part is one of 
its constitutive properties.”87 DeLanda refuses the idea that constituent parts of the body 
politic are only functional within relations to other parts of the body. While attributing the 
legitimacy of the king’s rule to the “might of þe communes” might summon the organismic 
metaphor, it is a reversal of this metaphor because “might” underscores capacities of action. 
                                                 
86 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 166. 
87 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, 8-9. 
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In fact, we summon the organismic metaphor only if we read “might” as strength and force, 
understanding the word in a hierarchical context. 
 Instead, DeLanda provides an alternative functional model based not on relations of 
interiority but on capacities to interact, reminding us that “a whole may be both analyzable 
into separate parts and at the same time have irreducible properties, properties that emerge 
from the interactions between parts.” Interactions between parts opens the system’s 
“capacities to interact” since the “capacities [of a system’s individual parts] are not given—
they may go unexercised if no entity suitable for interaction is around—and form a 
potentially open list, since there is no way to tell in advance in what way a given entity may 
affect or be affected by innumerable other entities.”88 Reading the Commons’ might as 
wedding their authority to their potential legitimizes their increasing capacities to interact 
with the sovereign, which they accomplished through the use of petitionary process. The 
idealized body politic that begins the commonweal episode becomes complicated by 
allusions to living processes—or capacities of interaction—that the petition affords in legal 
process: the petition directly to the king opens up common law to those who otherwise have 
no solution through normal local, legal procedures.89 
 In the commonweal episode, what follows the idealized body politic is a debate over 
the king’s relationship to the law, the law serving a mediating function in the king and 
Commons’ attachment. Using petitionary rhetoric to offer a more flexible vision of the 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 10. 
89 For a discussion of how the petition provided a supplement to common law procedures, see 
Dodd, Justice and Grace, 285, where he argues that “a petition provided the king’s subjects 
with the opportunity to access a ‘purer’ form of justice far more closely aligned to a moral 
imperative than the ‘ordinary’ justice offered in the king’s lower courts, which appeared to 
be governed more by earthly processes and which (at least in the minds of contemporaries) 
were often sullied by the flawed and corrupt judgments of the king’s justices.”  
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commonweal, the episode first summons a “lunatik” who nonetheless speaks “clergially”—
learnedly and skillfully,90 skillful speech invoking the rhetorical tradition—to reinforce that 
the king’s authority is not absolute but rather contingent upon his own petitionary 
relationship to Christ the King. The lunatik lays the foundations for the culture of complaint 
that are then debated throughout the rest of the episode, beginning the debate by addressing 
the king through the rhetoric and ceremony of petitionary procedure, “knelynge to þe 
Kyng”91 and offering the following: “‘Crist kepe þee, sir Kyng, and þi kyngryche, / And lene 
þee lede þi lond so leaute þee louye, / And for þi riȝtful rulyng be rewarded in heuene!”92 The 
lunatik requests that Christ not only defend, protect, and care for the king,93 but that he also 
“lene [the King] lede [his] lond so leaute [he] louye.” “Lenen” in Middle English explicitly 
means to give permission or to grant something to someone,94 and here, Christ is envisioned 
as granting to the king the ability to lead his land so that he loves justice; the king’s abilities 
to execute justice in response to complaints is itself conceptually wrapped up in the 
petitionary relationship between king and Christ. Langland’s depiction accords with 
fourteenth-century petitionary rhetoric, as well, as Dodd explains that religious discourse was 
central to the formulation of petitions,95 and that “[a] petition to the king was an appeal to the 
king’s sense of equity and fairness—to his conscience—and this, more than any formalized 
legal doctrine, was intrinsically linked to the sovereign’s personal role as the vessel of God’s 
grace.”96 Therefore, the king’s justice is an extension of Christ’s justice on earth, which, once 
                                                 
90 MED, s.v. “clergial (adj.)” a-b, accessed August 25, 2018. 
91 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.Prol.124. 
92 Ibid., B.Prol.125-27. 
93 MED, s.v. “kepen (v.),” 1a, accessed August 25, 2018. 
94 Ibid., s.v. “lenen (v.3),” 1a, accessed August 25, 2018. 
95 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 283-85. 
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again, Dodd extrapolates as a reminder that “the king had an obligation to provide justice and 
grace, for the sake of good lordship.”97 Due to the petitionary relationship between the king 
and Christ, which is a foundational element in the culture of complaint, justice is 
conceptualized as an obligation rather than a request, and the petition is a stylized demand for 
the promise of Christ’s justice on earth. 
 Understanding the petitionary foundations to sovereign rule leads next to a debate 
over how the king ought to enact sovereignty in the execution of the law. An angel of heaven 
speaks in Latin98 to the king on behalf of “lewed men,”99 and while the language of the 
petition was Law French, the mediatory function of the angel recalls the mediatory function 
of the Westminster clerks who translated complaint into the petitionary rhetoric and religious 
discourse that triggered the enactment of justice. The performativity of the angel as a 
petitionary mediator, then, frames the words he speaks: 
[“]Nudum ius a te estiri vult pietate. 
Qualia vis metere, talia grana sere: 
Si ius nudator, nudo de iure metatur; 
Si seritur pietas, de pietate metas.”100 
                                                 
97 Ibid., 286. 
98 See G.R. Owst, “The ‘Angel’ and the ‘Goliardeys’ of Langland’s Prologue,” The Modern 
Language Review 20, no. 3, (1925): 270-79. Latin speech implies for Owst a parliamentary 
context for the commonweal episode: “[I]f the angel be really the saintly but very human 
orator of the church [Brinton], Latin, it is to be noted, as opposed to the vernacular used for 
regular preaching ad populum, would be the appropriate language of his address alike for 
sermons before ‘parliaments’ of clergy, or for sermons, ‘in presence of lords,’ at the opening 
of Parliaments of the realm” (273). While I am not invested in the angel representing 
Brinton, the linguistic markers help to flesh out the context of the debate and relationship 
formed among the various speakers. 
99 Langland, Piers Plowman, B.Prol.129. 
100 Ibid., B.Prol.135-38. 
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[“Naked law wants to be clothed by you and by your sense of duty. Whatever 
you sow, of that kind of grain will you reap: If the law is made naked, then let 
naked law measure you. If justice is sown, you may reap justice.”]101 
Whatever relationship the king crafts with the law will then dictate how the law measures the 
king. Naked law (nudum ius), or the letter of the law, must be supplemented or clothed by the 
king’s duty, which are his interpretations of individual circumstances within the context of 
the law. As both the A- and B-text have made clear, duty enables the legal process to 
function properly. In placing the angel’s speech alongside the lunatik, we see that king’s 
engagement with the petitionary process in turn affects how the law will treat his own rule; as 
the Commons and the lunatik make clear, the king is below the law, and his authority rests 
both with a supplicatory relationship with Christ and by the permission granted by the 
Commons. If the king grants justice through petitionary process, the very same petitionary 
processes that enable his kingship will likewise maintain his authority. The petitionary 
relationship is inscribed in a hierarchy, but the biopolitical foundations of the ask in 
attachment behavior creates an intersubjective vision of the commonweal that resists the 
strictly hierarchical model of the body politic. Capacity for justice breeds capacities for 
sovereignty. And lastly, the need to clothe naked law and to interpret the law in individual 
contexts describes the function of the petition and is itself a care practice, clothing being 
among “needful things.”102 
  However, Langland refuses an easy and consistent portrayal of the law, 
understanding the petitionary process and the attachments that it facilitates to include 
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102 See Fradenburg, “Needful Things,” in Medieval Crime and Social Control, eds. Barbara 
A. Hanawalt and David Wallace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 49-69. 
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frustration. While the religious and feudal discourses that inform petitionary rhetoric seek to 
maintain an ideal vision of the attachment between citizen and sovereign, petitions were 
denied, which was also part of interpreting naked law. Attachments have the capacity for 
frustration, but if they last, also the capacity for reparation. After the angel speaks for the 
commons, “Thanne greued hym a goliardeis, a gloton of wordes, / And to þe aungel an heiȝ 
answeres after.”103 The narrator implies that the Goliard’s speech will challenge the angel, 
and the Goliard’s own gluttony of words admits that some political positions are excessive, 
and that affect and emotion are infused into language. Likewise in Latin, the Goliard offers 
an etymological argument for the king’s relation to the law, arguing that, “[d]um ‘rex’ a 
‘regere’ dicatur nomen habere, / Nomen habet since re nisi iura tenere” [“While ‘king’ from 
‘to rule’ is said to have its name, / He has the name without the substance unless he is zealous 
to maintain the law”].104 The ambiguity of the Goliard’s speech combats the angel’s 
petitionary agenda but refuses to settle on a clear role between the king and the law. Refusing 
a clear answer, Langland demonstrates the active nature of this debate in the fourteenth 
century, between oscillating positions and realities of limited and absolute monarchy with 
relation to the law. 
 While granting petitions, for the angel at least, is maintenance of the law, the 
combative nature of the Goliard’s words brings us back to “naked law” without the 
possibility of the king’s mercy or grace, as dispensed in response to petitionary requests. The 
Commons, who speak next, indeed are frustrated by the unresolved Latin debate, and 
communicate their frustration by shouting in unison, “Precepta Regis sunt nobis vincula 
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legis!” [“The commands of the King are for us the chains of law!’].105 Langland leaves the 
interpretation of this entire debate ambiguous, asking us to “construe whoso wolde,”106 
perhaps preparing us for the inconclusive debate in the Parliament of Rats and Mice that soon 
follows. Most important, however, is the affect of frustration that attends the debate: without 
a clear vision of king and law, the law can seem to chain the commons. While certainly 
carrying a negative connotation, chains do bind, and the Commons are so invested in this 
debate because they recognize that the law has a mediatory role in their attachment to the 
king: the king’s speech binds us. The chains of law hold together in conflict, but the imagery 
of the bond here (i.e., “chains”) negatively portrays the embrace as imprisonment. The law, 
so long as everyone is under it, means that no one can claim totality or totalitarian power or 
is entitled to the unbridled pursuit of their jouissance. Because of the question of the king’s 
relationship to the law drastically affects the Commons, the B-Prologue makes clear that a 
space is needed for the continual evolution of this debate. Immediately following, we witness 
a parliament that continues debating this same issue, shifting its focus to royal prerogative 
and its effect on those individuals who attempt to navigate the ambiguous, unresolvable 
abstractions that legal institutions produce. 
V. CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST VISION IN PIERS PLOWMAN: THE GOOD PARLIAMENT 
OF 1376 
Unlike much of the scholarship on Piers Plowman, my reading above does not claim 
to track any changes in Langland’s political leanings over the course of the A- and B-text 
revisions. Instead, I account for these revisions within the context of Langland’s culture’s 
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changing perspectives on governance, common profit, sovereignty, and political process due 
to the newly forming and ever-evolving parliament. However, readings that situate Piers 
alongside the parliament retreat to topical allegory, attempting to once again decode 
Langland’s specific thoughts on particular parliamentary events. In what follows, I discuss 
why typical allegorical readings limit the perspective and context for the poem, and I also 
contextualize the stakes of my own argument within the dominant Piers criticism. Having 
discussed the historical context for Langland’s revision, I conclude this chapter’s discussion 
by pointing to limitations of topical allegory and instead suggesting a broader theoretical 
framework for discussing these A- to B-text revisions. 
The critical history of the first dream vision in Piers Plowman overwhelmingly 
situates it within the context of the Good Parliament of 1376, among the chief 
accomplishments of which was the overwhelming number of petitions submitted to this 
parliament. The actions and consequences of the Good Parliament are traditionally taken as 
Langland’s impetus for transforming the A-text into the B-text in Piers Plowman criticism.107 
The reason is fairly obvious: the main addition to the B-text Prologue is the Parliament of 
Rats and Mice, which Langland likely adapted from Bishop Thomas Brinton’s Sermon 69—
in which a parliament of rats and mice likewise fail to bell a cat—a sermon which Brinton 
gave to the Good Parliament on May 18, 1376, as a warning against political inaction.108 As 
                                                 
107 For a discussion of the Good Parliament’s influence on the B-text revisions, see Bernard 
F. Huppé, “The Authorship of the A and B Texts of Piers Plowman,” Speculum 22, no. 4 
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John Taylor notes, Brinton delivered the sermon at a “critical juncture in the affairs of the 
Good Parliament” because it was given “after the king’s grant of an intercommoning 
committee to advise the Commons (13 May), and before the first meeting of the Commons 
with the committee,”109 a point at which the Commons were about to draft and act on their 
agenda of complaint. As noted, in Langland’s poem, the Parliament of Rats and Mice in the 
Prologue frames the ensuing drama (a drama made up of competing political processes) of 
Lady Meed in a subsequent scene of parliament in Passus IV. In fact, the trial of Lady Meed 
before the king’s parliament in both A- and B-Passus II-IV is typically read as an allegory for 
Alice Perrers, mistress to Edward III, who was likewise tried in the Good Parliament having 
“pursued various business and disputes in the king’s court by way of maintenance, bribing 
and influencing the parities.”110 This led to the passing of “an Ordinance against women 
pursuing business in the king’s courts by way of maintenance, singling [Perrers] out by 
name,”111 a reading that “the king should forbid any woman to do it, and especially Alice 
Perrers.”112 Among the many innovations of the Good Parliament was the sheer number of 
petitions submitted or co-opted by the Commons, and in the case of Perrers, the Ordinance 
specifically prevents her from seeking “disputes,” which in the original French—
“quereles”— refers in the legal context to legal complaints.113 That is, Lady Meed’s 
                                                 
Sources,” in Politics and Crisis in Fourteenth-Century England, eds., John Taylor and 
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109 Taylor, “The Good Parliament and Its Sources,” 91. 
110 PROME, parliament of 1376, item 45. 
111 Helen Jewell, “Piers Plowman—a Poem of Crisis: An Analysis of Political Instability in 
Langland’s England,” in Politics and Crisis in 14th-century England, 59-80; 68. 
112 PROME, parliament of 1376, item 45. 
113 Baker, A Manual of Law French, s.v. “querele (n.).” 
  
181 
interference in Peace’s petition in Passus IV likely resonated with readers who witnessed not 
only an onslaught of petitions in the Good Parliament, but also a petition that attempted to 
block the real life Lady Meed from interfering in petitionary business. Therefore, the topical 
nature of most studies of the first dream vision is justified and in fact testifies to the Good 
Parliament’s capturing of the public’s (here poetic) imagination. 
 However, topical allegory has been used in Piers Plowman criticism in an attempt to 
untangle Langland’s politics and to make claims that the poem’s revision history reflects 
Langland’s political leanings, conservative or otherwise. As a result, the analysis of the B-
text Prologue has been largely limited to topical allegory rather than considering Langland 
and his poem as part of a larger conceptual development of the parliamentary institution and 
its extended processes—namely the petition—despite the first vision’s abundant petitionary 
processes and rhetoric. Instead, critics take the petitionary presence in the B-Prologue and 
historicize it within the context of the Good Parliament. Critics have used topical allegory to 
establish many political positions that they then attribute to Langland, and in what follows I 
will outline these main positions in order to show that the critical conversation has limited 
the impact of the poem, and then offer a broader claim concerned less with Langland’s 
topicality and more with his role in the conceptual development of the parliamentary 
institution and its processes. 
The first and most enduring category of interpretation is that the revisions to the 
Prologue in the B-text, particularly the Parliament of Rats and Mice, betray Langland’s 
political conservatism and discomfort with parliament’s increasing power, often placing 
Langland in the school of political absolutism or anti-parliamentarianism. Unsurprisingly, 
this position mobilizes the Rat Parliament’s “inconclusiveness” as its prime example, reading 
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such inconclusiveness as its ultimate “failure,” as it has been termed, despite its desire to bell 
the sovereign cat. Anna Baldwin and Taylor both agree that the display of potential but 
ultimately failed power to limit monarchy is in fact a critique of parliament’s own increasing 
but inappropriate power, arguing that Langland’s portrayal of the Rat Parliament “may well 
indicate Langland’s opinion of Parliament,”114 namely that Langland’s own “conservative 
instincts” would likely not have welcomed a parliament meddling in sovereign authority.115 
Anthony Gross develops the argument even further with the bold claim that “[t]he poem 
reviled the processes which would in time provide the institutional framework of English 
democracy,”116 casting Langland not only as a critic of parliament but as actively writing 
against its developing role in governance over the projected longue durée. 
 Along the same lines that Langland’s Rat Parliament reflects his views on the actual 
parliament is that the inconclusiveness of the allegorical parliament is a comment on 
parliament’s own failure to accomplish anything. Bernard Huppé was the first to offer this 
argument, though he sees Langland as sympathizing with parliament’s reform efforts, 
claiming that the rats and mice meet to “restore the bridle of the law that the commons meet 
in parliament.” However, he continues: “[A]s that [1376] Parliament failed, so precisely does 
the Rat Parliament fail for lack of effective executive power.”117 Huppé’s analysis likewise 
portrays parliament’s work as a power grab, albeit here one for the betterment of the comune, 
and so necessarily anything short of absolute success (read, absolute parliamentary power, an 
opposite extreme from the absolutist argument outlined above with regard to the sovereign) 
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reads as a failure in these terms. Therefore, the origins of the failure argument adopt an 
absolutist position that is then used as the measuring stick of success or failure, a self-
imposed projection in the scholarship that is then mobilized to attribute a political position to 
Langland that might in fact belong more to the critic’s own historical context. That is to say, 
Huppé, writing only two years after the end of World War II, unsurprisingly saw political 
absolutism even in a proto-democratic body. 
 Like Gross’ argument above, Dodd argues that Piers Plowman is Langland’s attempt 
to actively participate in the evolution of the parliament by using the poem to remedy 
parliament’s failures, arguing that “it was parliament’s failure to gain adequate redress for its 
petitions that prompted Langland, in the late thirteen-seventies, to take up the reforming 
mantel himself and air these same grievances in his poetry.”118 True, Langland envisions a 
parliament with the power to remedy political sickness, and many writers, including 
Langland, continued the work that the Good Parliament began in a variety of literary and 
documentary forms. However, the continuance of the Good Parliament’s reform agenda 
through Langland’s poetry does not depend upon any notion of parliament’s failure. In fact, 
the presence of the Good Parliament’s agenda in poetry over the next decade and continuing 
with the Peasants’ Revolt testifies to a different type of success, one less rooted in outcome 
and more in the processes of intellectual and affective production that an “event” like the 
Good Parliament can catalyze. Furthermore, Dodd’s own captivation with parliamentary 
failure calls forth a neoliberal fantasy of “outcomes” and “measurable success” that, through 
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the twenty-first century’s own fixation on outcomes and standards, infuses the way he reads 
the poem.119 
 Dodd’s suggestion that the B-Prologue displays the Good Parliament’s supposed 
failures is a prime example of how the fetishization of success and failure for evaluating 
parliamentary process has led to the dominance of topical allegory in the critical tradition of 
Piers Plowman as the impetus for the poem’s revision history. Dodd tempers his claim about 
parliamentary failure by suggesting that “the fable is not a political treatise on the viability of 
the parliamentary system, but rather a satirized commentary on events that had recently taken 
place in specific parliaments.”120 For scholars who do not want to attribute a conservative, 
absolutist politics to Langland, the parliamentary failure argument must then rely on topical 
allegory; otherwise, if the Rat Parliament’s “failure” is not topical to the Good Parliament, 
we might then understand not only this parliament but rather all parliaments as failures. 
Further, as previously noted, not knowing how to treat the ending of the Rat Parliament other 
than through a narrative of topical failure has prevented some critics from examining the B-
Prologue as commentary on the larger issue of an evolving parliament. That is to say, what if 
the revision history of Piers Plowman is motivated less by topicality and more by Langland’s 
involvement in the conceptual development of the institution?121 The attachment to ideas of 
                                                 
119 We are reminded here of Halberstam’s Queer Art of Failure, which argues against such 
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evidence is undeniable that Piers Plowman’s allegory played a major role in insurgent 
rhetoric, what if we entertain the possibility that Langland viewed the Revolt as continuing 
  
185 
parliamentary failure, topical allegory, and representations of parliament that reflect a 
concrete political ethos betray as much about the critical tradition’s own influence by and 
investment in contemporary neoliberal discourses over success and failure in contemporary 
politics as they do about Langland’s own era. 
 However, within the Piers Plowman critical history (and, in fact, even within Dodd’s 
own argument) is a cluster of scholars who read the poem not as a reflection of popular ideas 
or even of Langland’s own politics, but rather as commentary or analysis on the Good 
Parliament, which enables the poem to participate in a larger-scale vision of parliament’s 
influence. Lassahn reminds us that no one narrative of the Good Parliament is authoritative, 
and that Langland might not even have agreed with competing accounts, and therefore 
understanding the poem as a reflection of popular attitudes undermines the complexity of the 
Good Parliament’s story and effects.122 Furthermore, Jewell insists on the unlikelihood—
even the naïveté—of expecting a consistent narrative of parliament over the time span of the 
poem’s three versions, writing that “only a blinkered political theorist never voices an 
inconsistency, or raises an opposite interpretation often to treat it ambiguously, seriously or 
satirically.”123 Nonetheless, these writers tend to the poem’s impact within the immediacy of 
the Good Parliament. Although I certainly contextualize the B-Prologue’s parliament in the 
first dream vision within the context of the Good Parliament, as well, I insist that Langland’s 
purposes were much more complex than writing a topical allegory that reflected an absolute 
narrative or political affiliation. This chapter maintains the importance of the Good 
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than horror over the co-option of his ideas? 
122 Lassahn, “Langland’s Rats Revisited,” 129. 
123 Jewell, “Piers Plowman—a Poem of Crisis,” 75. 
  
186 
Parliament to reading Langland’s poem both because 1376 synthesized the culture of 
complaint that had developed since Edward I’s law reforms and because the parliament 
captured the public’s affect and attention precisely because of this synthesis. But, this 
alternate reading does not treat the Good Parliament as the beginning, middle, and end of the 
meaningfulness of Langland’s poem. 
 The Parliament of Rats and Mice’s debate over belling the cat is essentially a debate 
over a petition, which is a theme present even from the A-text’s introduction of the fair field, 
as well. That is, the world’s “ask” in the A-text remains in the B-text, but takes on a new 
value as a preamble to the petitionary debate in the B-text’s new Rat Parliament when read 
after 1376. The Good Parliament serves as a catalyst for a larger discussion about the role of 
petitions and the larger culture of complaint, since 1376 witnessed more petitions submitted 
to date than in any single previous parliament;124 the B-text augments the presence of 
petitionary culture and complaint and in so doing highlights the affect at the core of 
petitionary rhetoric. The tone of frustration over the papal election and the formation of the 
commonweal and the fear in the Parliament of Rats all take advantage of the affective 
attachment that the public had to the Good Parliament in order to show that this same affect 
is present in petitionary rhetoric, that affective rhetoric preserves the individual amidst 
institutional formulae, and in fact might account for the Good Parliament’s almost 
contemporary legendary (or allegorical) status as an affectively resonant and therefore, 
influential, lasting memory that could reignite hopes for reform at any time in the future. 
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 Throughout the first vision, the language of the petition is employed in a way that 
explores the intersubjective connections between characters, the interior experience of being 
a political subject before the law, and the affects produced by political experience. The 
vision, then, takes the rhetoric of the petition and aestheticizes it in poetic form, 
recontextualizing it in the psychical world of the dream vision genre and emphasizing the 
affect that accompanies the petitionary process. This chapter proposes that the tensions 
between individual lived experience and abstracted allegory are mediated by the petition in 
parliament, which helps to incorporate the political subject into the making of the archive. 
VI. Conclusions: Petitions as Staging Intersubjectivity 
 Petitions are intersubjective and intersubjectively constructed. They are not literal 
narratives, but the stylized narratives meant to appeal to the emotion, attachment, and 
symbolic importance of the complaint, how it related to the larger realm, and how it 
constructed the relationship, and identities of those in the relationship, between king and 
petitioner, in addition to how it confronted individual and cultural trauma. However, how did 
this real-life complaint transform into a stylized, rhetorical construct? We know that 
petitioners would most likely have gone to a number of possible scribes to write the petition 
for them, rather than writing it themselves. So the question arises as to how this stylized 
narrative came into being: was it the scribe himself, or was it the petitioner’s responsibility to 
elaborate his or her story? Or, rather, was it the process of conversing, thinking together, 
even scheming, that constructs the language of the final petition, much like the group process 
in the Parliament of Rats and Mice constructs its petitions? 
Critics and historians who are quick to historicize Langland often miss the 
interpersonal cues in the formation of the archive, and as such miss the importance of process 
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to how individuals and the commonweal as a whole dealt with, bemoaned, were disappointed 
and enlivened by legal and political progress and setbacks. The means by which they 
publicly processed their reactions were through petitionary rhetoric, making the form, 
rhetoric, and language ubiquitous to any public expression. Critics who are quick to 
historicize sometimes neglect the processes it takes to move through the catalogued events 
that make up history, and these coping mechanisms are often expressed in literature as also 
stylized expressions of real-world affects. The excitement of 1376 and the unpopular 
reversals of its victories in 1377 must have caused an affective whiplash throughout at least 
London (Londoners hated John of Gaunt), and the political scenes added through the B-
Prologue of Piers Plowman reveal to us the tone of utter devastation and frustration over 
such political loss. This is not a criticism of parliament; it is a mourning of it. Studies of the 
medieval petition in the Piers Plowman critical tradition need to be read as highly political, 
because the way we envision contemporary democracy bears on how we read the medieval 
petition, then as now. 
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CONCLUSION: 
FEELING BUREAUCRATIC: ACTIVISM AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
 
“Delaying is a win.” 
— Angel Padilla, Indivisible National Policy Director 
November 15, 2017 
 
 For some readers, devastation and frustration over an unexpected political loss strikes 
close to home. After political loss, how can politics then move us forward? When access to 
governance, agenda-making, and policy is no longer feasible, how does the political system 
recuperate loss and maintain care? On November 8, 2016, 65.84 million people1 in the 
United States asked similar questions when Republican nominee Donald J. Trump beat front-
runner and Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton in the race for the U.S. Presidency.2 However, 
he lost the popular vote by about 2.9 million votes,3 sparking waves of activism around the 
country—both locally organized and nationally staged—soon to be known as the 
“Resistance.”4 In the face of a growing activism that resulted from a majority of the country 
having voted to stop the Trump administration’s agenda, Congressional staffers—i.e., the 
                                                 
1 Jon Sharman, “Hillary Clinton wins 2,864,974 more votes than Donald Trump, final US 
election count shows,” Independent, December 21, 2016, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/hillary-clinton-3-million-popular-vote-
donald-trump-us-election-a7487901.html. 
2 Ben Schreckinger, “Trump beats Clinton,” Politico, November 9, 2016, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/us-election-2016-result-donald-trump. 
3 Gregory Krieg, “It’s Official: Clinton swamps Trump in popular vote,” CNN, Politics, 
December 22, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-
popular-vote-final-count/index.html. 
4 David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Resistance: The Dawn of the Anti-Trump 
Opposition Movement (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018), 1. 
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clerks and bureaucrats that work for the elected U.S. Members of Congress (MoCs)—wrote a 
how-to guide for interested activists on how to resist the Trump agenda. As a result, 
Indivisible: A Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda5 was published online as a 
Google Document on Wednesday, December 14, 2016 around 7pm.6 On its cover, the guide 
states that in its contents “[f]ormer congressional staffers reveal best practices for making 
Congress listen.”7 The guide is a how-to manual on best practices for harnessing the political 
process in order to resist the Trump administration’s political agenda. Politics moves us 
forward not by fixating on outcomes (i.e., “we lost the election”), but by engaging political 
processes that, although institutionalized, are nonetheless accessible. The Resistance 
movement includes activists, but these activists are guided by activist-bureaucrats that use 
their political know-how to inspire others to creatively engage in political process. A modern 
Modus tenendi parliamentum, the Indivisible guide conceptualizes the capacities for political 
process in the face of loss, and, being an open-sourced document, provides a Natal function 
in its accessibility and culture of collectivity. 
 The Indivisible guide is a twenty-six-page how-to manual that instructs its users both 
on the political process and time-tested tools of political activism to trump Trump’s agenda. 
It is broken up into four chapters, ranging from the history of grassroots activism against 
President Barack Obama,8 to an analysis of how your MoC thinks,9 to instructions for setting 
                                                 
5 Indivisible: A Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda, The Indivisible Project, 
2016, https://www.indivisible.org/resource/guide-english.pdf. 
6 Charles Bethea, “The Crowdsourced Guide to Fighting Trump’s Agenda,” The New Yorker, 
December 16, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-crowd-sourced-guide-
to-fighting-trumps-agenda. 
7 Indivisible, 1. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
9 Ibid., 8. 
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up a local political group,10 to finally protest strategies that actually work.11 The majority of 
the how-to guide is devoted to outlining these strategies and to imagining scenarios that 
exercise the capacity of political process to provoke political activism. At first glance, 
although the guide’s mission is to assist in the resistance to Trump’s agenda, the political 
processes that they outline—i.e., town halls, public events, district office visits, coordinated 
calls12—are all activities that seem non-partisan. In fact, the guide is very self-aware of its 
own history, explaining that many of its tactics were inspired by the Tea Party, a resistance 
group that arose in 2009 as a backlash against Barack Obama’s presidency, and which 
ultimately was successful in delaying the Obama agenda.13 The Guide explains that its 
proposed processes will work 
because we’ve seen it before. The authors of this guide are former 
congressional staffers who witnessed the rise of the Tea Party. We saw these 
activists take on a popular president with a mandate for change and a 
supermajority in Congress. We saw them organize locally and convince their 
own MoCs to reject President Obama’s agenda. Their ideas were wrong, 
cruel, and tinged with racism—and they won.14 
Using their institutional knowledge and experience with protesters during the Obama 
administration, the guide reverse-engineers the Tea Party’s success by attending not to its 
ideology but to its tactics—its processes for expression. 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 12. 
11 Ibid., 16. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 Megan E. Brooker, “Indivisible: Invigorating and Redirecting the Grassroots,” in The 
Resistance: The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement, eds. David S. Meyer and 
Sidney Tarrow, 162-84 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018), 162. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
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 The “clerks of Congress,” or the staffers for U.S. Members of Congress, were central 
to the creation and dissemination of the guide. They themselves wrangle Washington D.C.’s 
political processes to preserve expression for constituents on a daily basis. The authors of the 
guide consist of about “thirty or so thirty-somethings,”15 younger Congressional staffers who, 
as explained in an op-ed written by Indivisible’s founding leaders, all “served as 
congressional staff members during the early years of the Obama administration.”16 
However, the guide does not self-present as an authoritative, Democratic Party-sanctioned 
policy document, but instead as procedural wisdom, “tricks of the trade,” so to speak, about 
how to maneuver U.S. political institutions. The guide explains that “[e]very single person 
who worked on this guide and website is a volunteer. We’re doing this in our free time 
without coordination or support from our employers,”17 thus presenting itself as a para-
institutional document, a whisper network of sorts that conveys unofficial knowledge useful 
for official political action. Noteworthy, however, is that these staffers are moonlighters, 
using their unofficial, off-the-clock, personal time to influence the activities of the very 
official institutional business in which they engage during official time. Indeed, this echoes 
the activities of the clerks of parliament in fourteenth-century England, many of whom also 
moonlighted by assisting in the writing of private, individual petitions to the king, when they 
weren’t busy writing the official documents for the parliament.18 In this way, both groups—
the medieval clerks and the modern staffers—aim to share their knowledge of official, 
                                                 
15 Bethea, “The Crowdsourced Guide.” 
16 Ezra Levin, Leah Greenberg, and Angel Padilla, “To Stop Trump, Democrats Can Learn 
From the Tea Party,” The New York Times, Opinion, January 2, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/opinion/to-stop-trump-democrats-can-learn-from-the-
tea-party.html. 
17 Indivisible, 2. 
18 Dodd, Justice and Grace, 314. 
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institutional processes in order to aid the “fair field ful of folk” in their efforts to petition the 
sovereign through official channels of government. Moonlighting, as outside of the official 
economy, exists parallel to it in order for unofficial culture to influence official practice. 
 It is through this unofficial guide that congressional staffers were able to infuse their 
political project into the political process. Although the guide uses many of the same tactics 
that the Tea Party successfully used during the Obama years, such as a defensive “just say 
no” approach and organizing locally,19 the authors change the political ideology that 
motivates these processes, and instead conceptualize a world in which U.S. political process 
can be used to enact a specific progressive worldview. The guide is very clear to distinguish 
itself from the Tea Party movement in one key area: the resistance movement’s ethos. For 
example, the guide states that this resistance must be “built on the values of inclusion, 
tolerance, and fairness,”20 valuing the capacity for expression and offering a contemporary 
vision of the “social link.” That is, although the processes are similar, the impetus and inertia 
for these processes are wholly different. The guide resuscitates political failure (i.e., the 
success of the Tea Party) only to transform it into progressive political action. This 
transformative ability is the ideological message at the heart of the guide: a progressive 
political vision can find transformation in the very strategies by which we seek common 
profit—or, the public good. 
 These are lofty ideas: a progressive vision of politics in the Age of Trump seems out 
of reach and out of touch. However, worth remembering is that the history of parliament as 
told in this dissertation, one in which a group of government workers used their imagination 
                                                 
19 Indivisible, 4. 
20 Ibid., 3. 
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and their intelligence to shape the very growth of an institution, is a history of both 
innovation and of lofty ideals. These ideals are not out of touch, as they made an impact on 
the ground in the fourteenth-century political arena and helped to shape the lived, expressive, 
and bodily realities of those who engaged in political process. Martha Nussbaum reminds us 
that “[i]deals are real: they direct our striving, our plans, our legal processes.”21 She 
continues to explain that, although documents like constitutions are “ideal documents in the 
sense that they are not always perfectly implemented all the time, […] they are also real, 
supplying a basis for legal action when the rights they guarantee are not delivered.”22 The 
Modus and the Indivisible guide certainly offer idealized visions of deliberative institutions 
and suggest lofty ways of engaging in politics (remember the Modus’ fantasy of the 
committee of twenty-five). But these idealizations, conceptualizations, and fantasies provoke 
action—provoke processes—and thus affect political work on the ground. 
The Indivisible guide offers a twenty-first century vision of my argument in this 
dissertation. In an interview with Angel Padilla, Indivisible’s National Policy Director, 
Padilla states that, in the Age of Trump, “delaying is a win.”23 The Indivisible movement 
understands that Trump and the Republicans have control over the national policy agenda; 
but, this does not foreclose politics for the other side, because politics is not only about 
outcomes, but is also about processes of engagement and expression. Delaying is a win 
because it elongates practices of group care, preserves expression, and postpones potential 
trauma. Delaying is a win because it incites political process. If we focus less on political 
                                                 
21 Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 2013), 383. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Booker, “Indivisible,” 177. 
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outcomes and more on the ability to engage in political process, this itself is a “win.” Feeling 
bureaucratic is at the center of activism: such feelings harness and embrace political process 
for the affective project of protest, of seeing alternate conceptualizations of the world. 
Political process is not a cumbersome bureaucratic nightmare, but is a way to get things 
done. My theory of political process offered in this dissertation is especially important in the 
twenty-first century, where a technocratic and administrative fascination with elections won, 
bills passed, and political productivity eclipses the very human processes and affects at the 
core of our politics. Valuing the capacity of political process admits entry to a politics of 
psychoanalysis. 
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